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 Work and the Aesthetic argues for the priority of a work-centred account of aesthetic 
interest. This 'Work Theory' proposes an internal relation between good work as an activity and 
our aesthetic interest in made things. Each is conceptually related to the other so that to be 
good, work as an activity must engage aesthetic interest; and aesthetic interest in products, in 
making, viewing and using them, is an interest in different aspects of good work. Good work is 
characterised around three elements, the technical, functional, and authentic, which essentially 
relate to work that is skilful, responsive to design problems, and freely chosen. Work Theory has 
important antecedents in the Arts and Crafts Movement, modern conceptions of the work of 
designers, and in existentialist accounts of free choice. Work Theory's core tenet of an internal 
relation between good work and aesthetic interest throws light on some problematic areas in 
philosophical aesthetics, including the nature of aesthetic interest, the relations of craft to art, 
aesthetic education, and what is meant by 'everyday aesthetics'. Work Theory also provides a 
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 The origin of this thesis is a philosophical interest in made things – everyday objects as 
well as artworks – and their relations to aesthetic interest. There is an historical interest too of 
course in made things. In 2010 the British Museum told the 'history of the world in 100 objects'1. 
In that context, the naturalist and broadcaster Sir David Attenborough speculated about the 
work of the maker of the oldest of the 100 objects, an Olduvai stone chopping tool, made 2 
million year ago: the object is made to fulfil a function but the maker also gets “some satisfaction 
from the knowing that he was going to do it very effectively, very economically and very neatly. 
In time, you would say he'd done it beautifully...”2. Now there are design awards for such good 
work: the winner of the 2011 British Design Award was Plumen 001, a low-energy light bulb, 
described as “a masterclass in using imaginative design to transform something of bland utility 
into a thing of coveted beauty, which then becomes more usable and more enjoyable”3. I 
believe these examples illustrate an internal relation between good work and aesthetic interest; 
and that this relation has philosophical significance, particularly in explaining the sources of 
aesthetic interest and the idea of ‘everyday aesthetics’.  
 Part 1 sets out the principle tenet of Work Theory that good work is good because its 
features necessarily engage aesthetic interest; and that aesthetic interest in made things is 
properly aesthetic when attending to – in making, viewing and using – work that is skilful, 
functional in the broadest sense, and authentically done. The internal relation between good 
work and aesthetic interest, then, comprises three elements, the technical, the functional and 
                                                
1 Neil MacGregor, A History of the World in 100 Objects (Allen Lane, 2010) 
2 Ibid, p.13 
3 Brit Insurance Designs of the Year (Design Museum, 2011), p.176 
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the authentic. The 'technical' relation is further characterised in Part 1 in terms of good 
workmanship, both by hand and machine-made. The 'functional' relation is characterised by 
successful unions of form with function, and I examine this in the context of the professional 
work of design. Work also involves choices of what to make or at least, and more commonly, 
how to make. Work Theory contends that work is good – alongside it being necessarily skilful 
and functional – when chosen or done on 'authentic' grounds. Authentic choice involves original 
ideation in the special cases of art making. But authenticity in Work Theory extends to 
imaginative plans and creative execution in making, and is evident in the decisions about finish 
made by craftsmen and in decisions about form and functionality by designers.  
 Part 1 concludes with an examination of Work Theory's philosophical and non-
philosophical antecedents. These are identified as the arts and crafts debate – especially 
around the use of machines and workmanship, a debate initiated by John Ruskin's account of 
the 'Gothic worker'; modernist ideas about design – captured in modernist slogans about the 
best architecture (Louis Sullivan's 'form follows function' being the best-known); and ideas of 
existential choice – particularly Jean-Paul Sartre's suggestion that art making is exemplary free 
choice. 
 Part 2 of Work and the Aesthetic is organised around four issues in philosophical 
aesthetics examined from the perspective of Work Theory, namely aesthetic interest, the 
relations between art and craft, aesthetic education and ideas of everyday aesthetics. In the 
section on aesthetic interest (Part 2, Section 1) I argue that Work Theory improves on Roger 
Scruton's development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's account of everyday aesthetic interest by 
introducing and properly differentiating between aesthetic interest and its internal relations to 
different aspects of good work (namely the technical, functional and authentic aspects of good 
work and their relations to finish, form and artistic choice). I argue that Work Theory captures 
and explains the aesthetic interests of good workers, and our aesthetic interest in made things 
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as users, in features of good work and aesthetic interest that are omitted from Scruton's 
account. Their inclusion means it is not necessary to introduce a separate faculty of 'taste' to 
explain 'the real point and value' of aesthetic interest.   
 In the section on art and craft (Part 2, Section 2) I argue that the aesthetic interests of 
craftsman as designers and skilled workers does not indicate their 'art', but aesthetic interests 
specific to good design and workmanship. As such, craft, so conceived, is a significant 
contributor to our aesthetic lives without it being art (and without any theoretic requirement that 
craftsmen be properly called artists). Craft functions to support made things of authentic design 
and workmanship, where authenticity is revealed by creative choices of how to make 
something.  
 In Part 2, Section 3, I argue that Work Theory supports the view that aesthetic education 
is a broad church embracing aspects of both art appreciation and the wider goals of moral and 
political improvement and change through political artworks. It concludes that neither of these 
available goals of aesthetic education are determined by ideas extrinsic to the idea of good work 
and its relation to aesthetic interest. In other words, the idea of aesthetic education is not 
explained in terms of education to establish and enhance a separate faculty of artistic taste; nor 
of any pre-established moral-political commitment that should determine an artwork's style and 
content. Work Theory then suggests a divided idea of aesthetic education corresponding to 
good work's internal relations to aesthetic interest. Firstly, artistic creativity is unteachable in any 
reasonable sense that accords with everyday ideas of imaginative originality, but makers and 
viewers assess the authenticity of artistic choices (including overtly moral-political ones) and in 
so doing accrue and accumulate art-appreciative resources. Also, design elements and 
principles can be taught and related to the problems that particular functional objects 
necessarily present to designers. And particular crafts can be taught according to the skills they 
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demand of qualified practitioners. Aesthetic education is internal to these art, design and 
workmanship aspects of good work, directing us only to their best practice.  
 Part 2, Section 4, critically examines the 'Everyday Aesthetics' programme, and its 
specific examinations of different instances of supposed everyday aesthetic experience, arguing 
that it wrongly concludes an essential difference between the aesthetics of artworks and that of 
other made things and activities. A significant consequence is a falsely divided philosophical 
aesthetics. While Work Theory argues the idea of a divided aesthetic interest between different 
aspects of good work (recognising in the process an aesthetics of the 'everyday'), that divided 
aesthetic interest – between authentic artistic choices, good design and skilled workmanship – 
does not support the 'Everyday Aesthetics' conclusion of theoretically discrete realms of 
everyday and art-centred aesthetics.   
 I conclude Work and the Aesthetic with a 'Postscript' which argues that the idea of 
'aesthetic lives' can be explained in terms of the different internal relations that apply between 
good work and aesthetic interest: each relation directs us to varying types and degrees of 
choice in what humans make as good workers. Aesthetic lives – lives guided by aesthetic 
interest – are led primarily by artists, designers and skilled workers, and by those with an 
understanding of their good work. And aesthetic lives are important because they produce 
things societies value: works of art and objects of function that allow us to flourish. In coming to 
these conclusions, I show how Work Theory contrasts with similar claims made by Richard 
Sennett for 'the craftsman' (in its relation too to Hannah Arendt's idea of 'homo faber') and by 
Ellen Dissanayake for 'homo aestheticus'.  
  
Author’s declaration: I hereby declare that this thesis is my work and has not been previously 
submitted, either in this or a different form, to this or any other University for a degree. 
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PART 1  
WORK THEORY 
 
1 The internal relations between good work and aesthetic interest 
 
 The idea of a relation between work and the aesthetic  
 
The general idea of a relation between work and the aesthetic is suggested by our 
intuitions and experiences of good work. From examples of the earliest made things to 
contemporary design awards, an interest in the beauty or aesthetic value of all made things – 
including objects of everyday use as well as artworks – evidently refers to (at least in some 
significant measure) the work that has gone into their production. We have in mind then a 
fundamental idea of ‘good work’ when, for example, we sense a maker’s ‘attention to neatness 
and economy’ in producing an effective stone chopping tool, or the ‘imaginative design’ of a low-
energy light bulb. We have an idea that work as an activity determines the aesthetic value of a 
product; and when that value is positive, we think the work that went into it ‘good’ – I will refer to 
‘good work’ throughout in that general sense of good working or making. The idea of good work 
then rests on some basic and familiar experiences and intuitions about work as an activity, 
about its relation to the aesthetic value of products, and about its relation to products that 
function well (the neatness of the work supports the effectiveness of the chopping; the design of 
the light-bulb makes low-energy use appealing, and so forth) – in what follows I add and 
examine many more examples from the work of artists, designers and craftsmen to support this 
general idea.  
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But why is this of philosophical interest? And what kind of relation is proposed? The two 
questions are linked because I will argue that the work-aesthetic relation is an internal relation 
between good work and aesthetic interest; and that so understood, philosophical issues, 
particularly around the sources of aesthetic interest and its relation to ‘taste’, and around the 
formulation of an ‘everyday aesthetics’ distinct from an ‘artworld aesthetics’, are seen in a new 
light. I call the whole account of the internal relations between different elements of good work 
and aesthetic interest ‘Work Theory’. Before beginning to detail those relations and then their 
philosophical significance, however, a note on the concept of an ‘internal relation’ is required.  
 
Internal relations and the work-aesthetic internal relation 
 
  Following James Bogen’s definition, an internal relation between x and y exists “if x 
could not be the same item, or an item of the same kind, without standing in relation R to y”4. By 
extension then an external relation exists if one item, x, stands in some relation R, to another 
item, y, but neither its identity nor its nature depends upon this being the case - x then is 
externally related to y. For example: the number 2 is internally related to 1, since no number can 
be identical to 2 without being greater than 1. By contrast, a relation between two people, one of 
whom is taller than the other, is external given that both individuals remain the same individual 
of the same kind regardless of their relative heights.  
To argue then that good work is internally related to aesthetic interest is to argue that its 
identity and nature depend on its relation to the aesthetic – it is what it is because of that 
relation. Good work, in other words, cannot exist if aesthetic interest does not exist. This relation 
is at the core of Work Theory, but its significance in terms of issues around the sources of 
                                                
4 James Bogen, ‘Relations, internal and external’, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ed. Ted Honderich 
(OUP, 1995) 
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aesthetic interest and the idea of ‘everyday aesthetics’ is revealed by analysis of the ‘moments’ 
or ‘elements’ of good work. I identify these elements as internal relations between skill, function 
and authenticity and different aspects of aesthetic interest.   
So, in summary, I will argue that a maker's exercise of a skill necessarily engages 
aesthetic interest in the product's finish in its users; a designer's drawings and prototypes 
necessarily marry an interest in form with an object's function; and the maker's own ideas start 
the process of making artworks, generate designs for functional products, and guide 
workmanship, thus creating new objects of aesthetic interest. Likewise then, aesthetic interest in 
makers is explained by their attention to their particular named craft skills; by their grasp of the 
purpose of the work at hand, by a full comprehension of the design problem being addressed; 
and by their thoughtful choices of what and how to make. By extension, users' aesthetic interest 
in made things is properly a recognition of these features of good work, so that their sense of 
the 'felt rightness' of something is a recognition of its workmanship, design and creativity.   
As characterised, Work Theory’s fundamental internal relation between good work and 
aesthetic interest is not a strong one – that is, while good work cannot exist without aesthetic 
interest, the relation does not operate in reverse5. In other words, we can conceive, at least, the 
existence of aesthetic interest in our lives without the existence of good work – such a 
conception can rest simply on the existence of our aesthetic interest in the natural world. There 
are two preliminary points to be made here then in respect of Work Theory: one about the 
reasonableness of a theoretical prioritisation of aesthetic interest in made things; the other 
about how Work Theory deals with the aesthetics of nature.  
                                                
5 Francois Clementz, ‘Internal, formal and thin relations’ in A.Reboul (ed.) Philosophical Papers 
Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan, Geneve, 2011, URL http://www.philosophie.ch/kevin/festschrift - 
Clementz calls a relation that is “vice versa” a “strong” internal relation.  
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 Giving philosophical priority to the aesthetics of made things seems a reasonable move 
given the pervasiveness of the made in our lives: we exist – if not all of us, then surely the vast 
majority – primarily as workers in a built environment. Furthermore, if there is an essential 
connection between that kind of life and aesthetic interest, then the priority is surely warranted. 
The development of Work Theory in what follows aims to justify this focus on good work. There 
remains an issue though about how the integrity of the idea of the aesthetic generally is 
maintained, if a made/natural dichotomy of aesthetic interest is assumed.  
  
A note on the aesthetics of nature 
 
I justify prioritising philosophical enquiry in aesthetics on the made rather than on our 
aesthetic experience of nature in terms of: 1) the pervasiveness of the made in our everyday 
lives; and 2) the promise of philosophical insights into the nature of good work that also resolve 
problems about the sources of aesthetic interest and about ‘everyday aesthetics’. This 
prioritisation does not commit Work Theory to repeating the error of neglecting the aesthetics of 
nature by supposing it can be explained in terms of the aesthetics of art – a neglect and error 
identified by R.W. Hepburn6. R.W. Hepburn noted a range of ‘aesthetic possibilities’ between 
our aesthetic interest in natural objects like a leaf (delighting in its vein patterns perhaps) to 
‘losing oneself’ in the grandeur and wilderness of a mountain range7. The experiences are 
unlike those appreciating art objects because, on Hepburn’s account, the aesthetic appreciation 
of nature is distinctively intimate and engaged, and, unlike art appreciation, is unframed. 
                                                
6 R.W. Hepburn, ‘Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty’, in Aesthetics 
and the Philosophy of Art, Eds. Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (Blackwell, 2004), 
pp.521-534 
7 Hepburn, p.525 
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Similarly, Malcolm Budd argues that the aesthetics of nature is distinct from that of art, 
especially in the case of natural objects, which are ‘subject to change’ so lack “an optimal 
condition, according to their creator’s intention, in which their aesthetic properties are manifest”8. 
So relatedly the “vital difference between art and nature…[is that] works of art are our own 
creations. But nature is not our creation”9.  
But Work Theory proposes an aesthetic theory across all made things, not just artworks; 
and does not argue that this account extends to nature. Ex hypothesi the internal relation 
between good work and aesthetic interest is one-way, conceivably allowing then an aesthetics 
of nature characterised in Hepburn’s and Budd’s terms to be argued independently. However, it 
is important to note two points about the relation between Work Theory and any aesthetics of 
nature – one about the scope of Work Theory, the other about the unity of aesthetic theory 
generally. First, for Work Theory the internal relation between good work and aesthetic interest 
extends across all made things and so explains many areas that have occupied the attention of 
‘everyday’ and ‘environmental’ aesthetics. These two related theoretical approaches share the 
Hepburn-Budd view of a distinct non-art aesthetics but – I will argue below – falsely divide 
aesthetic theory between art and non-art10. In short, much of the aesthetics of the everyday 
environment are explicable in terms of Work Theory, that is, in terms of a general theory of the 
aesthetics of the made; and this narrows the range of an aesthetics of nature qua ‘environment’ 
to the aesthetics of ‘wilderness’ or other purely natural products and processes. The examples 
used to illustrate Work Theory in what follows seek to establish a boundary there that does not 
also falsely conflate all non-art aesthetic interest. Second, I believe that the idea of a 
                                                
8 Malcolm Budd, ‘Aesthetics of Nature’, in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics, Ed. Jerrold 
Levinson (OUP, 2003) p.133 
9 Budd, p.128 
10 See Part 2, Section 4 ‘Everyday Aesthetics’ 
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comprehensive aesthetic theory across both made things and the natural word is a virtue and 
consistent with Work Theory. In this regard, Work Theory does not challenge the idea of a 
singular notion of aesthetic experience (and its development in what follows sets down, I 
believe, a challenge to theories that would). So, for example, in examining the ‘Everyday 
Aesthetics’ thesis I will argue that its division between art and the everyday is falsely premised 
on the supposed disjunctive character of aesthetic experience, as either ‘disinterested’ (for art 
appreciation) or ‘engaged’ (for everything else)11. Work Theory supports the idea of aesthetic 
experience as phenomenologically and axiologically distinct from everyday experiences (for 
example, from merely personal, pleasurable responses then) across all things. Our sense of 
something being ‘just right’ (the characteristic phenomenology of aesthetic experience) 
combined with it having some explicable general value might indicate that the aesthetics of 
nature too is a matter of good working (appealing perhaps to biological or evolutionary function, 
albeit clearly distinct from the working of things made by us) – but I do not pursue that notion 
here, only note that Work Theory is, at the very least, not necessarily divisive of the idea of the 
aesthetic generally12. To reiterate, my focus is on the made within an overarching, singular 





                                                
11 Again, see Part 2, Section 4 ‘Everyday Aesthetics’ 
12 In this vein though see, for example, Parsons and Carlson – they develop a notion of 
‘Functional Beauty’, the idea that a thing’s function is integral to its aesthetic character, which 
suggests perhaps a strong internal relation between work (albeit in an extended sense beyond 
good work as I characterise it for made things) and the aesthetic. Glenn Parsons and Allen 
Carlson, Functional Beauty (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.2 
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Skill and aesthetic interest 
 
 Skill, defined as practical knowledge combined with ability, is one essential characteristic 
of good work. It also establishes a link to the internal relation between good work and aesthetic 
interest. Good work qua skill involves an interest in the finish of made things; in turn aesthetic 
interest in the finish of products – both in making and use – is explained by the demands of 
particular skills that deliver it. By 'finish' is meant the visible detail of a product emergent on its 
making. It contrasts with the prosaic, non-qualitative meaning of 'finish' as merely the final piece 
of work, the 'last coat of paint', that completes a product. Similarly, this meaning contrasts with 
ideas of decorative or ornamental work that might be said to provide 'finish' to products, but 
which are effectively – for Work Theory – separate products. Ornamentation has its own full-
blown aesthetic, in other words, comprising its own (doubtless various) standards of finish, 
design and creativity, which in turn can be judged good or bad.  
 There are, it goes without saying, a huge number and variety of human skills. Typically 
we think of craft skills in the context of good work. These are sets of skills associated with 
named crafts – like potting and furniture making, extending as new technologies emerge to 
include programming in the 21st century – that produce particular kinds of utilitarian products – 
like pots and vases, chairs and tables, and computer software. Craft skills are techniques and 
their application reveals good or bad workmanship. Techniques obviously vary from craft to craft 
– the potter's being different from the carpenter's and so on – and guides and manuals explain 
techniques for every craft. In short, they can be taught. A technique that is learnt and applied 
well in making something is marked by an attention to detail, to that product's finish, and is 
evidence of good workmanship. Correspondingly, a product looks well-made when makers 
apply techniques with an eye for a product's finish. A well-made product may serve any function 
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(there is no moral dimension to good workmanship): in other words, the craftsman's skill simply 
delivers a design. 
 Work Theory does not a priori limit skills or techniques to handicrafts. Different 
technologies present different opportunities for their skilled use and therefore for an aesthetic 
interest in the kinds of finish they produce, be it a potter's wheel or a programming language. 
Aesthetic interest in the well-made is explained craft by craft, object by object, in terms of good 
workmanship, that is in terms of the attention to detail or finish in the application of a technique 
or techniques. It is not, in itself, however, merely an aesthetic interest in a product's form, which 
comes from its overall design. 
  
Function and aesthetic interest 
 
 Good work is also characterised by successful unions of form with function. A successful 
product depends on its designer(s) being fully cognisant of the functional requirements that a 
project to make something sets. Tall office buildings and housing estates present different 
functional requirements (and sets of requirements) and so generate different kinds of design 
problems. Different design problems create the conditions for different formal design solutions. 
Correspondingly, aesthetic interest (realised in aesthetic pleasure in use) in the overall form of 
made things is generated by design work's necessary attention to a product's function(s).   
 A product's function is its designed use; and in good design that function is necessarily  
fully conceived as the product's 'design problem'. It includes the core or simple function(s) of a 
product (scissors that cut, for example), but also specific or complex functions that meet 
particular needs (cutting cloth and being safe to use), and cultural or normative functions (made 
of wholly recyclable materials, to complete the example). Paradigmatically, living and working 
spaces (homes, factories and offices) generate a multiplicity of functional demands from the 
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simple to the normative, from core functions associated with shelter to complex normative 
functions about the types of houses and workplaces that support 'the good life'. Functional 
demands set the parameters of design problems; good designs function well as products in so 
far as products are experienced as 'just right' in use. Aesthetic interest then in made things 
resides in our experience of their functioning well, as well as in their finish and associated sense 
of being well-made.  
 In coming to this conclusion about our experience of objects in use, Work Theory thus 
endorses some version of aesthetic functionalism – that aesthetic interest is determined by 
practical use – for everyday objects of use. It correspondingly opposes a view of aesthetic 
independence that states aesthetic interest (in made things) can be accounted for in its entirety 
independently of the function a made thing fulfils. Neither does Work Theory endorse an 
aspectival aesthetic appreciation of made things, aesthetic interest switching between finish and 
use, where each has its own discrete appreciative grounds. In Work Theory the grounds of both 
the aesthetic appreciation of finish or appearance and of an object in use are good work. 
Aesthetic interest in finish is accounted for by reference to skills and these skills are applied 
appropriately or not in terms of delivering a design; and designs deliver a made thing's 
functional requirements. In other words, an aesthetic interest in a product's finish is related to 
the product qua functional product (rather than anything else) through the necessity of good 
workmanship delivering a design. An aesthetic functionalism/independence dualism – where 
some aspect at least of aesthetic interest is accounted for independently of a product's function, 
usually its 'appearance' – is therefore not endorsed by Work Theory.         
 Work Theory's version of aesthetic functionalism extends to artworks if they fulfil 
functions qua art which then account wholly for their aesthetic value. Otherwise, aesthetic 
independence – or a combination of independence and functionalism – would hold for this class 
of made things. The dualism between aesthetic functionalism for made things of use and 
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aesthetic independence (or a mix of independence and functionalism) for art depends then on 
anti-functionalist accounts of art. These oppose the idea both that art is descriptively functional 
and that it is normatively functional13. Descriptive functionalists argue that all artworks – good 
bad or indifferent, and regardless of artistic intention – necessarily fulfil certain functions, be 
they psychological, social and so on. Alternatively, normative functionalists argue different 
cases for how artworks ought to function, and so artworks succeed or fail as art against 
standards set by their proposed function. Work Theory has nothing to say about normative 
functionalism, making no claims about what properly constitutes art's function(s). There are no 
grounds there then for Work Theory to extend aesthetic functionalism to artworks. Similarly, in 
characterising one feature of good work as explicitly functional – that is as a broad 
understanding in makers and users of the design problem set by making a particular thing – 
Work Theory assumes that the functions of made things of utility can be empirically and 
culturally explained with relative ease (and in most cases there is no explanation required for 
the simple or core functions at least of objects of utility). But such a descriptive function – one 
that at least hangs on a simple or core function – has proved problematic for art; and so again 
there are no grounds yet established for a general aesthetic functionalism across utilitarian 
artefacts and artworks.  
 However, Work Theory contends that the difference – the relative ease of identifying 
descriptive functions in objects of utility contrasted with an unresolved equivalent artistic 
function – lies in the kind of making involved rather than in a fundamental functional/non-
functional dichotomy. Art making is descriptively functional in the following sense. A to-be-made 
object of utility presents a functionally conditioned challenge – that is to say a specific challenge 
                                                
13 The distinction between two functional views of art, descriptive and normative, is taken from 
David Novitz's article 'Function of art' in A Companion to Aesthetics, Ed. David Cooper 
(Blackwell, 1992) 
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to perform a named function, to cut, or hold, or provide a safe and educational place to play, 
and so on – to a maker's skill, design and authenticity. These challenges present functional 
demands that can be met and the product can be meritorious or not in aesthetic terms. In other 
words, the challenge set for makers by a design problem is fundamentally different from that of 
simply carrying out a spec. The work can be good, that is, well-made and designed. Also the to-
be-made artwork presents similar challenges of design and delivery to the maker(s). Ordinarily 
understood, making an artwork involves a special authenticity or freedom of choice. Artistic 
ideation includes the formation of an idea to make something in addition to questions that 
necessarily follow about how the thing will be made. In short, the maker as artist, in choosing to 
make something at all, effectively chooses a work's function – creates a new function – by 
setting out a design problem and raising questions about appropriate workmanship. In contrast, 
the maker of everyday objects of utility – as skilled worker and good designer – enhances and 
improves the existing stock functionality in the world (through good workmanship and 
imaginative designs).  
 If these claims of differentiated authenticity in making are correct, then the claim of a 
general aesthetic functionalism in terms of good work – across all made things – is sustained 
while still maintaining reasonable intuitions about the real differences in making objects of utility 
and artworks (essentially centred on ideas of self- and problem-generated creativity). Ex 
hypothesi, art making is shown to be functional, albeit in peculiarly authentic ways, because 
each case of making an artwork necessarily involves practical problems of delivering an idea. 
The inclusion of artworks in Work Theory's account of an internal relation around functionality 
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Authenticity and aesthetic interest 
 
 Work involves choices of what to make or at least, and more commonly, how to make. 
Work Theory contends that work is good – as well as it being necessarily skilful and functional – 
when chosen or done on 'authentic' grounds. In ordinary language, the term is broadly 
synonymous with a person's choices being genuine, honest and in character. It naturally 
extends then to its more common use when referring to the authenticity of artworks – that an 
artwork is not a copy – and also more technically to authenticity in musical performance – that a 
piece is performed using the style and instruments contemporary with its date of composition. 
Philosophically, although related still to the ordinary usages, 'authenticity' has a more specific 
meaning relating human choices to the necessary structures of human existence. In summary, 
existential philosophies propose a fundamental clash between an individual's ability to freely 
choose actions and the structured situations – the organisation of family, economic and cultural 
life, for example – in which this putative freedom finds itself. Characteristically in existentialist 
philosophy, this essential paradox of harnessed freedom is then argued to be realised as 
feelings of psychological anguish within the individual. At that point the individual can choose 
their actions authentically, their identity or role in life, freeing themselves from predetermined 
courses of action, or – acting in bad faith – deny themselves that existential choice and revert to 
an unreflective, conformist life. This existential meaning of authenticity also relates to a further 
sense – distinct from ideas about fakes and originals, and authentic performance – of authentic 
making in the arts, 'expressive authenticity', which rates artistic making in terms of originality 
and sincerity14.  
                                                
14 The idea of 'expressive authenticity' is taken from Denis Dutton as ”having to do with an 
object's character as a true expression of an individual's or a society's values and beliefs”. 
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 In Work Theory this expressive authenticity – within the overarching concept of 
existential authenticity – is more broadly conceived beyond the arts: it has a specific meaning in 
characterising and understanding good work generally. It relates firstly to the choices makers 
necessarily make about techniques and materials, and about conceiving a design problem. And 
it relates – once these decisions are made – to their practical delivery in terms of actual 
workmanship and design. All these considerations confront a maker as moments of choice. In 
the first instance, these are choices about whether or not to skimp on materials, for example, or 
uncritically deliver a poor design that will only poorly fulfil a product's function, and so on. And 
also as choices during making itself, while a thing is being crafted or a design drawn. A maker 
choosing authentically acts aesthetically, both in choosing how to make something and in 
choices made during, and completing, the production process itself. Choices of materials, 
techniques, and designs – and corresponding good workmanship and design work – are guided 
by an aesthetic interest in the final product as 'just right' in terms of its finish and design, and 
finish and design that deliver the product's function. Certain choices of materials and so on are 
known, in other words, to compromise the quality of a made thing; and good workmanship and 
design are not closed shops of copyists. In Work Theory then authenticity is not limited to 
creativity in choosing to make things called artworks. The possibility at least for authentic 
choices of materials, techniques and designs confront every maker, even when the simple or 
core function of the thing is already established (when there is no scope for artistry as such). 
Choices necessarily present themselves, in other words, in establishing how something will be 
made – which materials do the job best? which techniques deliver the best finish? how is design 
problem properly conceived? More significantly for Work Theory – because it identifies authentic 
work choices with the exercise of a craft skill and the completing of a design, as well as with 
                                                                                                                                                       
'Authenticity in art' in The Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (Oxford University Press, 2005), 
p.259  
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artistic creativity – the maker as craftsman or designer must also decide the point at which their 
work, on the product before them, is the best it can be.  
 In making things, existential angst is experienced as choices of what, but more often of 
how to make; and how something is made extends from planning to execution. Authentic choice 
involves original ideation in the special cases of art making – which is typically understood as at 
least exemplifying expressively authentic work. But authenticity in Work Theory extends to 
imaginative plans and creative execution in making, art or not. It is particularly evident in the 
decisions about finish made by craftsmen and in decisions about form and functionality by 
designers. Their good work – in making authentic choices based on wanting to make the best – 
is guided by aesthetic interest; and that aesthetic interest is internally related to good work, in 
this aspect, as necessarily an interest in users in authentically chosen and applied skill and 
design. 
 
2 Philosophical and other antecedents of Work Theory  
 
 Work Theory contends that good work is good because its features necessarily engage 
aesthetic interest; and aesthetic interest in made things is properly aesthetic when attending to 
– in making, viewing and using – work that is skilful, functional in the broadest sense, and 
authentically done (or by observing their absence). The internal relation between good work and 
aesthetic interest comprises then three elements, the technical, the functional and the authentic. 
Work Theory has some important philosophical and non-philosophical antecedents that – while 
not explicitly proposing Work Theory's internal relations between work and the aesthetic – 
contribute to characterisations of good work around these three elements. These are the arts 
and crafts debate, especially around the use of machines and workmanship; modernist ideas 
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about design, captured in modernist slogans about the best architecture; and ideas of existential 
choice, particularly those exploring the idea that art making is exemplary free choice. 
 In short, there are a 'skills argument', a 'function argument' and an 'authenticity 
argument' supporting the notion of good work and its relation to aesthetic interest. 
 
The 'skills argument'  
 
 The 'skills argument' supporting the technical characterisation of good work begins with 
John Ruskin's account of the 'Gothic worker'. Ruskin's Gothic worker is an idealised medieval 
craftsman whose craft skill is evidenced by, and only by, Gothic architecture's ornamentation 
and diversity. Unfettered craft skill necessarily produces – because the Gothic worker 'loves 
change' and is 'generous' in displaying his skill – ornamentation and sundry design. And this 
architecture, so the argument goes, is visibly more interesting, both to make and to view and 
live with. So for Ruskin “the Gothic ornament stands out in prickly independence, and frosty 
fortitude, jutting into crockets, and freezing into pinnacles; here starting up into a monster, there 
germinating into a blossom; anon knitting itself into a branch, alternatively thorny, bossy and 
bristly, or writhed into every form of nervous entanglement; but, even when most graceful, never 
for an instant languid, always quickset”15. Ruskin's account, perhaps unsurprisingly, links skill to 
good work. But additionally – which is significant to Work Theory – it links that work to an 
aesthetic interest in makers to produce decoratively and variously. And likewise it relates our 
aesthetic interest in decoration and diversity to its maker's good work.  
 Ruskin limits good work to the handicrafts and to a particular kind of effect of skilled 
work. (That effect does go beyond an interest in ornamentation per se, but Ruskin's argument is 
                                                
15 John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice Edited and abridged by J.G. Links (Penguin Books, 
2001), p.174 
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still fundamentally about the necessary superfluity of workmanship and design for good work 
and aesthetic interest.) Antithetically, the argument of the 'industrial arts' onwards is that 
machine-made goods are products of applied technology which do not involve handicraft skills 
but nevertheless are aesthetically pleasing. Indeed their aesthetic interest hangs on economy of 
workmanship (that there is in fact no visible human workmanship involved) and design (think of 
the demand for 'streamlined' products in the 1930s, for example, up to 21st century appreciation 
of the 'clean' finish of personal technology products). Synthetically, the 'skills argument' in Work 
Theory holds that the opposition of handicraft and machine-made work – while clearly indicating 
a real difference in making – also reveals an idea of good workmanship that encompasses both 
kinds of making. The skilful application, in both cases, of a handicraft technique or a machine in 
making, aim at improving a product's finish. Even automated production processes must be set 
in motion with an idea, good or bad, of what the finish of the product – created once and 
produced identically in large numbers – should be. (Of course this is not a matter for the 
'operative' of an automated process.) In all cases, decisions about technologies – from hand 
tools to automated processes – involve some considerations of finish. But Work Theory 
acknowledges – what is obvious after all – that good workmanship is bifurcated by traditional 
ideas of craft and by machine production. The handicraftsman is constantly engaged in 
improving finish until his work is done. And there is another type of maker, typically the 
designer, one who has chosen a production process thought best-suited to achieve a pre-
conceived finish, who must wait-and-see, and experiment and change the machine process if 
necessary to achieve a desired finish.  
 In acknowledging the claims of aesthetic interest – in making and in use – in the finish of 
products of both handcrafted and machine-made production, Work Theory extends the idea of 
skill beyond traditional craft ideas, and of workmanship beyond Ruskinian notions of 
ornamentation. Ruskin's account is flawed about the full relationship between skill and finish 
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because its characterisation of skill is limited by a socio-psychological account of the 'Gothic 
worker' or craftsman. Paradoxically, Ruskin's account limits the idea of skill because it includes 
facets of work beyond ideas of the skilful application of a technology. So he famously lists the 
mental characteristics of the good worker (a list of seven, including 'generosity', 'love of change' 
and 'sacrifice'). Engaged thus, the worker necessarily produces ornamental work, while its 
absence in a product surely indicates that the worker is 'enslaved' in his making, unable 
therefore to express his skill in visually exciting decorative work, so the argument goes. Ruskin's 
extended notion of the Gothic worker as 'artist' (accepting the characterisation includes features 
of work normally associated with original ideation and thus 'artistry') therefore neglects the 
specifiable effects of skilfully applied technology per se.  
 In Work Theory, in terms of craft skills, good workmanship in making centres on a 
particular skill used to meet a design intention, but critically with care too for its close-range 
visual (and by extension, tactile) effects. This good work entails knowledge of the visual (and 
tactile) effects of techniques on different materials and so using appropriate techniques and 
materials in meeting a functional requirement with care for its close-range aesthetic appeal in 
use16. There is no necessary requirement here for Ruskinian 'ornamentation'. Furthermore, the 
idea of skill as delivering a design with care for finish extends and applies to the right choices 
and use of non-hand technologies. In Work Theory, there is no a posteriori reasoning – after 
Ruskin – from the 'clean' finish of some machine-made products to the absence of skill in 
making. Rather, this is evidence of different kinds of workmanship, supporting then David Pye's 
analysis of workmanship that is essentially 'risky' – the kind associated with a craftsman's 
constant attention during making to a product's finish, and essentially down to that individual 
                                                
16 Ruskin’s account of ‘honesty’ in production (particularly in The Seven Lamps of Architecture) 
– as a characteristic of the Gothic worker – does however accord with this idea of appropriate 
use of materials. 
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craftsman – and workmanship that is 'certain' – the kind where 'certainty' is established by the 
set technology of the machines used in making17. In Work Theory, both can be good because it 
is possible to be skilful in any technology, either craft or machine based. Moreover, an internal 
relation applies so that a skill worker uses a technology with an aesthetic interest in its impact 
on a product's finish; and an aesthetic interest in a product's finish recognises a maker's skill. An 
example compares the use of traditional potting technologies with using 3-D printers to produce 
cups and plates and so on. For each technology, becoming skilful as a maker means gaining an 
understanding of the material effects, in terms of finish, of the technology through its use – by 
examining the effects, for example, of a potter's wheel and firing in a kiln, and of the digital 
construction of things. And getting the best effects means having an aesthetic interest in what 
the technology produces when used in different ways and for different products. The results of 
digital production depend on the instructions makers give to 3-D printers, and those can be 
given with more or less aesthetic interest. And aesthetic interest in skilful making, by makers, 
extends then beyond the interest individual craftsmen show in exercising their craft – 
traditionally understood as handicraft – to the control and understanding of any technology by a 
maker that affects finish. Reciprocally, as users, aesthetic interest in good work includes an 
interest in the finish of machine-made products as products of good workmanship of that kind.    
 * 
 Work Theory's 'skills argument' synthesises craft and machine workmanship around a 
technical characterisation of good work, linking them both to aesthetic interest in the finish of 
products by makers and users. The traditional 'arts and crafts' debate, then, about the aesthetic 
merits of 'handmade versus machine-made' products, recast in terms of good workmanship, 
does not reveal one category of making as exclusively aesthetic. An 'arts and crafts' conclusion 
                                                
17 David Pye, The Nature and Art of Workmanship (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1968), 
especially pages 4-8. 
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about the exclusively aesthetic character of craft – and the impossibility of machine-made 
aesthetic value – is not supported by Work Theory. That said, recognising this synthesis also 
reveals proper divisions in the aesthetic interest in finish between the 'workmanship of risk' 
associated with craft and the 'workmanship of certainty' of automated making18. That distinction 
is one familiar to – if not stated and theorised in those terms – by industrial artists. By the early 
20th century artist-craftsmen like the potter Bernard Leach were noting the relation between their 
aesthetic aims and ways of working and the separate aesthetics of industrial production. “The 
work of the individual potter or potter-artist, who performs all or nearly all the processes of 
production with his own hands, belongs to one aesthetic category, and the finished result of the 
operations of industrialised manufacture, or mass production, to another and quite different 
category”19. Leach's work is a practical exemplification of the idea that at every stage of 
production, and every moment within, the application of a craft skill is affecting or 'risking' the 
quality of the product being made in terms of it delivering a design. It clearly contrasts with the 
'workmanship of certainty' then, where production after an initial idea is fully automated and if 
the process has been correctly calibrated then the industrial design is delivered. Still, Work 
Theory duly notes that automated processes like 3-D printing have to be programmed and 
skilful use of the technology means an aesthetic interest in the results. Leach correctly alludes 
to the idea that the increased risk of his working methods – that the pot that is delivered is 
subject to his potting and firing skills – has an aesthetic effect different from the certainties of 
automated production. The potter's traditional craft creates one set of aesthetic possibilities – 
including so-called gifts of the fire – and an automated process of pottery production another. 
And so on for every craft and automated process, and production processes between. In Work 
Theory the technical aspect of good work is the ability to control a product's finish and to 
                                                
18 Ibid, p.4 
19 Bernard Leach, A Potter’s Book (Faber and Faber Ltd, 1940), p.1
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exercise that control with aesthetic interest. The broad categories of risky and certain 
workmanship differ then in terms of aesthetic interest only in so far as makers' interests vary as 
they control finish either through all parts of a production, or in testing different materials, trying 
different programmes, and so on before a production run. Correspondingly, viewers and users 
of made things recognise good work appropriate to handmade and to mass-produced products, 
appreciating signs of handwork, striations and flecked surfaces, asymmetries, in craft works like 
pots and vases but not in MacBooks, for example20.   
 While Leach's craft skill exemplifies one kind of aesthetic interest in finish, the 
‘workmanship of certainty’ is consistent with the tradition of ‘industrial art’ and the idea of the 
'abstract art' of beautifully designed but mass produced products21. Work Theory notes from this 
– from the idea of finish associated with industrial art – one further consequence of the 'skills 
argument' for the relation between good work and aesthetic interest. It draws on Ruskin's thesis 
about the aesthetic interest engendered by good craft work. Ruskin argues that good craft work 
necessarily generates visual diversity on an environmental level – that is, beyond makers' 
interest in finish of individual products. The unintended impact of good craft workmanship is an 
aesthetically diverse rather than visually monotonous built environment. Contrastingly, well-
made but mass produced products must, en masse, have an opposite effect. For Work Theory 
then there is an aesthetic paradox of well-made and mass produced goods. As individual items, 
                                                
20 Pye provides examples: the 'workmanship of certainty' evident in a mass produced ceramic 
insulator for an electrical power line is set against a potter’s workmanship of risk producing a 
lid for an earthenware crock. Pye compares the two as both use a similar material, colour 
and glaze, and “because aesthetically they are quite different in quality, and each in its own 
way is good” (p.85). 
21 Herbert Read, Art and Industry, (Faber and Faber Limited, 1934) for the idea of the 'abstract 
art' of machine-made products. Rightly, Read notes that he was 'propagating the ideals of 
Gropius' and the Bauhaus (p.40). 
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part of our aesthetic interest in making and using mass produced goods is explained in terms of 
good workmanship and therefore their finish, but collectively their 'finish' is, after Ruskin, 
unaesthetic. The point has some empirical validity. So, for example, we find particular models of 
car or types of building or styles of laptop computer aesthetically pleasing in terms of individual 
finish but their visual effects en masse (streets full of similar cars; characterless housing 
estates; offices all using the same branded computer) tend to aesthetic disvalue.  
 For Work Theory, our aesthetic experience of cars, buildings and products is always an 
active one, from using made things ourselves to living amongst them. Our aesthetic interest in 
personal, practical use tends to an interest in workmanship. Good workmanship is evident at the 
level of use, from things in the hand, to furniture, to the immediate environment of buildings and 
vehicles, in our ordinary, functional interactions with them. Our aesthetic interest in made things 
as part of the built environment in which we live tends to an interest in design, as we look at 
blocks of flats or shelves of goods or rows of shops in a mall. For Work Theory the aesthetic 
paradox of well-made products but mass-produced visual monotony is explicable then in terms 
of an inevitable but perhaps resolvable (Work Theory is agnostic on this point) tension between 
their design and workmanship. It is not a theoretic break at least in the internal relation between 
good workmanship and aesthetic interest in finish. Designs for made things are responses to 
design problems and if a design problem does not include regard for the aesthetic effects of 
mass production – of finish en masse – then (good or bad) workmanship is effectively 
disregarded, in its environmental aspect, by the designer. Workmanship then simply delivers a 
design, having as it were only a single item, rather than millions, in mind, and the workmanship 
of certainty – of mass production – delivers the individual item effectively ignorant of global 
aesthetic effects. The internal relation around the idea of skill between good work and aesthetic 
interest holds on the grounds of good workmanship in terms of an individual maker's and user's 
aesthetic interest in the finish of an individual product. But the relation – between good work and 
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aesthetic interest – fails functionally, rather than skilfully (qua Work Theory), when the 
environmental idea of finish – that is, finish en masse – is neglected.  
 In summary, Work Theory's  'skills argument' (drawing on philosophical and other 
antecedents) contends that all technologies for making things can be applied skilfully and skilful 
application is a function of an aesthetic interest in an individual product's finish. This good 
workmanship is however bifurcated between craft skills that engage makers throughout a 
production process, and machine production where skill relates to setting in motion the right 
automated processes to deliver a pre-conceived finish. Work Theory's 'skills argument' also 
notes that the precision and regularity of good machine workmanship tends to produce an 
unaesthetic built environment, and explains the aesthetic paradox of well-made but collectively 
monotonous products. The paradox is explained as being a general consequence of a limited 
notion – on any particular occasion – of the design problem for products, one that disregards or 
underplays their overall environmental effect in mass production. In other words, in Work 
Theory's characterisation of good work, built environmental aesthetic disvalue is a failure of 
work's functional rather than technical aspect. I now turn to that aspect of good work, and its 
philosophical and other antecedents.       
 
The 'function argument' 
 
The 'function argument' supporting Work Theory's characterisation of good work is 
archetypically Modernist. Work Theory posits an internal relation between a maker's proper 
understanding of a product's function and their, and users, aesthetic interest in its design. 
Functional requirements for made things generate design problems and a necessary interest – if 
the work is good – in a product's right form to meet those requirements. And users' aesthetic 
interest in good design is, correspondingly, an interest in how successfully a design meets a 
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functional requirement. A clutch of Modernist slogans, in architecture at least, allude more or 
less to an essential work-aesthetic nexus around functionality too, albeit without a single 
supporting theory – 'ornament is crime', 'a house is a machine for living', 'form follows 
function'22.   But Modernism in design and architecture also became associated with particular, 
related styles, culminating in a MOMA exhibition celebrating the 'International Style'23. 
Functionality, it could be said, took a back seat in design: 'form followed form' and was 
appreciated accordingly. Mies van der Rohe-like buildings, for instance, have an appreciable 
look, a style –  geometric, minimalist – but one that differentiates little between their different 
functions as offices, homes, schools and so on. Relatedly, Modernism became associated with 
an absence of regard for the full impact of its style on the functions its buildings, housing in 
particular, were designed to serve, when 'functioning' was understood to include the experience 
of living and working in such buildings. Most people did not like the look of, nor like living in, 
large-scale modernist housing estates; the demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe housing estate in St. 
Louis in 1974 was announced as the 'death of modern architecture'24. 
Work Theory proposes an account of the functional aspect of good work centred 
exclusively on the aesthetic interest inherent in good design work per se. It recognises then the 
rhetorical contribution of Modernism in relating a product's form with the fulfilment of its function, 
but argues this to be an aesthetic interest by maker's in solving a design problem, so that a 
product 'looks right' for what it is qua product. Work Theory, then, rejects the idea that there is a 
(Modernist or any other) style best suited to delivering products' functional requirements, which 
                                                
22 Slogans by (or versions of) Adolf Loos, Le Corbusier, and Louis H. Sullivan respectively. 
23 The term was coined by Alfred H. Barr Jnr. for an exhibition of modernist architecture at the 
New York Museum of Modern Art in 1932. See Peter Gay's Modernism: the Lure of Heresy 
(Heinemann, 2007), p.312 for an account. 
24 The quote was made by the architectural theorist Charles Jencks at the time of the 
demolition – see, for example, the wikipedia entry for 'Pruitt-Igoe'. 
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can be simply applied to any design problem successfully. Rather, the good work of design 
starts with a proper conception and understanding of a design problem – from recognising a 
product's core or descriptively functional aspects (what a product must do to be a product of its 
type) to its normatively functional possibilities (to deliver putative social and environmental 
goals). In short, Work Theory understands good design functionally rather than stylistically. And 
this design functionalism is aesthetic because good designs deliver products' functions – in the 
fullest sense established by their respective design problems – in ways that are, yet, stylish, the 
best 'look and feel' for the function they serve. For Work Theory then the idea of 'the art of 
design' has a particular meaning, referring properly to the creativity of design solutions to 
functionally described design problems. It contrasts with the idea that the 'art of design' 
exclusively refers to an individual designer's 'artistic vision', a vision that is independent of any 
particular design problem that is being confronted. The 'style' or 'art' of a product's design is 
internally related to its good design work in making because that work, if it is good, progresses 
from a full sense of a product's function to its best design. Work Theory does consider visionary 
design work theoretically but in the context of authentically good work, to which I return later. 
* 
Louis H. Sullivan's famous Modernist slogan 'form follows function' is the conclusion of 
an analysis of the architectural practice associated with designing an office building25. 
Examining that analysis reveals similarities and differences with Work Theory's account of the 
functional aspect of good work, especially around the idea of 'artistry' in design. Sullivan called 
the first stage of a design problem its “social basis”, so that for example, “architects are 
challenged by social conditions to design tall office buildings”26. Social conditions are a matter of 
                                                
25 Louis H. Sullivan, 'The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered', 1896 
http://academics.triton.edu/faculty/fheitzman/tallofficebuilding.html 
26 Ibid (online, no page nos. available) 
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fact and Sullivan noted in this case the need for offices, the economics of high speed elevators 
and steel manufacture, population growth and congestion as factors characterising the design 
problem. Other parameters of the design problem are established by “practical conditions” (in 
this case, those for plant below ground for power, heating and lighting, and so on)27. For Work 
Theory, Sulllivan's social and practical considerations comprise a product's descriptive function. 
We could add normative functions too, depending on cultural values associated with working in 
offices (that they be open-planned, for example, to encourage democratic and collaborative 
organisational working practices). In good design work, both descriptive and normative functions 
establish the full functionality of a product and are a necessary element of the design problem 
for a particular product.    
 If an essential element of a design problem is establishing social and practical 
considerations (in Work Theory extending to establishing a product's full functionality) and then 
materially satisfying them, Sullivan notes the design problem still has an ‘artistic consideration’: 
“how shall we impart to this sterile pile [the tall office building]… the graciousness of … higher 
forms of sensibility and culture”28. For Sullivan, the answer is argued to lie in further stages of 
the design problem, in short in the way it is addressed creatively by the designer. So, if ‘design 
constraints’ are properly considered “in the simplest possible way, following natural instincts, 
without thought of books, rules” then the design will follow ‘inevitably’29. Sullivan further portrays 
the designer’s work as an “innocent path from his problem to its solution” so that if a designer 
has “some gift for form in detail, some feeling for form purely and simply as form, some love for 
that, the result … will have something of the charm of sentiment”30. The analysis here, of a 
                                                
27 Ibid (online, no page nos. available) 
28 Ibid (online, no page nos. available) 
29 Ibid (online, no page nos. available) 
30 Ibid (online, no page nos. available) 
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functionally-defined design problem reconstituted as the designer's own problem, which is then 
resolved formally, reveals subtleties, perhaps contradictions, in Modernism's 'form follows 
function' account. 'Form' in this account is associated with artistry, rather than functionality, in 
both its reference to the vision of the designer in generating 'his' design problem and to its  
potentially 'charming' solution. In Sullivan's account then, a product's aesthetic interest – its 
'charm' – is not internally related to design work that delivers function, but to its 'artistic work'. 
And what is to say that that interest in form should not be a Ruskinian interest in ornament 
(rather than the International Style)?    
Sullivan's response is that there is a “finer sanction” for a design, namely that a good 
design is dependent on the designer successfully comprehending and expressing the chief 
characteristic of the building or product (in the example, the 'sanction' of being a ‘tall office 
building’)31. That sanction says Sullivan, famously expressing Modernism's putative commitment 
to functionally-driven design, “brings to the solution of the [design] problem a final, 
comprehensive formula. All things in nature have a shape, that is to say, a form, an outward 
semblance, that tells us what they are, that distinguishes them from ourselves and from each 
other… so that form ever follows function”32. This is a puzzling claim – if it is that the right form 
for a product is one that makes its function visible – in so far as 'nature's shapes' would seem to 
hide as much functioning as they reveal. Work Theory maintains, contrastingly, that rightness of 
form is about successful functioning, about function in use. This contrasts then with the idea – 
after Sullivan – that an artistic form, if it is good, simply reveals a function. It contends that the 
good designer's aesthetic interest in form is properly an interest in how a product functions in 
use not merely on inspection. And a user's aesthetic interest in a product's form is properly an 
interest in 'look and feel' in use and so relates internally to the product's function and design, 
                                                
31 Ibid (online, no page nos. available) 
32 Ibid (online, no page nos. available) 
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and to the designer qua designer by extension (rather than involving formal comparisons of 
artistic style, extending to relating design work to individual artistry).  
* 
Work Theory's view of the designer qua designer as essentially interested in function 
accords with a standard model of professional design work; and with its differentiation from the 
work of artists. 'Artistry' in design is properly regarded as an aspect of responding to design 
problems, dealing with them imaginatively in short. Originating design problems identifies the 
artist rather than the designer. Norman Potter's account of 'art and design', for example, 
acknowledges this basic dichotomy33. He notes that a designer’s outputs, like models and 
drawings, are neither ends in themselves (they are not the finished product of course, and 
indeed might end with nothing more tangible than a model) nor are they the sole output of the 
designer’s vision but rather the outcome of many discussions with clients and other 
stakeholders. These might be procedures familiar to artists – especially artists working on public 
or other commissions of course – but still the origins of artistic work are more inward, so that “a 
painter’s first responsibility is to the truth of his own vision”34. There is a different ‘order of 
freedom’ then in design and art. Reiterating the point, Kees Dorst argues that while a designer's 
goals are essentially set by others, because stakeholders in the end product require a practical 
need to be met, artists set their own goals35. He notes too that one aspect of the artist’s work 
can be characterised as design work, namely that the artist behaves as his own client, as it 
were, by setting himself a design problem which must then be solved. Work Theory notes this 
                                                
33 Norman Potter, 'Is a designer an artist?' in Design and Art Ed. Alex Coles (Whitechapel 
Gallery, 2007) 
34 Ibid, p.32 
35 Kees Dorst, 'But, is it art?' in Design and Art Ed. Alex Coles (Whitechapel Gallery, 2007) 
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observation as supporting an aesthetic functionalism across all types of making, utilitarian and 
art-making.  
Work Theory's extended idea of 'form follows function' – based on a conception of 
descriptive and normative function that includes users' experience of products' functioning – 
also accords with professional design practice. The design ethos of applying skill and artistry to 
meet to ‘improve’ people’s lives is evident throughout design’s history from the 1850s at least, 
when design established itself as an independent profession. This was not simply a moral 
reevaluation of design work’s role in certain situations, but a conceptualisation of the generic 
design problem as one that necessarily engages problems of need in a society. It is exemplified 
perhaps in social housing schemes from Hampstead Garden Suburb at the beginning of the 20th 
century to current schemes like Staiths South Bank36. Henrietta Barnett’s vision for Hampstead 
Garden Suburb was a community showing “how thousands of people, of all classes of society, 
of all sorts of opinions, and all standards of income, can live in helpful neighbourliness”, and that 
against a design problem of doing “something to meet the housing problem by putting within the 
reach of the working people the opportunity of taking a cottage with a garden within a 2d. fare of 
Central London”37. Hemingway Design states that the Staiths project “marries contemporary 
design with a nostalgic nod to community values… It will be a development where everyone can 
recognise their own home from the way it looks, where children can play safely free of cars and 
where private gardens open out into communal gardens where residents can get to know each 
other”38. It is at least implicit in such ventures that to successfully deliver a design requires 
                                                
36 A 'History of Hampstead Garden Suburb (HGS)' is available at 
http://www.hgs.org.uk/history/index.html; and of Staiths Estate at 
http://www.hemingwaydesign.co.uk/html/staiths.htm 
37 HGS website (no page nos. available) 
38 Hemingway Design website (no page nos. available) 
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sensitivity to a wide range of functional considerations that comprise a design problem; and that 
these include a full comprehension of the psychological and social impact of the product being 
designed (of course in large-scale housing projects, social considerations take on an added 
significance, absent in, say, designing a chair). The argument is premised on the idea that 
products alter the aesthetic fabric of the world in ways that necessarily impact the quality of life: 
that a housing estate design impacts on neighbourliness, allows, for example, children to play 
outside their homes, and so on, for example. In short, good design reflects an extended notion 
of functionality; and the aesthetic experience of good design extends beyond an interest in form 
to forms that function well.  
 
The 'authenticity argument' 
 
In Work Theory, authentically good work refers to expressive authenticity in creating new 
artworks, to imaginative designs for products of utility, and to creatively skilful use of technology 
to deliver the finish of designs for artworks and other products. In each case – for the work to be 
authentically good – the maker exercises free choice in, respectively, deciding to make an 
artwork, designing a product, and applying a skill. Work Theory then does not limit the idea of 
authentic work to an existential choice 'to create', that is to conceiving artworks. Authentically 
good work extends to free choices in making that are structured by design problems and 
particular crafts. Makers' aesthetic interest in authentic work varies then: it is an interest in 
originality and sincerity of artistic expression; in visionary design; in highly skilled workmanship. 
And correspondingly, our aesthetic interest in authentic work is an interest in art that 'looks and 
feels' truly expressive and in products that are 'cutting edge'. 
* 
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In Existentialism Jean-Paul Sartre considers how an existential moral choice – a choice 
about a right course of action made without recourse to established moral laws or norms – 
might be modelled on making a work of art. An artist, argues Sartre, makes a painting without a 
priori considerations of what to make, without appealing to 'pre-existing aesthetic values'. The 
artist then is supposed exemplary in choosing freely39. A straightforward appeal is being made 
by Sartre to the idea of the artist as being both a maker and a free originator (rather than being 
a skilled copyist for example), someone whose choices (to make works of art) reflect their 
cognitive and emotional responses to the specific situations they experience. Artistic making 
then is identified with a free, self-generated and situated originating act to make this or that work 
of art. It is this idea of art that Sartre thinks exemplifies, or at least most closely approximates to, 
authentic choice more generally. Sartre's fictionalised account of art making in Nausea pursues 
this theme of art making as exemplary free choice40. Towards the end of the novel its central 
character, Antoine Roquentin, is passing the time in a cafe before his train to Paris. He listens to 
a record of some jazz music – and imagines the composer in a New York skyscraper in a 
baking hot room, sweat rolling down his cheeks, the taste of cigarette smoke in his mouth, 
sitting before his piano with a ghost of a tune in his head, and how the tune gets noted down 
'like that', in those circumstances. Roquentin listens again to the record and finds himself moved 
by this reflection on the composer. But he understands his feeling is not a response to the 
composer's circumstances as such (that include money and relationship problems that he 
                                                
39 Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Existentialism' in Existentialism and Human Emotions (Castle, undated), 
pp.42-43. This 1946 essay has been published in English under different titles, including 
'Existentialism is a Humanism'.  
40 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea Translated by Robert Baldich (Penguin Books, 1965) 
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imagines the composer also has), but to the composer making the music, to his composing. 
Roquentin is moved, listening to the music, “because he [the composer] made that”41.  
For Work Theory, Sartre's comparisons of moral and artistic choice reveal then an idea 
of good work (as an unintended consequence of investigating existential moral choice). Good 
work is necessarily authentic in so far as it is work that is freely chosen. Roquentin listening to 
the piece of jazz music is intellectually and emotionally struck by the idea of it having been 
composed at all. He recognises the piece as an original work. But Work Theory contends that 
the existential insight into the nature of creative choice is limited to special cases of creating 
unique artworks, although the possibility of authentically good work – of freely chosen work – 
also extends to design and craft (perhaps Sartre inadvertently realises this when he has 
Roquentin recognise the jazz singer's, as well as composer's, contribution to making the piece 
he is listening to). Furthermore, no internal relation between authentic choices and aesthetic 
interest is argued by Sartre. For Work Theory, that internal relation between good work and 
aesthetic interest explains Roquentin's further liking of his favourite record on realising its 
composer's (and its singer's) authenticity. 
* 
Authenticity in design differs from artistic authenticity because designers do not create 
their own design problems. Their design problems are elaborated around the functional 
requirements of a product, rather than being self-generated by artists. Design creativity involves 
conceptualising new products in response to design problems. This design creativity has often 
been seen – in literature theorising the practice of design – as indicating design’s status as an 
art. So, for example, Dorst associates design creativity with artistry, arguing that where 
designers develop their own goals, and build these into projects, they “are something of 
                                                
41 Ibid p.250 
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artists”42. Dorst thus suggests that design’s art status resides in the ‘artfulness’ of self-generated 
goals, rather than in some shared, transferable practical skills or professional standards 
between designers and artists. So for Dorst the point at which designers are artists is that at 
which they develop an individual ‘style’, albeit one that is only enacted through the possibilities 
for creativity set by design problems. Similarly, Norman Potter characterises design’s artistry in 
a “shared visual sensibility” rather than in specifiable skills or procedures43. For Work Theory 
conceiving design as art in respect of self-generated goals is problematic because it blurs a 
fundamental distinction between art's self-generated expressive goals and design's functionally 
structured problems. Still, imaginative design does contrast with design work that simply meets 
the functional demands of a social and practical problem by referencing pre-existing design 
solutions. But Work Theory conceives this as a matter of design authenticity rather than design 
artistry. Design is authentic in so far as a designer understands every design problem as 
presenting a unique set of circumstances, and therefore the necessity of choosing new design 
solutions. Writers on 'design as art' rightly allude to this in terms of the possibilities for original 
and visionary design solutions, but thereafter tend to mistakenly conflate the problems artists 
and designers are set (by themselves and by problems of functionality) in making artworks and 
products. A designer's aesthetic interest in form is properly an interest in how a product 
functions in use, and it is guided by the knowledge that every design problem presents the 
challenge of an authentic (rather than an unthinking, procedural) response. As users of products 
our aesthetic interest in form is, likewise, an interest in a product's form that functions as a 
creative response to a design problem – to experience a product in use as 'well-designed' is to 
reference creative design, authenticity, in other words, but not artistry.  
* 
                                                
42  Dorst, p.88 
43  Potter, p.32  
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The possibilities for authentic skilled workmanship hinge on a maker's control over the 
exercise of his skill or craft. In a similar vein to 'design as art' arguments, this control over 
production is argued to support a 'craft as art' argument, associated with the Arts and Crafts 
Movement. In that movement 'control over production' naturally became associated with political 
ideas about the best organisation of labour and productive forces – authentic work seemed to 
entail at least a workshop economy that would allow craft skills to flourish without the lethal 
competition of factory and mass production. Notably, William Morris appeals to a golden age of 
workmanship identified with the craftsmen of medieval Northern Europe in arguing for the idea 
of 'craft as art' and a revival of handicraft-based production: the craftsman “had full control over 
his time, his material, and his tools – of his work, in short – that is, he was a free workman, an 
artist”44. Continuing, the true craftsman's work is not mere habit or toil but involves “daily 
creative skill”; this work “exercising the energies of mind, soul and body” is helped by memory 
and imagination and the worker’s own thoughts; all other work is conceived as slaves’ work by 
Morris45. The ability to freely apply skill in making as defining of ‘art in general’ is retained in 
later writers in the same tradition such as Eric Gill, who only differentiates between the skills 
required to make paintings and engines, for example, rather than between art and non-art46. 
According to Work Theory, the 'craft as art' argument repeats the fundamental error of 
the 'design as art' argument – namely not acknowledging that an artist's authentically good work 
is fundamentally different in kind from that of the craftsman. The craftsman's aesthetic interest in 
                                                
44  William Morris, The Relations of Art to Labour Edited by Alan Bacon and Lionel C. Young 
(William Morris Society, 2004), p.29 
45  William Morris, 'Useful Work versus Useless Toil' in Collected Works, Volume 23 (Russell 
and Russell, 1966)   p.100 
46  Eric Gill, Art (John Lane The Bodley Head, 1934), p.13 for a summary of Gill's argument that 
“art is skill” and that there are only “arts of ...” painting, poetry, cooking, building, and so on. 
In passing, of course Gill's workshop notions were Catholic rather than Morris's communistic.  
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making something is an interest in the finish of a product and does not extend back to a self-
generated choice to make the product. Authenticity in workmanship, in delivering a design, then 
relates to the scope for choices in determining the finish of a product. 'Control over production' 
in terms of workmanship is limited to that 'delivery' aspect of the production, and therefore does 
not warrant the designation 'art' after Arts and Crafts. Work Theory's notion of authentic 
workmanship does however involve the recognition of choices by a maker in delivering a design 
and is an aesthetic interest in delivering it to the best possible standard. It is, then, necessarily a 
feature of the 'risky' workmanship associated with craftsmanship, where choices about materials 
and about their crafting during the making of a product is a constant feature affecting the final 
finish of a product. Likewise, as users of products our aesthetic interest in their finish is an 
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PART 2  
SECTION 1 WORK THEORY AND THE SOURCES OF AESTHETIC INTEREST 
 
1 Everyday and pre-theoretic ideas of aesthetic interest 
 
 In proposing an internal relation between good work and aesthetic interest, Work Theory 
starts with some everyday, ordinary language or pre-theoretic ideas of the aesthetic. The most 
general and least critical use of ‘aesthetic’, for English language speakers, refers us to the 
appearance of things, particularly to their being pleasing to viewers. In this usage, the quality of 
being pleasing to the eye is called ‘aesthetic’ and ‘aesthetic interest’ refers us to an interest in 
the ‘look and feel’ of something. By extension, sensitivity to, rather than simple aesthetic interest 
in, the visually pleasing aspects of things is commonly regarded as an ‘aesthetic’ aptitude or 
‘taste’ for the ‘beautiful’ (and its related terms). The pre-reflective 'look and feel' conception of 
the aesthetic typically extends from aesthetic interest in objects' visual appearance to an 
aesthetic interest in the taste, touch, sound, and smell of things. Natural sounds like birdsong 
and waves breaking on a shore, interludes of silence, as well as musical works, have an 
indisputably ‘aesthetic’ status also accorded them. It follows from the ordinary 'look and feel' 
conception of the aesthetic that the products of the visual arts, like paintings and sculptures, and 
artefacts like cars and buildings, along with music and natural sights and sounds, are taken to 
greater and lesser degrees as objects of aesthetic interest. But it is questionable to what extent 
and in what manner makers of art and functional objects are then understood – in everyday 
discourse, pre-theoretically – to be contributing, by their work as artists, designers and 
craftsmen, to our aesthetic experiences of made things.  
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 On one prosaic pre-theoretic understanding, aesthetic interest is confined to the product, 
so that even where there is recognition of a 'job well done', aesthetic interest is not attributed to 
the maker in making the product. Alternatively in ordinary language, a maker's contribution to a 
made thing's aesthetic quality can be accorded a mysterious character, most notably when 
artistic aesthetic interest – in Work Theory specifically the artist's decision to make a particular 
work of art – is made a function of ‘genius’ or the proverbial 'muse'. Related to this 
understanding of artistic genius – in so far as no internal relation between the work of a maker 
and an object's aesthetic interest is implied – ordinary language 'look and feel' understanding of 
the aesthetic includes a contrast with the idea of ‘functionality’. On this extension of the ordinary 
understanding of the term ‘aesthetic’, it is used explicitly to mark those aspects of a functional 
object that supposedly do not bear on its functioning in any way. So the 'aesthetic' on this use 
and understanding is typically a matter of a product's supposed superfluous, decorative 
(possibly 'artistic' or 'stylistic') aspects.  
* 
 In terms of the everyday, ordinary language or pre-reflective ideas of the aesthetic 
outlined here, Work Theory critically rejects features that challenge the account of the internal 
relations between good work and aesthetic interest. Those rejected features are, firstly, the 
prosaic understanding of good work in terms of a 'job well done'; secondly, the ordinary or pre-
reflective idea of artistic genius and its supposed relation to aesthetic interest; and thirdly, the 
pejorative and ultimately misleading conception of 'aesthetic' in relation to functional objects 
(where it is equated, for example, with fashion). 
 In the first everyday, ordinary language case, the idea of 'a job well done' reveals only a 
superficial link – in our everyday use of the phrase – to the maker's own aesthetic interest in 
their work. The interest expressed by saying 'job well done' is limited, in other words, to an 
interest in the product's functionality. In fact this usage cannot distinguish between genuinely 
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good work and a job that has merely satisfied an immediate functional requirement (of course 
there are circumstances where this latter kind of work is acceptable, for example when making 
emergency shelter). As such, this ordinary language use also fails to recognise an important 
conceptual difference between a maker doing work the best he can (and therefore the internal 
relation between good work and aesthetic interest), and a worker with simply a 'knack' (or 'trick 
of the trade') for getting a particular prescribed job done so that a product he makes delivers its 
core function, but with no knowledge of how. Likewise appreciating a 'job well done' would then 
be to acknowledge that a product meets its immediate, core functional requirements, without 
any sense of it being as right as it can be. Work Theory, then, explains the difference between 
good work and having a 'knack' in terms of the aesthetic interest of the good worker and its 
absence in cases of 'knack'. Good work (in making objects of utility) is driven by an aesthetic 
interest in a product's form and finish in use, and is responsive to the design problem a product 
sets (for good design) and to the need to deliver a design well (for good workmanship). Neither 
of these requirements are necessary to delivering a product by 'knack'.   
 In the second rejected case of everyday, ordinary language use and understanding, the 
idea of 'genius' (and of creativity more generally) is taken as essentially inexplicable, and 
certainly not connected to ideas about authentic choices in workmanship and design. There is 
no explanatory role for a concept of 'genius' in Work Theory's account of aesthetic interest. The 
choice to make something at all, a 'work of art', is understood as a special case of making – that 
is, an individual artist's choice to create a design problem from his own situation and expressive 
demands. Design problems and consequent demands on workmanship to deliver designs are 
more commonly set by utilitarian considerations. But in each case – of individually chosen 
creative projects, and of utilitarian design and workmanship problems – there is scope for 
authenticity in choosing to make the best. For Work Theory this aesthetic interest in making 
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things 'just right' across artistic choice, design and skilful work – rather than an idea of 'genius' – 
explains our aesthetic experience of, and aesthetic interest in, made things.  
 In the third rejected everyday ordinary language case, an 'aesthetic interest' in products 
is understood as entirely unrelated to considerations of their function and not as connected 
therefore to how design problems are conceived. Work Theory argues that our everyday 
aesthetic interest in functional objects is properly an interest in their forms as they function, that 
is in use. Otherwise, the object is experienced as 'pure form' rather than as designed to fulfill a 
functional requirement. Where 'forms' deliver functions our aesthetic interest is properly in that 
idea of form, that is in forms that function well.  
* 
 Some everyday ordinary language ideas about the relations between work and the 
aesthetic have a theoretic counterpart in Roger Scruton's development of Ludwig Wittgenstein's 
reflections on the aesthetic interest of a carpenter at work47. Here too, aesthetic interest is not 
internally related to good work but, rather, requires a separate exercise of 'taste' by makers and 
users – in this case, theorised of course. Scruton argues that Wittgenstein's description of a 
carpenter asking of his work 'does that look right?' reveals a typical everyday aesthetic interest. 
Examples from everyday life, like this, tell us “that there are choices remaining when utility is 
satisfied”48. These are choices about appearance, about the way things look. But examples like 
Wittgenstein's, continues Scruton, do not tell us “the real point or value” of making choices 
about appearance, about aesthetic interest in other words49. Scruton's additional theoretic 
                                                
47 Roger Scruton, ‘In Search of the Aesthetic’, British Journal of Aesthetics, July 2007, pp.232-
250. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and 
Religious Belief, Ed. C. Barrett (Blackwell, 1966). 
48 Scruton, p.240 
49 Ibid, p.240 
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contribution is to argue that something like 'taste' is exercised by the carpenter in deciding 
whether his work 'looks right'. 'Taste' is explained as a distinct human faculty for judging 
appearances – separate from the carpenter's (or any) working practices. I argue that Work 
Theory improves on Scruton's development of Wittgenstein on everyday aesthetic interest by 
introducing and properly differentiating between aesthetic interest and its internal relations to 
different aspects of good work (namely the technical, functional and authentic aspects of good 
work and their relations to finish, form and artistic choice). Work Theory then captures and 
explains the aesthetic interests of good workers (like Wittgenstein-Scruton's 'carpenter'), and 
our aesthetic interest in made things as users, in features of good work and aesthetic interest 
that are omitted from Scruton's account. And their inclusion – I will argue – means it is not 
necessary to introduce a separate faculty of 'taste' to explain 'the real point and value' of 
aesthetic interest.   
 
2 The Wittgenstein-Scruton account of aesthetic interest 
 
Theorising the 'carpenter's' aesthetic interest 
 
 In 'In Search of the Aesthetic' Roger Scruton argues that Wittgenstein’s observations 
and explanations of the behaviour of craftsmen at work (particularly examples of how a 
carpenter finishes a job) reveal something essential to all aesthetic interest50. In a word, that 
essence is the idea of ‘fit’; and that things fit together because they ‘look right'. In the Scruton-
Wittgenstein model too, a maker's ‘sense of fit’ determines the final 'look and feel' of a product 
strictly after its functional requirements have been met. A 'sense of fit' or 'taste' is argued to 
                                                
50 In case there is any doubt, I use Wittgenstein's 'carpenter' to refer to any maker, and so to 
making in the digital age.   
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direct choice about the way things look.  'Senses of fit' reflect cultural norms that set stylistic 
standards for appropriate ‘look and fit’ solutions to design problems. In this model then ‘look and 
fit’ decisions become extrinsic to the process of making itself and are essentially matters of the 
disinterested exercise of ‘taste’ while, for example, designing and fitting a door frame (and by 
extension in appreciating them aesthetically in use).  
 Work Theory proposes that there are internal relations between the necessary 'skill', 
'function' and 'authenticity' features of good work and makers' and users' aesthetic interest in 
made things. Makers and users are interested in made things 'looking right' and this interest is 
explicable in terms of makers' exercise of skills, conception of design problems, and authentic 
choices about how to make (and of what to make in the rarer cases of artistic choice). Work 
Theory relates workmanship to an interest in made things 'looking right' in terms of their finish; 
and designs look right as formal solutions to design problems. It contrasts then with the 
Wittgenstein-Scruton model, where a maker's behaviour in relation to aesthetic interest amounts 
to a separate exercise of 'taste' after a product's functional requirement has been met. On this 
Wittgenstein-Scruton account, a door can be designed and delivered to function as a door, but 
its 'good' design and workmanship in terms of aesthetic interest are explained outside any 
characterisation of good design and good workmanship per se. Work Theory argues then that 
the Wittgenstein-Scruton model fails to recognise essential differences between the good work 
of craftsmen and designers and artists; and how each engages, without the separate exercise of 
'taste',  aesthetic interest in their own way51.        
Scruton’s idea of ‘fit’ and aesthetic interest draws on Wittgenstein’s observation that in 
designing a door its designer (the 'carpenter') will “look at it and say: Higher, higher, higher…oh, 
                                                
51 It also fails then to differentiate artistic aesthetic interest – but the focus here is on what can 
be rightly explained from insights about everyday aesthetic interest like that of a carpenter at 
work. 
Work and the Aesthetic  
 48 
all right”52. Alternatively, the phrase could be ‘there: thank God’, or ‘yes, that’s right’. 
Wittgenstein has other examples from tailoring and from musical appreciation, to which I will 
return, that are also suggestive of a notion of aesthetic interest that centres on ‘correctness’ and 
feelings of ‘contentment’ with products – the core idea that Scruton develops. But closer 
analysis of these examples reveals that developed notions of both design and workmanship are 
necessary to satisfactorily explain aesthetic interest; and these are absent in Scruton’s 
development of Wittgenstein’s basic account. Only with such notions (Work Theory's ‘good 
work’ summarily) do we understand the content of the carpenter’s satisfaction with his doorway, 
for example, and how its design and workmanship inform his appraisal and provide reasons for 
liking that support his (and by extension other people’s) aesthetic judgement.  
In that respect, it is significant that Wittgenstein’s examples are principally in support of a 
general claim about the language of aesthetic judgement, rather than about the work that has 
gone into the products that are judged ‘right’. So he notes that “when aesthetic judgements are 
made, aesthetic adjectives such as ‘beautiful’, ‘fine’, etc, play hardly any role at all; rather “the 
words you use are more akin to ‘right’ and ‘correct’”53. This language registers satisfaction with a 
product that is then evidenced by its use. So a bespoke suit is judged, in this example 
somewhat literally, by its final fit (so it’s cut to the point at which the wearer can say ‘leave it as it 
is’); and the cutter simply marks and alters the cloth accordingly and the wearer likes being seen 
in the suit54. Wittgenstein rightly quashes any suggestion that such judgements – if properly 
aesthetic – are mere exclamations of delight: “when we make an aesthetic judgement about a 
thing, we do not just gape at it and say: ‘Oh! How marvellous!’ We distinguish between a person 
                                                
52 Wittgenstein, p.13 
53 Ibid, p.3 
54 Ibid, p.5 
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who knows what he is talking about and a person who doesn’t”55. We properly talk then about 
‘appreciation’ and need to understand in what that consists. Again Wittgenstein notes the 
appreciation of the man at the tailors, this time in choosing material, saying things like ‘it is 
slightly too dark’ and so on, and of the listener to a piece of music saying, ‘”does this 
harmonise? No.The bass is not quite loud enough”56. Reasons for liking are given and these 
people can be rightly called appreciators of suits and music – we observe their reasons as being 
appreciative advances on merely providing ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses.  
But what are good reasons? It is a step forward to recognise an appreciator as one who 
gives reasons for liking (with appropriate physical gestures perhaps) – that there is something in 
‘what he says and how he acts’ as Wittgenstein puts it – but what happens when there is 
dispute? Wittgenstein warns that there are an extraordinary number of different cases of 
appreciation; and that there is always more to know about any particular case: in short, that to 
describe what appreciation consists in would be to “describe the whole environment”57. 
Wittgenstein’s move out of this apparent dilemma is to introduce the idea of culture and the 
related idea of taste (a move Scruton also makes, as will be noted later). So: “to describe a set 
of aesthetic rules fully means really to describe the culture of a period”58. Wittgenstein does not 
add much to this statement, but what he does note is exclusively about the behaviours of 
consumers rather than any indication that aesthetics pursue examination of makers’ art, design 
and craft. Wittgenstein‘s person of taste is a spectator, or a collector, or a user, of a thing. They 
are also embedded in ways of watching, curating, dressing and so on in their time and place. 
The ‘whole environment’, in other words, is posited as a set of appreciative norms and related 
                                                
55  Ibid, p.6  
56 Ibid, p.7 
57 Ibid, p.7  
58 Ibid, p.8 
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social arrangements (that could conceivably be exhaustively described and be the ‘taste’ of any 
one period). However, such neglect of the work of artists, designers and craftsmen and 
emphasis on personal but cultured taste in aesthetic theory is premature: in all cases of 
appreciation there is an appreciated product with a history of making and associated intrinsic 
standards of correctness (both general and to that kind of making) about it; although from here 
too, of course, cultures of appreciation are possible and develop59.  
Work Theory agrees, after Scruton, with Wittgenstein’s insight into everyday aesthetic 
interest as essentially an interest in something made looking correct. But for Work Theory that 
observation primarily reveals something significant about the aesthetic import of design and 
workmanship, and correctness (or good work) there, prior to any considerations of 'taste' – 
indeed the idea of 'taste' is redundant in Work Theory as a separate explanatory category of our 
aesthetic interest in made things, as I will now argue60. So a designer's aesthetic interest in form  
is intrinsic to the design problem at hand; and a craftsman's in finish to the skilful exercise of a 
craft (where finish is handmade).  
 
The 'carpenter' as designer 
 
In arguing the redundancy of 'taste' in explaining a maker's aesthetic interest in their 
work, take again Scruton’s 'carpenter' (Scruton adopts a generous view of carpentry to include 
                                                
59  For Work Theory's account of the development of appreciative skills at large, see Part 2, 
Section 3 on aesthetic education. Note too that some footnoted transcriptions of 
Wittgenstein’s lectures on aesthetics give some indication that a theory of taste is work- 
rather than culture-bound, but that kind of speculative interpretation is not my aim here.  
60  'Taste' may be conceived as acquired through good work, and therefore as having a 
'secondary' or rather derived importance. As noted above, the idea of aesthetic education is 
examined in Part 2, Section 3.  
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aspects of architectural design, that is, the carpenter as both designer and craftsman). In what 
sense is his consummatory response to a doorway that he has designed and constructed 
(following Wittgenstein’s text and Scruton’s interpretation) – that it is 'just right' – one of 
aesthetic interest conceived as ‘taste’? Or are we better to think of this aesthetic interest being 
related to his carpentry, his work? As a carpenter (on Scruton's characterisation), ideas of 
correctness will gel around many design and workmanship factors. Specifically, a carpenter qua 
designer will produce specifications and drawings that meet sets of requirements for the 
doorway – from obvious core functions to normative concerns. There is also the situation (albeit 
exceptional) where the designer is his own client. Furthermore, the carpenter as skilled 
craftsman is interested in the finish of a preconceived design. So at what point or points in the 
working life of Scruton's carpenter does he step back and ask, ‘does this look right’? Work 
Theory's characterisation of good work distinguishes between the creative choices of artists to 
make at all, design creativity around preset design problems, and the delivery of designs by 
skilled workmanship. Properly, the aesthetic interest of Scruton's carpenter breaks down into 
two distinct kinds of aesthetic interest, around conceiving and solving a design problem and the 
workmanship required to deliver the final design.   
Scruton mistakenly conflates these interests in arguing that we think – as makers and 
users – about a completed design in terms solely of a final disinterested contemplation of the 
thing that is made, such that we are content to say, after Wittgenstein, ‘that’s right’ and so on. 
Consider the aesthetic interest of the designer. The designer qua designer (a professional 
designer ordinarily understood) does not reach this stage of disinterested contemplation, yet his 
interest in a product does have a necessary aesthetic dimension. His product is not the finished 
doorframe – following Wittgenstein's example – but the drawing of the doorframe (indeed 
Scruton provides an example of a Georgian spec for a doorframe in one presentation of his 
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argument61). The look of a final product depends in part on factors (strictly) outside of the 
designer's control, namely the workmanship that completes the design. Still, we would want to 
say of course that design – carried through – influences the final look of a product, its form in 
short, so some amendment at least is required to Scruton’s account. Doorframes are designed 
in the context of design problems about access to and through buildings. Core and normative 
functional requirements vary across different building projects, and so different design solutions 
are possible. Doorframes are designed within that context, of providing suitable forms for 
particular building design problems. Good designers are interested in forms that deliver 
functional requirements in use. Furthermore, they choose authentically when they exercise the 
relative freedom to solve a design problem creatively, rather than by simply appealing to 
prescribed forms. This creativity may extend into the development over time of a designer's 
personal style, but risks inauthenticity if it is applied without reference to the uniqueness of 
every design problem. This style or personal vision is therefore incorrectly understood as 
'artistry', where (for artistry) a personal vision extends back to creating the whole parameters of 
a design problem (to produce a work of art). A designer’s aesthetic interest in their work is an 
interest in producing a drawing or model, for example, that fully represents and solves a design 
problem.  
In summary, a 'carpenter's' aesthetic interest in their work, qua designer, is not an 
interest in a product during its production. Rather, it is an aesthetic interest in a drawing or such 
like, in the context of a design problem, and therefore an interest in how a form will successfully 
fulfil functional requirements set by a design problem. It is a 'closure' – a consummatory sense 
                                                
61 Roger Scruton, Beauty (Oxford University Press, 2009), p.83 
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of 'that's right' – that is both partial (the final look is still open to the effects of workmanship) and 
contextual, necessarily sensitive to the initiating design problem62. 
 
The 'carpenter' as craftsman 
 
To complete the picture of the aesthetic interest of Wittgenstein's 'carpenter' we also 
need to understand the carpenter as craftsman (rather than as designer) or how workmanship 
relates to aesthetic interest. Wittgenstein’s aesthetically interested carpenter is properly 
understood as a designer-craftsman, a maker who has both designed a doorframe with some 
licence to introduce his ideas about how to best solve the particular 'doorframe design problem', 
and who will complete the job himself too. That latter work though has its own distinct demands 
and effects on how something will look (and of course is usually not carried out by the designer). 
In David Pye’s dictum, while ‘design proposes, workmanship disposes’ – what is aesthetically 
significant though is how workmanship delivers deliberate visual effects irreducible to the work 
of designers63. 
The work of the carpenter completing a design puts the quality of the end product at risk. 
Following Pye, the risk is that the designer’s intention will not be met by workmanship in two 
regards: that the product won’t be ‘sound’ and/or that it won’t be ‘comely’64. In terms of ‘look’ 
                                                
62 The latter is evidently a required modification to Scruton when we reflect on his somewhat 
shocking assertion that a door fit for ‘invalids’ cannot be beautiful – if we think about doors 
and disabled access as a typical design problem setting up initial client needs, in turn 
perhaps limiting the choice of materials and so on, but still with choices about appearance 
open to designers, then such statements are rightly understood as ungrounded in aesthetic 
theory.  
63 Pye, p.1 
64 Ibid, p.23 
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then, we are interested in how ‘comeliness’ is risked. Still it is worth briefly differentiating 
‘soundness’ in work. In that former category, we can easily think of examples of a design being 
met in terms of basic patterns and dimensions, but a carpenter, for example, using poor quality 
materials and glueing and nailing joins rather than dovetailing, and so on. If we think of work in 
terms of soundness, then we are challenging whether the product – so made – will perform its 
intended function (will the doorframe be strong enough, will it last, for example). Of course the 
conditions for good workmanship are not limited to the kind of craft skills associated with 
carpentry. Mass production methods can deliver precision and soundness in line with design 
intentions no less than the soundness dependent on craft skills. Such automated machine work 
entails no risk though (the choice of look has been made, or using Scruton's phrase, the 
'redundancies have been closed off'). Consequently there is no opportunity for the look of the 
end product to differ from that established by the design (thus terms such as Pye’s 
‘workmanship of certainty’ and Herbert Read’s ‘abstract art’ in referring to industrial design). Any 
aesthetic value in such machine-made products is therefore a function of the aesthetic interest 
inherent in the design. 
In contrast, the carpenter is making choices during the process of making that do 
influence the ‘comeliness’, as well as the soundness, of the product. If this evokes notions of the 
aesthetic appeal of handicraft, still an explanation is missing as to why such a claim is 
warranted. Seminally, R.G. Collingwood challenged the view that a carpenter following a design 
could do any more than meet the requirements of the specification he was working to, and that 
there is no ‘art’ in such work but merely technical ability65. Any risk, on this account, associated 
with workmanship is entirely based on criteria related to soundness – the failure of the worker to 
                                                
65 R.G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford University Press, 1958). Work Theory argues 
there is indeed no 'art' in workmanship but that there is an aesthetic interest in crafts that 
affect the finish of products.  
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simply deliver a doorframe eight feet by three, and such like, the risk in other words associated 
with mistakes and shoddiness. On this account there are no Wittgensteinian ‘higher, higher, 
there just right!’ interventions – no attention to comeliness, no aesthetic interest. It is right that 
the carpenter completing a design will not ordinarily stand back and alter fundamental aspects 
of a design like basic measurements – indeed to do so changes his persona (to designer-
craftsman). But this is to ignore at least one aesthetic element of workmanship that is neither 
design proper (cannot be entirely controlled by a design) nor some decorative flourish 
(ornamentation) beyond a design intention. This element Pye calls ‘surface quality’ and it is 
related to the care in making taken by a ‘craftsman’ (for want of a better word). If we think of the 
craftsman with an intimate knowledge of the visual effect of working with different methods, 
tools and materials, then we begin to mark that out as an interest in the appearance of things 
that bears the stamp of the aesthetic – of standing back from one’s work, but at close hand, 
examining its effect on a product’s surface (so thinking in terms of ‘finish’) and closing 
redundancies accordingly. Such work does not simply reference a specification (after 
Collingwood’s model of the craftsman, for example), but nor does it challenge a design (in which 
case it reverts to a design aesthetic).  
For Work Theory, the claim is that good workmanship, as individual skill and care in 
making a finished product, represents a genuine and distinctive aesthetic interest. Collingwood's 
characterisation of craft is wrongly deflationary in ignoring this aesthetic interest in finish66. The 
kind of 'technical' aspect of craft that he describes is a matter of either poor workmanship; or of 
applying a skill unthinkingly; or is a certainty in workmanship that is proper to automated 
production methods. The latter category of technical work is, definitionally, not craft work, but 
                                                
66 Of course Collingwood's aim is to argue against any 'technical theory of art'. Work Theory 
does not argue a technical theory of art either – but neither is craft strictly technical along 
Collingwood's lines. 
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work to a finished product that is set in motion by a design and associated instructions to 
machines. Work Theory argues that a craftsman working in such a manner (to the 'workmanship 
of certainty'), after Collingwood's characterisation, is not exercising craft skills at all, which 
necessarily involve choices about a product's finish left open by a design. Closed designs, that 
dictate all aspects of delivery, preclude craftsmanship. Still, it is right to acknowledge that where 
a craft skill is exercised without any knowledge of how particular finishes are achieved, then 
something like a 'technical' (on Collingwood's definition) exercise is performed. For Work Theory 
though, this is not craft proper but the exercise of a 'knack' and corresponds roughly with the 
ordinary use of 'mechanical' to describe work that is done without care and attention and 
understanding, but 'gets the job done'. The conceptual difference between craft and knack 
reflects a real difference then between the evident aesthetic interest in work that is done with 
the best finish in mind, and work that only does (indeed can only do) what is required to deliver 
a product's core function. 
 
The 'carpenter's' taste 
 
Aesthetic interest in design and workmanship share a Wittgensteinian sense of 
perceived correctness then, but it is an interest in the ‘ways things look’ that is intimately 
associated with making, and can be further discriminated by referencing the task the maker – 
either as designer or craftsman – is engaged in. A sense of aesthetic correctness stops work, 
but when we come to examine work as design and workmanship, we understand that a sense of 
‘that’s right!’ is a permanent feature of good work (in other words, of repeatedly checking the 
look of things in the process of designing or constructing) rather than a contingent, final extrinsic 
judgement. It is not a 'Eureka!' moment in the sense of being sudden and unexpected. There is 
a felt sense of consummation (something that marks out aesthetic experiences 
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phenomenologically) but it is one that is worked towards. It is the consummation of an existing 
aesthetic interest in form and finish. It is an interest that is intrinsic to good design work and to 
care in making a product. On this basis, the question of why something looks right becomes a 
set of questions about good and bad design and good and bad workmanship, about properly 
conceiving and creatively solving a design problem and about applying craft skills (and by 
extension, about recognising them as a spectator)67. 
Contrasts with Scruton’s development of Wittgenstein elaborate further Work Theory's 
arguments for the redundancy of 'taste' in explaining aesthetic interest in made things. For 
Scruton, the 'carpenter' faced with deciding when to stop his work and “justify this frame” does 
so by comparisons with other doorframes and the surrounding architecture68. His aesthetic 
interest is accounted for by these acts of ‘fitting’ and ‘matching’69. Fitting and matching, Scruton 
continues, has two consequences. Firstly, it necessarily engages the 'carpenter' with other 
viewers of the doorframe and so in conversations with them; secondly, it follows that from these 
dialogues products acquire shared meanings. So, in other words, from fitting and matching 
comes a “socially engendered sense of the right and wrong appearance” or, in a word, ‘taste’70. 
The carpenter is applying taste to close redundancies, so it goes71. He will justify a doorframe 
                                                
67  The word ‘craft’ can be problematic – no limitation to handicraft is meant here and I follow 
Pye in preferring ‘workmanship’ to ‘craft’ because it excludes design and includes industrial 
manufacturing. However, when referring to skills associated with workmanship that affects 
‘look’ beyond that set by prior design, craft remains the best term. 
68 Scruton, 'In Search of the Aesthetic', p.243 
69 Ibid, p.243 
70 Ibid, p.244 
71 ‘Taste’ here is Scruton’s view of it as the human faculty for sensing order or form in the 
arrangement of things, and attaching meanings to these that become the lexicon of aesthetic 
response (so that an order or form can induce a shared sense of ‘it’s serene’ for example).  
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then ‘formally’ – focusing on the appropriateness of size and shape – and in terms of social and 
moral ‘meaning’ – that a doorframe is ‘serene’ or ‘homely’ and so on72.    
The 'carpenter' (after Wittgenstein-Scruton, but really a designer-craftsman) does indeed 
necessarily engage with other people who also see his work, but deconstructing his work we 
see that as a designer that engagement is essentially structured around a design problem, and 
as a craftsman around issues about appropriate care in workmanship. For Work Theory, the 
fitting and matching that goes on here represents something other than an exercise of taste in 
Scruton’s sense – and that is an account of the separate characteristics of the aesthetic interest 
evident in the good work of craftsmen and designers. 
The basic anatomy of a typical design project includes initial meetings with clients from 
which ideas are worked up from their requirements to a ‘drawing’ (that might include sketches, 
plans, 3-D images, layouts, models and so on) that is finally handed over to executants (unless 
the designer is also the designer-craftsman) to deliver a final product. The designer’s ‘fitting and 
matching’ are conditional on demands set by the client’s brief and emerge from this context: 
they are a series of ‘if…then’ solutions to a design problem that culminate in the right looking 
drawing. The designer of a door faces requirements about the building’s use (domestic, 
commercial and so on), that extend to considerations of location (urban, rural?), and perhaps to 
interior design too. The requirements entail decisions about dimensions and proportion of the 
overall frame, about panelling, about doorsteps, lights, jambs, stiles and door furniture. Fitting 
and matching solutions occur in respect of each element of the door in its larger design context 
– ‘this will look right for this use; and this will work well with this’. To what extent do these 
represent an aesthetic interest in work? Fitting and matching could simply be a matter of 
recognising that one is working on replacing modern doors in a client’s Georgian house and that 
                                                
72 Scruton,'In Search of the Aesthetic', p.246 
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there are Georgian pattern books to copy. This hardly seems a matter of taste (under any 
conception) and is no more than a proper understanding of the design problem (assuming it is 
the client’s wish to restore their house to its original integrated design). Aesthetic interest, then, 
must involve more than simply knowledgeable responses to design problems. 
 In the example of fitting Georgian doors, the designer’s simply 'knowledgeable' work 
indicates something about the design problem rather than any lack of aesthetic interest, 
however, on his part. That absence of aesthetic interest reveals that the design problem is 
prescribed or closed such that the designer cannot reference his preferred solutions. For fitting 
and matching to be properly aesthetic we require then the designer to refer to something other 
than existing design solutions – but this of course requires that his design brief allows him to. 
Say the client wants a contemporary take on Georgian doors – now the design problem is set 
up in such a way that an aesthetic interest in the project is possible, so that the designer can 
communicate his ideas, with his drawings, about panelling and door furniture, for example, to 
his client. The designer is behaving aesthetically but does not need to introduce taste as 
something extrinsic to the design problem he confronts. Indeed as noted if he was simply 
referencing a ‘standard of taste’, this does not necessarily engage any commitment to the 
‘standing back’ adaptive behaviours Wittgenstein calls aesthetic. This capacity for aesthetic 
response in design is occasioned by a relatively open design problem that allows the designer 
(and the client depending on their involvement) innovation in their work, in their final design 
drawings. And design problems are inherently 'open' if the situations they confront are properly 
conceived as necessarily unique. If innovative drawings, then, are the ‘art of design’, their 
essential reference is the terms of the design problem and its scope for a designer to create 
new adaptive responses (so that clients are contented with a product too) to the problems of 
‘doors’, ‘ceilings’, ‘floors’, and so on (following the examples above).  
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If a design project ends with a handover of drawings to craftsmen (rather than to 
automated manufacture), then the craftsman’s aesthetic interest is delivered through, broadly, 
attention to detail in the element of production that is his responsibility. Similarly to design, there 
is no necessary reference to taste extrinsically engendered (from outside particular issues of 
finish) in understanding the aesthetic character of workmanship. It is sufficient for accounting for 
the aesthetic interest of good workmanship to refer to the way, for example, a door’s finish fits 
its surrounding brickwork, whether there is apparent matching of roughness in the finish and 
such like, visual considerations still independent of whether the doorway will last for years to 
come or not. The craftsman as a skilled worker does not alter the form of a product (which is set 
by design drawings). A designer-craftsman might alter form in crafting something – one thinks of 
potters perhaps where a design might just be a sketch and where throwing itself changes the 
eventual form of a pot somewhat from its rough design. But this is another, albeit hybrid, case 
where taste is not an explanatory factor in the aesthetic interest that effectively completes the 
work. 
Work Theory acknowledges that there are sets of standards that develop in each and 
every kind of making, with all the sub divisions associated with particular types of design 
problem and craft skill that inevitably follow. But these standards are still better conceived as 
skills and good design practice per se (in the latter case, perhaps including a greater range of 
environmental factors, for example). They are not 'knowing-how' knacks or tricks of the trade 
then; but nor are they standard design styles reflecting a society's 'taste', like Georgian 
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Summary and conclusions 
 
  Work Theory acknowledges certain features of the Wittgenstein-Scruton approach to 
aesthetic interest. It is right to characterise aesthetic interest in a sense of things looking right; 
and to locate theoretically significant aesthetic interest in everyday activities, especially in craft-
like working methods. But design and workmanship, extending to authentic creative artistic 
choices, ‘good work’ in short, comprises the complete discourse of aesthetic understanding. 
Work Theory offers an alternative explanation of aesthetic interest, acknowledging the 
Wittgenstein-Scruton insights about the everyday craft-like aesthetic interest of things ‘looking 
right’, but arguing that aesthetic interest is differentiated between different aspects of good 
work's interest in a consummating sense of a product being 'just right'. Good work necessarily 
involves an interest in form's relation to function for each design problem, and an interest in a 
product's suitable finish.  
 Concluding, Scruton's account of aesthetic interest fails to discriminate between its 
different sources. A designer's aesthetic interest in a product's ‘form’ is explained by his interest 
in it fulfilling the functional requirements set by its specific design problem. Additionally, the 
account omits the aesthetic interest that comes with workmanship’s attention to the detail or 
finish of things. For Work Theory, therefore, ‘taste’ is properly understood – for users of made 
things – as a matter of recognising innovation in design and care and skill in workmanship (as 
well as artistic authenticity in the special cases of creating artworks). And for makers, it is really 
not a matter of 'taste' at all, but of the aesthetic interest that comes (or not) with doing their work 
as designers, craftsmen and artists – their necessary interest if the work is good in the best 
functional form, in products being well-made and finished, and in authentically chosen work.  
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PART 2 
SECTION 2 WORK THEORY, ART AND CRAFT 
 
1. Aestheticism and art's function 
 
Work Theory's internal relations between good work and aesthetic interest confirm that 
works of art – narrowly conceived – are not the unique focus of our aesthetic interest in made 
things. Aesthetic interest extends to interests in good design and workmanship in functional 
objects. In distinguishing between art, design and workmanship, Work Theory differentiates art's 
good work from that of design and workmanship in terms of the aesthetic interest that artists 
have in making something at all – in making an authentic choice to make something – rather 
than in dealing with a given design problem and with decisions about the best delivery of a 
design solution73. The artist who also makes his artwork solves the design problem his artistic 
conception has set and completes the work with appropriate skills and workmanship. As such, 
the theory understands conceptual artists as, strictly speaking, concerned solely with the 
initiating idea to make something at all. It also understands works of art as artefacts. Traditional 
painters and sculptors, for example, are artists in the fuller artefactual sense, a sense that is 
also ordinarily understood, in that they initiate projects by authentic choices to make unique 
works of art but are also designers and skilled workers in delivering their works as finished 
made things. Our aesthetic interest in artworks therefore extends from an interest in 
authentically chosen artistic projects and ideas through to their delivery through appropriate 
design and workmanship.  
                                                
73 By 'art' as 'making something at all' I refer to the existentialist insight into authentically 
chosen projects – experienced as a realisation that 'he made that'. It contrasts with 'art' as 
the set of artworks.  
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This might suggest that Work Theory is still committed to a kind of philosophical 
aestheticism about art's function. But Work Theory rejects philosophical aestheticism's 
functional thesis (in its traditional and new variants) – that art functions to afford aesthetic 
experiences – on three broad grounds. First, Work Theory argues that aesthetic interest, 
generally and in artworks, is not reducible to a psychological state of mind called 'disinterest', to 
a traditional account of 'aesthetic experience' in other words. Second, artworks do not function 
solely to deliver aesthetic experiences. Third, Work Theory's account of aesthetic interest and of 
art's function suggest a more complex set of relations between art, other made things and 
aesthetic interest that is not reducible to aestheticism's functional thesis. 
Work Theory's rejection of traditional and new aestheticism's key tenet – of an exclusive 
art-aesthetic internal relation and art's aesthetic function – does not therefore also imply that our 
aesthetic interest is a trivial or marginal activity. Noel Carroll, for example, draws this conclusion 
on the grounds that aesthetic interest is properly limited to an aestheticist view of art74. But Work 
Theory's rejection of philosophical aestheticism's functional thesis is based on arguments for the 
full set of internal relations that exist between aesthetic interest and good work. These relations 
extend the idea of aesthetic interest beyond those argued by aestheticism's art-bound account, 
while still retaining a coherent account of aesthetic interest and its relations to art and beyond.  
* 
Work Theory rejects philosophical aestheticism's functional thesis, and arguments 
employed here also help resolve outstanding theoretic issues about art and craft as activities 
and what functions they fulfill. For Work Theory, all aspects of good work – its art, design and 
skill – relate to a made thing's function: firstly, artists create new functional requirements by their 
                                                
74 Noel Carroll Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge University Press, 2001) argues a 'deflationary' 
view of aesthetic experience that excludes any aesthetic interest in artworks beyond their 
'design aspects.  
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authentic choices to make unique works; and secondly, designer-craftsmen deliver functional 
requirements (both set by artists but also by everyday demands). For Work Theory then, art's 
function (the important end it serves, distinct from the particular aim of individual artists) is to 
sustain authentically chosen projects to make unique things, and what works of art share as a 
class of objects is their distinct origination. The design and workmanship of works of art are 
initiated by the functional requirements set by an individual's authentic choice to make 
something at all. A further theoretic consequence is that art's function is not prescribed but 
distributed among the various functions artists generate for their artworks. So artists can be 
'political', for example, and remain true to the idea of art. I will argue then that Work Theory's 
functionalism about art – as summarised here – is not a commitment to 'Aesthetic 
Functionalism' (AF) where art, and art alone, functions to deliver a limited set of aesthetic 
properties75. AF states that “works of art have the function of embodying or sustaining aesthetic 
properties, such as beauty, elegance, delicacy, daintiness, and dumpiness”76. For Work Theory, 
artists set all kinds of functional requirements by their authentic choices to make unique works 
of art, including but not limited to works that are intended to be 'aesthetically engaging'. 
Work Theory understands craft as a related functional kind, but where its function is to 
make everyday functional objects the best they can be (that is, in terms of fulfilling their intended 
function). Craft activities for Work Theory are properly understood as design and workmanship. 
Design and workmanship are activities associated with all made things, including non-
                                                
75 'Aesthetic Functionalism' after Nick Zangwill (see full reference in footnote below) makes no 
claim to be a version of aestheticism but its functional thesis is similarly art-centred. I have 
also used 'aesthetic functionalism' (lower case) to indicate Work Theory's argument that 
good work's internal relations to aesthetic interest apply across all made things (see Part 1). I 
examine both in more detail below in relation to art and craft as functional kinds. 
76 Nick Zangwill, 'Aesthetic Functionalism' in Aesthetic Concepts Eds. Emily Brady and Jerrold 
Levinson (Clarendon Press, 2001) p.125 
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conceptual artworks. Craft as a class of objects differs from art then not in those respects, but in 
terms of their origin – craft objects share a functionally-generated origin. Craftsmen, in short, do 
not generate new functional requirements for made things, but deliver – through designs and 
workmanship – pre-established functional requirements for things like chairs, houses, personal 
computers, and salt-cellars. Work Theory's account of craft as a functional kind still recognises, 
however, that craft objects are properly objects of aesthetic interest without their designs and 
workmanship indicating 'artistry'.    
In arguing art and craft as different but related functional kinds, Work Theory answers a 
fundamental question about why artworks themselves are important to us. Their importance is 
two-fold. We value them as part of our lives because they introduce new affective responses to 
questions of how to live that are authentically chosen by individuals in situations that we 
recognise ('he made that'). Also, we value them because their art – that is the authentic choice 
of an artist – is materialised and delivered by good design and skilled workmanship ('he made 
that'). I will also argue that Work Theory's explanation of the importance of artworks explains 
their content-rich expressiveness, the ordinary sense still of them being 'non-functional', and 
their necessary relative rarity in the set of all made things, and within the set too of all well-made 
things.  
 
2. Traditional and new aestheticism 
 
Aestheticism is variously understood as an artistic movement, a morality and as a theory 
in philosophical aesthetics. Those differences are evident when we consider works attributed to 
aestheticism in an art exhibition, or as a lifestyle, or as arguments about the proper relations 
that hold between art, everyday life and the aesthetic. In this latter vein, Gary Iseminger 
identifies a central tenet of traditional philosophical aestheticism as its “functional thesis, F” that 
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“a work of art is so by intending to function to afford aesthetic experience”77. He also proposes a 
new aestheticism with a new functional thesis: “F': the function of the artworld and practice of art 
is to promote aesthetic communication”78. The following discussion is focused on these versions 
of aestheticism's functional thesis.   
 
Arguments against traditional aestheticism  
 
 Monroe Beardsley defines an artwork as something that is produced “with the intention 
of giving it the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest”. And he accepts that the concept of 
aesthetic interest is satisfactorily defined in terms of aesthetic experience79. Beardsley's account 
of aesthetic experience represents a traditional philosophical aestheticism then. He 
characterises the aesthetic as a 'reception' of some thing that involves an experience that is 
"lifted in a certain way", "takes on a sense of freedom from concerns about matters outside the 
thing received, an intense affect that is nonetheless detached from practical ends, the 
exhilarating sense of exercising powers of discovery, [and] integration of the self"80. Beardsley 
adds that artists uniquely intend to satisfy the aesthetic interest of spectators, who in turn only 
take that interest to their reception of artworks. So on this account art functions to produce 
aesthetically interesting artworks. And aesthetic interest is explained psychologically as 
essentially a particular kind of experience: as 'lifted', 'exhilarating', 'integrating'. 
                                                
77 Gary Iseminger, The Aesthetic Function of Art (Cornell University Press, 2004), p.8 
78 Ibid, p.23 
79 Monroe C. Beardsley, 'An Aesthetic Definition of Art' in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art 
Edited by Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (Blackwell, 2004), p.59 
80 Ibid, p.58 
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 Work Theory's objections to Beardsleyan or traditional philosophical aestheticism are 
two-fold: first about the nature of aesthetic interest, and relatedly about the activities of artists 
and spectators. Our aesthetic interest in made things, as makers and users or spectators, is an 
interest in their looking right in terms of their function (whether artistically conceived or 
everyday), and that interest extends through to an aesthetic interest in their design and skilful 
execution as meeting functional requirements. Aesthetic interest then is internally related to the 
good work that goes into conceiving and making something and so is necessarily an interest 
engaged, contra Beardsley, with the practical ends a made thing is intended for. Relatedly then, 
made things fulfill many kinds of artistic and everyday functions aesthetically (they are made to 
look right) but – again contra Beardsley – without their function being to satisfy aesthetic 
interest. So as users and spectators our aesthetic interest is in a made thing functioning well, 
not in a detached sense of 'exhilaration'. Furthermore, Beardsley fails to examine how aesthetic 
interest's internal relations to good work indicate different aesthetic interests in authentically 
chosen projects to make, good designs, and skilful workmanship.  
 Iseminger acknowledges the narrowness that follows from the Beardsleyan version of 
aestheticism both in terms of the account of aesthetic interest as a disengaged state of mind 
and of the type of activities in which makers actually engage. But he characterises these 
objections as antipsychological and antiessentialist, and as related solely to art and related 
intuitions about art's relation to the aesthetic, rather than to making generally. I turn now to 
Iseminger's aestheticism, and begin to engage those objections and intuitions.   
 
 Arguments against new aestheticism  
 
 Iseminger's new aestheticism is designed to meet “antiessentialist and antipsychological 
objections” to traditional accounts while retaining what he takes as some incontrovertible 
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intuitions about art and the aesthetic and their relation that warrant, indeed demand, some kind 
of philosophical aestheticism. By antiessentialism Iseminger refers us to the idea of the 
supposed open-endedness of art as a concept reflecting art's novelty in practice. And by 
antipsychological objections he refers broadly to arguments denying a separate state of mind 
called aesthetic. The intuitions are about the special link between art and the aesthetic, and 
about the necessity of experience for appreciation. Iseminger's aims to "explain and defend a 
new version of aestheticism that aims to honor the intuitions and avoid the objections"81.  
 Iseminger's new aestheticism states: 'F': the function of the artworld and practice of art is 
to promote aesthetic communication'. He argues this meets the overarching objection to 
traditional aestheticism that it does not explain the facts of artistic making and aesthetic interest. 
This divides into two objections: antiessentialist about art and antipsychologism about aesthetic 
experience. The fundamental antiessentialist objection to aestheticism is that, traditionally, it 
defines art aesthetically, but that no necessary and sufficient conditions can be given for 
something to be a work of art (aesthetic conditions or otherwise) since art by its very nature is 
‘expansive, adventurous and novel’82. More specifically, antiessentialism (following Iseminger's 
characterisation of it) claims support from the existence of: 1) supposedly non-aesthetic works 
of art, like Duchamp's Fountain, and 2) from ‘hyperaesthetic’ art, namely art with religious or 
political aims83. Iseminger supports this antiessentialist objection against traditional aestheticism 
but claims his functional thesis F' makes no essentialist claim about art. He also argues F' 
embraces the historicism and institutionalism that lies behind the objection by incorporating the 
social institution or practice called the artworld.  
                                                
81  Iseminger, p.22 
82 See Robert Stecker for a brief summary of antiessentialism in 'Definitions of Art' in The 
Oxford Handbook of Aesthetics (Oxford University Press, 2003) pp.144-145 
83 Iseminger, p.22 
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 Work Theory challenges F' firstly on the grounds that it is not implied by antiessentialist 
arguments about certain types of artwork. It is a negative argument then, in so far as it does not 
tackle Iseminger's use of the notions of 'artworld' and 'aesthetic communication'. Work Theory 
reveals that these terms are simply redundant in the context of making (artworks) and aesthetic 
interest. Work Theory challenges the existence of a category of non-aesthetic art on the 
grounds that artworks are made with a necessary aesthetic interest in their conception, design 
and execution that follows if they are made well. Relatedly, our interest in a work of art is 
necessarily aesthetic in so far as we attend to its originating idea and how well that takes shape 
and is delivered as a made thing. Similarly, the category of hyperaesthetic art is redundant in so 
far as it fails to capture any unique aesthetic interest that makers or spectators have in artworks 
that is not already accounted for by their aesthetic interest in the appropriateness of a chosen 
work in a given situation (and then in its design and skilful execution). For Work Theory, placing 
a urinal in an art gallery and calling it Fountain or painting a picture with a political or religious 
motivation and/or content are examples of creative choices to make something and are good 
work qua art in so far as those choices are authentic. Still, it is true that works like Fountain 
engage very little, if any, extra aesthetic interest than in the 'rightness' of their artistic 
conception, since their design and workmanship by the artist amounts to no more than making 
the right placement. A painting with political or religious inspiration and content will have the 
additional aesthetic interest necessarily involved in designing and executing the painting to 
deliver effectively the originating idea.  
 In both cases then, of 'non-aesthetic', conceptual art and religious or politically inspired 
art, antiessentialism correctly counters narrow conceptions of making artworks such as, for 
example, ones centred on an aesthetic interest in the formal properties of works of art. But this 
insight does not necessarily imply F' (and its concession to institutionalism in aesthetic theory). 
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Nor, perhaps more importantly, does it imply antiessentialism about art, but I return to that when 
discussing art as a functional kind that sustains all kinds of artworks.    
* 
 I turn now to the antipsychological objection to traditional aestheticism. Again, my 
argument is a negative one against F' that its explanatory terms – 'artworld' and 'aesthetic 
communication' – are redundant because the antipsychological insight against F can be 
explained in terms of our aesthetic interest in good work. The antipsychological objection to 
aestheticism expresses scepticism about the existence of a distinctive aesthetic emotion or 
experience or state of mind, or at least doubts it is an experience exclusive to art. It centres on 
the apparent lack of distinctiveness of characterisations of the aesthetic, concluding that 
aesthetic experience is a myth and/or that it must fail to do the art definitional work aestheticism 
demands of it. George Dickie has famously criticised attempts to isolate a special aesthetic 
attitude of 'distancing' or 'disinterest', arguing that appropriate responses to artworks are cases 
of 'paying attention' to them rather than indicative of a special attitude of putting aside or 
distancing oneself from private and practical concerns84. 
 Work Theory does not argue an exclusive relation between art and the aesthetic. It does 
acknowledge a distinctive phenomenology of aesthetic experience, however, that accompanies 
an aesthetic interest in a made thing as 'just right'. So there is a felt sense of some made things 
being 'just right', one that is commonly recorded in our everyday experiences. But that felt sense 
is not one requiring a distinctive act of 'distancing' from objects' use. Work Theory's account of 
aesthetic interest in made things argues that our sense of 'rightness', elemental to accounts of 
the aesthetic, is still an 'interested' encounter. Our aesthetic experience can be articulated in 
terms of the rightness of conception, design and workmanship of a made thing. There is a felt 
                                                
84 George Dickie, 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', American Philosophical Quarterly 1 
(1964), pp.65-66 
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sense of rightness in the look and feel of made things that can be explained in terms other than 
the mere phenomenology of aesthetic experience, the moment of 'that's right!'. So Work Theory 
meets the anti-psychological objection without abandoning the idea of a consummatory 
aesthetic experience.    
* 
 Work Theory's account of aesthetic interest then challenges Iseminger's 'aestheticist 
intuitions' as the supposed aesthetic bulwark against both anti-essentialist and anti-psychologist 
objections to aesthetic accounts of art. He lists them as: 1) a close connection between art and 
the aesthetic; 2) that experiencing an artwork is necessary for appreciating it; 3) that there is a 
distinction between artistically relevant and irrelevant properties; and 4) that the criterion of 
artistic value follows from the nature of art85. Work Theory acknowledges a 'close relation' 
between art and the aesthetic, but it does so non-vaguely around our aesthetic interest in 
authentically chosen projects, and also in the formal and technical excellence of completed 
artworks. The internal relations between good work and aesthetic interest do not imply 
traditional aestheticism's essentialism about art. Nor do these relations support an essentially 
phenomenological account of our aesthetic interest in made things. Additionally, if we think 
about the aesthetics of making generally, then Work Theory acknowledges our aesthetic 
interest in the design and workmanship of everyday objects of use, thus meeting a broader 
range of intuitions about what makes a situation aesthetic than those presented by the 'new 
aestheticist', leaving them effectively redundant86.  
                                                
85  Iseminger, p.10 
86 In this regard them Work Theory supports J.O. Urmson's broad characterisation of an 
aesthetic situation in terms of 'simple' and 'more sophisticated' cases of looks and sounds of 
things related to the kind of thing in question, for example, rather than Beardsley's (although I 
do not analyse it further here). J.O. Urmson, 'What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?' in 
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3. Art and craft as functional kinds  
 
Art as a functional kind 
 
 Zangwill's aesthetic functionalism AF states that: “1. being a work of art consists in 
having an aesthetic function; and 2. each work of art has some specific aesthetic function that is 
essential to it being the particular work of art that it is.”87 So for example Mondrian's later 
geometric works fulfil an aesthetic function by being 'elegant and bold because of their particular 
colours and forms'. To have an aesthetic function is to sustain one or more aesthetic properties 
like elegance and boldness then, according to AF.  
 AF's claim that artworks each fulfil an 'aesthetic function' contrasts with Work Theory's 
view that as makers and users our aesthetic interest in made things, including artworks, is a 
complex set of interests in origination, design and workmanship. For Work Theory, if art fulfils 
an aesthetic function after AF in 'sustaining aesthetic properties', it would be an interest in one, 
a combination, or all of these interests – origination, design and technique – in respect of any 
non-conceptual artwork. Examining a little more closely Zangwill's example of Mondrian's later 
work reveals how that complexity of aesthetic interest properly reflects the richness of artistic 
making and appreciation. Looking at Composition with Red, Black, Blue and Yellow we are 
interested in how Mondrian came to his particular ideas about abstraction. And about their 
delivery as 'black, white, and primary coloured rectilinear shapes' in this work. Finally, we 
experience the work's arrangement of colour and shape, perhaps as 'elegant and bold'. For AF, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Edited by Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olson 
(Blackwell, 2004), p.25 
87 Zangwill, p.125  
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if 'elegance and boldness' were Mondrian's intentions for the work, then he has succeeded in 
delivering them; and has fulfilled art's aesthetic function. Work Theory modifies AF in two 
important ways. First, the artist does not need an aesthetic conception or intention – 'I intend 
this work to be elegant and bold', for example – to be interested in a work's aesthetic properties. 
Let us say Mondrian's artistic project was determined by a theosophic viewpoint influenced by 
his father's strict Calvinism88. Then he has set himself the problem of designing and painting 
spiritual works of an ascetic kind, and his aesthetic interest is in what abstract forms and 
techniques work best to that end. Second, relatedly, the spectator's interest in a work's aesthetic 
properties qua art relate to the artist's choice. Is the 'elegance and boldness' right for delivering 
Mondrian's artistic ideas? And ideas about spirituality and abstraction, are they being conceived 
with originality and intelligence? In other words, aesthetic properties sustain (or not) artistic 
functions, and these functions are not necessarily aesthetic per se. These functions comprise 
choices by artists that are subject to our aesthetic interest in their authenticity as self-chosen 
projects, in their being right choices in the circumstances.  
* 
 Work Theory's functionalism in respect of art differs from AF in that aesthetic interest in 
makers and appreciators is an interest in authentic artistic choices and their delivery, rather than 
only in the successful delivery of an aesthetic function like being 'elegant and bold'. An objection 
to this stance is that art properly excludes the possibility of certain kinds of made things fulfilling 
practical ends, even where aesthetic interest is evident in their making and finish. So R.G. 
Collingwood argues that some 'artworks' – called 'magical' – are not art proper because their 
primary function is to evoke: 
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‘of set purpose some emotions rather than others in order to discharge them into the 
affairs of practical life. Such an art may be good or bad when judged by aesthetic 
standards, but that kind of goodness or badness has little, if any, connexion with its 
efficacy in its own proper work’89.  
 The magical functions of art are various according to Collingwood's account: it can be 
that associated with the 'ceremonies of social life' like marriages, funerals, dinner parties and 
dances. But it can be associated too with recognisable arts like literature and painting where 
their ‘proper work’ has become propagandist or nationalistic and so on. In all such cases the 
primary function of the ceremony or artwork is called 'non-aesthetic' by Collingwood because it 
serves some emotion demanded by the specific ritual or political or other goal.  
 Collingwood has a special sense of 'aesthetic', but it is not necessary to explore it in 
detail here. The point at issue is whether Work Theory's functional account of art wrongly 
includes a category of 'artworks' made to deliver a range of political, religious and cultural 
emotions and ideas. The answer lies in Work Theory's differentiation between our aesthetic 
interests in authentic choices to make something at all and aesthetic interests in design and 
workmanship. Where a primary function for a made thing is to meet an everyday need, from 
basic requirements to live to complex cultural rituals, then Work Theory argues these are 
objects setting design problems rather than artistic choices for makers. As such they do not 
enter into consideration as artworks at all, and so are outside the scope of Work Theory's 
account of art's function. Where there is the opportunity for an authentic self-chosen project to 
make a unique work of art, then there is the opportunity to create a function for an artwork. Here 
artistry is a matter solely of an authentic choice to make a unique work. Indeed Collingwood 
rightly points out that there is a significant difference between the artist genuinely exploring and 
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expressing political emotions and the artist slavishly following the party line90. But while for 
Collingwood this is explained as an 'aesthetic' difference, Work Theory accounts for it more 
finely in terms of our aesthetic interest in an artist's authentic choice of project. So, for example, 
take the difference between a work of the Soviet avant-garde in the 1920s and a work of 
socialist realism dictated by the Zhdanov Doctrine from a decade or so later (Symphony of 
Sirens versus Roses for Stalin, say). We recognise a change in style, with experimental forms 
and ideas replaced by a conventional representational style in painting and prescribed content. 
More fundamentally what is revealed is the internal relation between authentically good work 
and aesthetic interest. There is a difference in the type of choice an artist can make then, 
between responding to a political idea or motivation or situation their way, authentically, or not. 
So continuing the example, our aesthetic interest in political works of art differentiates between 
the avant-garde artist, still with political emotions and ideas to express, and the technically 
good, politically motivated, but unoriginal artist producing to State guidelines. In short, Work 
Theory points to our aesthetic interest in authenticity and inauthenticity in artistic choices to 
account for Collingwoodian misuses of art. And so there is no proscription on art functioning 
politically.  
* 
Conversely, having tackled Collingwood's arguments against 'magical art', Work 
Theory's functionalism about art is also potentially challenged by his objections to 'aesthetic 
individualism' – characterised as the idea that artistic projects are merely self-expressive. Again, 
Work Theory's counter to this objection centres on the internal relation between authentic 
artistic choices and aesthetic interest. An artistic project can be assessed in terms of its 
authenticity, that it is freely chosen by an artists and an original conception. There is an 
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aesthetic interest too in an artwork's 'rightness' in terms of whether it realises its desired 
function. Going beyond Collingwood's art-centred account of aesthetic individualism, Work 
Theory also explains how good designers and skilled workers make things the best they can to 
meet everyday functional requirements. In summary, Work Theory rejects aesthetic 
individualism as an account of artistic projects to make unique artworks; and the rejection 
extends beyond art, given the internal relations that exist between aesthetic interest and good 
work making everyday functional objects.  
For Collingwood aesthetic individualism wrongly conceives an artist as the “sole author 
of everything he does”, and as therefore expressing in his art only something of himself. It is, 
Collingwood thinks, a product of holding to an individualistic psychology, one that fails to grasp 
that we are what we are because of our relations with others. In short, Collingwood embeds art 
in the life of a culture: an artist is not “God, a self-contained and self-sufficient creative power”, 
but necessarily works in the context of his relations to the art and techniques of his time, to the 
experiences and expectations of the society that must be his audience. If this were not the case, 
then the artist’s relation with his audience is a “mere by-product” of their creative aesthetic 
experience91. Audiences would be left to grope towards the artist’s own imaginative experience 
in their appreciative efforts and would necessarily fail in their endeavour since an exact 
reconstruction is an ‘endless quest’ for, at best, ‘partial understanding’92. But, reiterating the 
artists' cultural embeddedness, “artists...become poets or painters or musicians not by some 
process of development within…but by living in a society where these languages are current”93. 
Audiences are therefore “present as an aesthetic factor in artistic labour – defining what the 
problem is which as an artist he is solving, and what the solution is”, and so do not simply 
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‘overhear’ private artistic expressions but are effectively encountering themselves through the 
expressions of artists94. Collingwood then contrasts aesthetic individualism with the notion of 
‘collaboration’. He characterises the artist as a spokesman articulating through media like words 
and pictures and sounds the otherwise inarticulate and ill-expressed experiences of people in a 
community. They are both, artists and audiences, equally a part of a community through sharing 
broadly the same (non-artistic) encounters, and also general understanding of the ‘languages’ of 
art. So Collingwood states that: 
‘the artist…tells his audience, at risk of their displeasure, the secrets of their own hearts. 
 His business as an artist is to speak out, to make a clean breast. But what he has to 
 offer is not, as the individualistic theory of art would have us think, his own secrets. As a 
 spokesman of his community, the secrets he must utter are theirs’95. 
 While correctly indicating problems with an individualistic account of artistic work, 
Collingwood's account is vague on the grounds of real, practical collaboration between artists 
and audiences. The vagueness stems from a failure to distinguish between artists making 
authentic choices to create works of art and other kinds of aesthetic interest shown by makers 
and users more generally. This failure is encapsulated in Collingwood's statements about the 
collaborative role of audiences in relation to artist's work, so that audiences effectively 'define 
artistic problems and solutions' and are also 'told by artists the secrets of their own hearts'. 
Without interpreting Collingwood specifically, Work Theory understands two distinct kinds of 
aesthetic interest here, susceptible to different kinds of aesthetic collaboration, distinguishing 
between problem-setting and solving, on the one hand, and artistic expression on the other. The 
kind of aesthetic 'problem-setting and solving' collaboration that Collingwood alludes to is 
properly and concretely ascribed to the aesthetic interest that designers and users have in 
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everyday made things of utility. Their aesthetic collaboration is a function of our shared human 
needs for everyday made things that function well for us. It can be tied-down then to the 
practicalities of designing and making everything from chairs to computer apps. It is evidently an 
aesthetic collaboration not confined to artists and audiences. Indeed it contrasts with the 
aesthetic 'expressive' collaboration that Collingwood describes in terms of artists delivering 
through their art previously inchoate and unexpressed ideas and feelings present in a 
community. Here, the nexus of aesthetic collaboration between artists and audiences is found in 
an account of authentic artistic choice (rather than in, following Collingwood, developing the 
metaphor of 'community medicine'). 
 Aesthetic collaboration in Collingwoodian terms is not a viable philosophic notion then 
because it is falsely limited to that between artists and audiences; and because aesthetic 
collaboration is a divided notion reflecting different internal relations between artistic and 
design's good work and aesthetic interest. Concluding, Work Theory's functional thesis for art 
does not support aesthetic individualism; but its account of aesthetic collaboration extends 
beyond art, and for art that collaboration is best understood in terms of our aesthetic interest in 
the authenticity of artist's choices to make particular works of art.   
 
Craft as a functional kind 
 
Typically, pro-craft theorists account for its function on a 'craft is art' basis; or at least 
that craft marks out a special kind of making with close connections to art. But theories and 
expressions of this view are various and do not comprise a coherent 'craft theory'. So any 'craft 
theory' is a construction from a variety of sources: I construct such a theory from sources that 
are broadly related around the argument that the idea of craft has been diminished by 
erroneous contrasts with art. These sources have historical as well as conceptual connections 
Work and the Aesthetic  
 79 
from John Ruskin's characterisation of the 'Gothic worker' and its influence on the Arts and 
Crafts Movement, through to Walter Gropius's Bauhaus Manifesto. More recently, ideas about 
craft as a special kind of creative as well as skilled making have reasserted themselves in 
anthologies like The Culture of Craft and in exhibitions of craft work like The Power of Making96. 
Always prompting its historical development, craft theory supplies its own historical narrative of 
the supposed progressive diminution of the craftsman with the dual rise of the idea of art and of 
industrial production. But whatever the merits of this narrative, craft theory focuses its attention 
on craft's relations to art. I will argue that Work Theory establishes these relations by relating 
both art and craft to the idea of good work generally. In so doing, Work Theory is not dependent 
on any particular historical narrative about art and craft; it elucidates a clear distinction between 
art and craft as types of making; and it retains the intuition that both art and craft are 'creative' 
while explaining the different kinds of work and relation to aesthetic interest each represents. I 
conclude that craft as a functional kind supports a different function than art, although both are 
related to good work's internal relation to aesthetic interest.   
* 
 Craft theorist Peter Dormer notes Bauhaus as the highpoint of the idea of ‘craft as art 
and art as craft’97. Walter Gropius’s Bauhaus Manifesto and Programme declared that the visual 
arts should be directed to architecture rather than the ‘isolation of the salon’; and that artists 
should return to learning craft skills and that these skills are a necessary condition of the 
exercise of creative artistry98. Architecture for Bauhaus unified the arts of design, painting and 
                                                
96 Peter Dormer (editor) The Culture of Craft (Manchester University Press, 1997). Daniel 
Charny (Editor), Power of Making (V&A Publishing, 2011) 
97 Peter Dormer, 'Introduction' to the The Culture of Craft 
98 Walter Gropius, The Bauhaus Manifesto, reprinted in Bauhaus: Art as Life exhibition 
catalogue (Koenig Books, 2012), pp.15-17 
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sculpture in the creation of buildings; and the artist then is properly an “exalted craftsman”, his 
proficiency in a craft “the prime source of creative imagination”99. There are a number of 
different claims here that on examination reveal theoretic and practical differences between art 
and craft, rather than support the 'craft theory' thesis of an equivalence or at least close relation 
between art and craft. First, about the privileging of making everyday objects of utility 
('architecture') over works of art ('works for the salon'); second, about the relation between 
specific craft skills and creativity; and third about the artist as exemplary craftsman.  
 First, while acknowledging the typically assertive tone and style of a 20th century 'art 
manifesto', the aesthetic privileging of a category of quotidian made things related to buildings 
over works of art has no obvious theoretic grounding. Work Theory argues that aesthetic 
interest is divided between different aspects of good work, but there is no implication that the 
aesthetic interest of skilled craftsmen in the finish of products, for example, or of designers 
solving everyday design problems, is superior to that of artists conceiving new artworks. All 
products that are made well are made with aesthetic interest. It is true that the range of work 
associated with the 'building' – as conceived by Gropius – allows a whole range of interests to 
flourish, from the building itself to its interior design and the made things that function within it. 
But again for Work Theory, these are best analysed in terms of artistic creation, good design 
and skilled workmanship. Perhaps an 'exalted Bauhausian craftsman' would have all these 
aesthetic interests. But we can say the same about non-conceptual artists who complete the 
making of their works. In any case, an all-round interest  in the 'building' would seem to suggest 
an exceptional individual who, on analysis, is both artist and craftsman – I look at the example 
of Le Corbusier in this context shortly. Second, claims about the necessity of 'craft for art' are 
reasonable on Work Theory's analysis of craft as involving both design and workmanship. If 
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craft is conceived as such, then it is right that craft is necessary to deliver an artistic idea as an 
artefactual work of art. But craft skills are not necessary for the generation of artistic choices to 
make this or that work; and craft skills of course deliver more than artistic conceptions. Third, 
and relatedly, for Work Theory the 'exemplary craftsman' is either a good designer or skilled 
worker (or both). 'Craft theory' is essentially wrong then in contending that the artist fulfils this 
role, since his art (in terms of good work) consists in the choice to make a work of art rather 
than in the design and skill in making it (of course in practice non-conceptual artists at least are 
also designers and skilled craftsmen).  
 These differences between art and craft can be illustrated by the work of Le Corbusier. 
Alongside his  seventy-five buildings and forty-two city-planning projects, for which he is best 
known, he also left behind 8,000 drawings, more than 400 paintings and pictures, and forty-four 
sculptures100. Together with this range of work, his specifically architectural work reveals his 
inventiveness with forms and functions, creating new shapes for existing design problems, 
extending their use to deal with other functional requirements, and also using existing shapes to 
meet other previously unconsidered uses101. Work Theory explains these facets of Le 
Corbusier's architectural work as signs of authenticity in design, rather than as evidence of the 
'art of design'. We can examine a little more closely his famous dictum that a 'house is a 
machine for living in'. Le Corbusier starts with an age-old design problem, the house, but states 
“the problem of the house has not been stated”102. Less rhetorically, he is stating that the design 
                                                
100 Jean-Louis Cohen, Le Corbusier (Taschen, 2006), p.7 
101 Charles Jencks notes, for example, that Le Corbusier's inclined linear building designed to 
shield a stadium finds other functions; and the hyperbolic shape of industrial cooling towers is 
transposed to the design of a church. Le Corbusier and the Tragic View of Architecture 
(Penguin Books, 1987), p.160 
102 Le Corbusier, Towards a New Architecture Translated by Frederick Etchells (The 
Architectural Press 1948), p.100 
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problem for housing needs to be reconceived in the light of the modern needs of people and the 
opportunities that new technologies bring. If a house is conceived as “a shelter against heat, 
cold, rain, thieves and the inquisitive... a receptacle for light and sun... [with] cells appropriated 
to cooking, work and personal life”, then why, he continues, are houses designed the way they 
are, with 'enormous, useless roofs, scanty windows', and so on103. And to keep building in the 
old way is to build with 'eyes which do not see' the possibilities for dealing with the problem of 
housing in new ways. Le Corbusier often photographed his buildings with his latest motor car in 
the foreground; and Towards a New Architecture illustrates the text on the problem and solution 
of housing with photographs of airplanes. The bad designer's eyes do not see these new forms 
(still of course radically new in the early 1920s when Le Corbusier was writing) in the sense that 
they do not see the possibilities they suggest for new forms too in building houses to meet the 
requirements of modern domestic living. The 'new architecture' then remains about the essential 
functional requirements of buildings (housing especially) then, for all its creativity both in 
conceiving modern domestic living and the best forms to meet those needs; remains design 
rather than art in short104. It confirms too the internal relation between good design and the 
designer's aesthetic interest. Good design conceives a design problem fully, does not settle 
unthinkingly on existing design solutions, and works to create forms that are right to meet the 
design's functional requirements. And correspondingly, our aesthetic interest in those right 
forms is an interest in those forms working in practice, being forms that are right for houses and 
so on. Of course whether Le Corbusier's forms are right for houses is a matter of critical 
practice, and so outside the scope of Work Theory.  
                                                
103 Ibid p.106 
104 Le Corbusier is an artist (in terms of Work Theory at least) when he refuses to design a 
facade at the 1958 Brussels World Fair and contributes an Electronic Poem instead – what 
would now be called 'an installation' piece. 
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 The differences between art and craft that Le Corbusier's architecture illustrates refers to 
craft conceived as creative design work. There is another category of cases, where craft's 'art' is 
again seemingly evidenced: this time in workmanship, alongside design, of outstanding quality. 
Here again Work Theory argues that craft – as workmanship 'shown off' by design – indicates a 
specific kind of aesthetic interest in a maker distinguishable from that of the artist. Take an 
example like Benvenuto Cellini's salt-cellar of 1543. This extraordinary piece of tableware is 
hardly recognisable as a salt-cellar. It is made of gold enriched with enamel, the design 
dominated by two principal figures and with many subsidiary figures and decorative forms 
around its ebony base. For all intents and purposes, it is not a salt-cellar but a piece showing off 
(leaving the design aside) its makers extraordinary goldsmithing skills105. The salt-cellar is 
originally commissioned by Cardinal Ippolito d'Este in 1539 and two of his advisors suggest 
designs for Cellini to choose between. But Cellini wants to make something that gives free rein 
to his 'art'. So he rejects the design choices offered him, saying “I cherish the children born of 
my own art”106. For Work Theory, Cellini's 'art' properly refers to his creativity in choosing, in this 
case, a design that allows the mastery of his craft skills to be exhibited. Cellini, like Le 
Corbusier, designs creatively when free from 'eyes that do not see' the possibilities for design 
solutions other than the conventional. But whereas Le Corbusier's design solutions reflect his 
conceptions of the functional requirements  of housing, for example, Cellini's design creativity 
serves his aesthetic interest in the possibilities of his technical skill. The salt-cellar is a 
masterpiece in the old craft sense of the word. And our aesthetic interest in it is an interest in its 
maker's extraordinary execution of his craft skills, in workmanship that is the best of its kind. So 
                                                
105 Of course 'masterpiece' originally referred to a one-off work exhibiting and proving a 
craftsman's skill, their attainment of 'master' status in a craft guild. 
106 Benvenuto Cellini, Autobiography (Penguin Books, 1998), p.237 
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our aesthetic interest in the salt-cellar then, like Cellini's in making it, is effectively liberated from 
its function, but it nevertheless remains a craft object rather than 'craft as art'107. 
 Concluding, Work Theory argues that the aesthetic interests of craftsmen as designers 
and skilled workers does not indicate their 'art', but aesthetic interests specific to good design 
and workmanship. As such, craft, so conceived, is a significant contributor to our aesthetic lives 
without it being art (and without any theoretic requirement that craftsmen be properly called 
artists). Craft functions then to support made things of authentic design and workmanship, 
where authenticity is revealed by creative choices of how to make something. As a functional 
kind it differs from art, which supports authentic choices to make unique works.
                                                
107 A similar set of cases relates to objects of everyday use but made for ceremonial use of 
some kind, never to be used for their function, for example, the Canterbury Jade Axe and 
many similar objects in the British Museum. 
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PART 2 
SECTION 3 WORK THEORY AND AESTHETIC EDUCATION 
 
1. Art-appreciative and moral-political aims 
 
 In philosophical aesthetics the idea of aesthetic education has traditionally been 
elaborated in two distinct, although not mutually exclusive, ways. I term them the 'art-
appreciative' and 'moral-political' (distinctions within these two categories soon become evident 
too). Alongside these – under the broad term 'art education' – are various practical approaches 
either to training artists, designers and craftsmen, or to teaching the appreciation of artworks. 
My focus here is on the idea of aesthetic education in philosophical aesthetics as elaborated in 
art-appreciative and moral-political ways, although in formulating an idea of aesthetic education 
appropriate art educative practices naturally come into consideration.  
* 
 One set of ideas of aesthetic education centres on the appreciation of works of art and 
the cultivation of a special sensibility to them (I call this 'art-appreciative'). Within this concept of 
aesthetic education, formalist and expressionist approaches to learning to appreciate works of 
art, after Paul Hirst's categorisation, are identifiable108. Summarily, the formalist approach 
educates the spectator of works of art by directing him to the formal properties of works – 
                                                
108 Paul Hirst in 'Aesthetic Education' in A Companion to Aesthetics Edited by David Cooper 
(Blackwell, 1992) identifies formalist and expressionist approaches to categorise all aesthetic 
education: I am arguing then that his division is properly a sub-division of the 'art-
appreciative' and fails to distinguish a separate primary categorisation of 'moral-political' 
aesthetic educational ideas.  
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including their patterns of colour and line and spatial relations – that supposedly exclusively 
support aesthetic experience of them in those terms. Expressionists direct spectators to formal 
properties but extend the relevant features of works of art for aesthetic appreciation beyond 
formal aesthetic properties to, for example, representational features of a work. But both 
approaches typically adopt a 'see it as I see it' educative technique. The educator points out 
features in a work that induce us to experience it aesthetically in particular ways. Education then 
is persuasive and iterative, aiming at producing spectators who can aesthetically experience 
works in a discriminating way (with 'taste' in some descriptions). So, following Frank Sibley's 
example (in the expressionist educative mode), we are capable of a fuller aesthetic appreciation 
of Breughel's Fall of Icarus when the small splash indicating Icarus' plunge into the sea is made 
aware to us and contrasted with the large foreground figure, a ploughman, going about his 
everyday business109. Then we experience, like W.H. Auden, how human suffering takes place 
amidst ordinary, everyday events and that we are able to turn away because it is not important 
to us directly – “the ploughman may/Have heard the splash, the forsaken cry,/But for him it was 
not an important failure”110. This type of aesthetic education, in Arnold Isenberg's 
characterisation of art criticism, is a 'retrial of experience', education to a 'second aesthetic 
moment' more discriminating than the preceding111. 
* 
                                                
109 Frank Sibley, 'Aesthetic Concepts' in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art Edited by Peter 
Lamarque and Stein Hauhom (Blackwell, 2004), p.136 
110 Extract from W.H. Auden's poem 'Musee des Beaux Arts' 
111 Arnold Isenberg, 'Critical Communication' in Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism 
(University of Chicago Press, 1973), p.168 
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 The second broad conceptualisation of aesthetic education is premised on the supposed 
developmental possibilities of aesthetic experience for all of one's life, beyond the cultivation of 
a discriminating taste in works of art (I call this the 'moral-political'). While Hirst's general 
expressionist categorisation links art appreciation to the cultivation of a range of sensibilities in 
individuals that are employed beyond the arts, the moral-political category indicates aesthetic 
education that also educates people in new forms of personal and societal life. Friedrich 
Schiller's On the Aesthetic Education of Man remains the seminal work in this tradition. Paul 
Guyer places Schiller alongside William Morris, John Ruskin and John Dewey in arguing that 
aesthetic experience allows a distinctive “freedom to develop our imaginative and cognitive 
capacities, to gain knowledge of ourselves and others, and to imagine new ways of life, a 
freedom that is valued not simply for its own sake but also because of the benefits the 
developments of these capacities can bring to the rest of our lives". Guyer could reasonably 
have added Karl Marx to the list of names, and with him related ideas about the supposed 
aesthetic character of free or disalienated labour. In any case, there are a number of claims 
here, but in terms of the idea of aesthetic education there is a distinctive claim implied about its 
purpose, namely that it is an education in, or that results in, improving one's and society's 
general life. The moral and political aims of aesthetic education based on a developmental 
conception of aesthetic experience outlined by Guyer have been variously expounded. So by 
way of introduction – I investigate the moral-political idea of aesthetic education in detail below – 
Herbert Read argues in this tradition for an aesthetic education that both cultivates sensibility to 
aesthetic experience and expands the realm of that experience beyond the art gallery to every 
worker's experience of their everyday labour. For Read, the aesthetically unsophisticated 
worker in an art gallery (the 'strayed riveter') does not need the art-critical education of 'see what 
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I see' but the chance to be an artist himself (“every man is a special kind of artist”). Then, so the 
argument goes, workers create their own culture – in short, the aim of aesthetic education is to 
create a democratic society of makers out of 'strayed riveters', not to get them to appreciate 
existing works of art. And that is achieved, in addition to using broadly 'art education' methods, 
by reorganising general production methods in ways that encourage aesthetic interest, even to 
making 'pots and pans' aesthetically. 
The moral-political idea of aesthetic education then shares with the art-appreciative view 
an idea of cultivating aesthetic experience but extends its scope for moral-political ends. Of 
course the experience of art too can be put straightforwardly to political use when used as 
propaganda (Soviet Socialist Realism, for example) but ex hypothesi, for Work Theory, it is 
therefore excluded from the category of the aesthetic. However, I return to the case of 
Lehrstucke or learning-plays (and of 21st century participative theatre) in the context of Work 
Theory later, where the idea of the experience of making a political artwork does have relevance 
for the idea of aesthetic education conceived in moral-political terms. 
*    
 Concluding these introductory remarks, given Work Theory's internal relations between 
good work and aesthetic interest, is the idea of aesthetic education correct in the terms set out 
by theorists of the 'art-appreciative' or 'moral-political' view? I will argue that the art-appreciative 
idea of aesthetic education rightly characterises the essentially persuasive character of 
aesthetic education in appreciating individual works of art – and that this persuasion properly 
draws on a spectator's everyday experience outside that of artworks, after Sibley. But this extra-
artistic source of aesthetic interest is not a 'blessing' (a pre-existing special sensibility – of 
general 'good taste' – that can then be attuned to appreciating works of art), but is cultivated 
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itself by an individual's experience of good work in making and using generally. And this good 
work is divided between experiences of artistic originality, and of the design and workmanship 
that delivers unique works of art and everyday functional objects. I will also argue that the 
moral-political view rightly suggests an educative aspect of aesthetic experience beyond the 
appreciation of artworks to enriched ways of living, and one that is gained through aesthetic 
activities – broadly through making and performing. But for Work Theory these activities, as 
good work, necessarily engage aesthetic interest in the maker and spectator, and are not in 
need of extrinsic justification in moral-political terms.  
 I conclude therefore that the idea of aesthetic education is properly viewed as simply a 
summary term including just those educational arrangements that relate to the idea of good 
work, namely that support its creative choice, design and workmanship aspects. It does not 
essentially serve any specifiable appreciative, moral or political aims – even though some such 




 Nick McAdoo notes that Sibley's theoretic connection of aesthetic concepts to non-
aesthetic features of artworks “opens the door to the educability of taste”112. Sibley's account of 
the logic of aesthetic discourse argues that recognising non-aesthetic features require only 
normal sense detection and some understanding of artistic terms relevant to the medium under 
inspection; but attributing aesthetic qualities to artworks require something more. Still, and 
                                                
112 Nick McAdoo, 'Sibley and the Art of Persuasion' in Aesthetic Concepts (Edited by Emily 
Brady and Jerrold Levinson, 2001), p.46 
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critically in terms of aesthetic education, non-aesthetic and aesthetic are linked by the fact that 
“aesthetic concepts all carry with them attachments and in one way or another are tethered to or 
parasitic upon non-aesthetic features”113. Sibley counters then Stuart Hampshire's speculation 
that a perfect group of aesthetes would be 'disengaged from practical needs and manipulations', 
arguing Hampshire's understanding of aesthetic experience would effectively blind us to many 
aesthetic qualities we can appreciate by association with non-aesthetic features114. Still Sibley 
acknowledges that the 'puzzling feature' remains of how a critic can justify or support his 
aesthetic judgements by “pointing out the features , including easily discernible non-aesthetic 
ones, upon which the aesthetic qualities depend”115. Sibley's answer is to describe what the 
critic does, how he gets his audience to 'see what he sees' through the power of persuasion. 
Sibley's description of the critic's persuasive work falls under seven broad headings: pointing 
out the non-aesthetic; pointing out the aesthetic; pointing out the links in instances of both; using 
similes and metaphors; using contrasts and comparisons; repeating and reiterating points; and 
using non-verbal communication like gesturing.  
 In short then, Sibley argues that aesthetic education is always, and can only ever be, a 
matter of getting someone to read again or look again and so on. He states, “this is what 
succeeds if anything does; indeed it is all that can be done”116. Sibley grounds our aesthetic 
sensibility towards artworks in our supposed pre-existing sensibility to aesthetic concepts and 
our upbringing. So, for example, given our natural potentialities and tendencies for aesthetic 
experience, we further learn about grace and delicacy and other aesthetic concepts as children 
                                                
113 Sibley p.136  
114 Ibid, p.136 Sibley quotes Hampshire here. 
115 Ibid, p.134 
116 Ibid, p.137 
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taught by parents and teachers in the presence of graceful and delicate objects and behaviours. 
These methods are, according to Sibley, of a piece with those of the professional art critic, who 
effectively broadens out that same method of acquaintance and persuasion to greater levels of 
subtlety and autonomy117. Sibley argues then in effect for an aesthetic realism about 
judgements of aesthetic (dis)value. There are, in other words, aesthetic reasons that justify 
aesthetic experiences. Work Theory supports some such version of aesthetic realism, but 
argues that aesthetic experiences are justified by reasons that explain aesthetic (dis)pleasure in 
terms of a made thing's 'fit' or 'rightness' for its function. And by extension then, aesthetic 
education is possible in so far as we are educable in fitness and function. This aesthetic 
education is not an education in taste per se  – building only on a supposed natural propensity 
to find a disinterested (dis)pleasure in the perception of things – but  specifiable around 
activities that are necessarily involved in making things118. 
   Work Theory suggests that practical needs and manipulations, rather than being 
antithetical to aesthetic experience, necessarily engage our aesthetic interest in so far as that 
                                                
117 Ibid, p.138 
118 Note should be made then that the point of contention is, broadly, the requirement for , and 
education of, taste. Sibley extends the critic's repertoire beyond Clive Bell, for example, who 
famously limits aesthetic appreciation to a work's formal elements of colour, line, mass and so 
on. So “to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing but a sense of form and colour 
and a knowledge of three-dimensional space” combinations of which are 'significant form' (Clive 
Bell, Art (Oxford University Press, 1987) p.27). In other words, all people must have is an 
emotion for pure form (and this is the unique aesthetic emotion); the role of the critic is to make 
the appreciator feel the emotion for himself by continually 'pointing [significant form] out' (Bell, 
p.9). Soon after Bell, art critics like Roger Fry sympathetic to Bell still pointed out that an interest 
in form does not eliminate an interest in representation nor references back to life. Sibley no 
doubt follows Fry in that regard but is still committed to an aesthetic education of taste. 
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work is good. It connects art appreciation in particular to an artwork's creation, formulation and 
technique. Our aesthetic experience of an artwork then can be justified in terms of its creative 
authenticity, its right form and skilled workmanship. Aesthetic concepts relate to these aspects 
of a work. To say a work of art is 'delicate' may mean an artistic idea is delicately handled or 
that workmanship delivering an idea (however indelicate in itself) is delicate. In other words, 
what justifies the use of an aesthetic concept is its appropriateness to aspects of good work, 
that in turn are explicable independently of appeals to taste, being appeals to a felt sense of the 
authenticity of that idea and to its delivery. Of course the persuasive techniques that Sibley 
describes may well be used to encourage our aesthetic appreciation of a work; but for Work 
Theory they properly have a specifiable content in terms of good work to which appeal is being 
made ('see how that works as an artistic idea in this medium so that you feel...'). Appeals to 
taste are redundant. And this marks a significant difference from a Sibleyan idea of aesthetic 
education (for art appreciation). The Sibleyan idea trusts to our natural propensities to aesthetic 
judgement or taste built up over time by educators using their rhetorical force to 'see it like I see 
it'. Contrastingly, Work Theory explains aesthetic interest in terms of good work, implying the 
possibility of aesthetic education for art appreciation through knowledge of artistic ideas, the use 
of form, and skilful applications of artistic techniques of production. It therefore breaks the 
possible, non-virtuous circle of taste (where my taste depends on your critical taste). This circle 
is evident in McAdoo's argument, after Sibley, that “we cannot force ourselves to feel... on such 
occasions then [appreciating artworks], we have only the critic's expressive and empathetic 
powers to fall back on”119. Rather, Work Theory connects aesthetic experiences of artworks 
(and beyond) to our experiences of fit and function generally, and therefore in essence to 
                                                
119 McAdoo, p.38 
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educable information and skills about artistic ideas and making things well. And these in turn 
necessarily engage our aesthetic interest. So although aesthetic appreciation, at least the 
consummatory aesthetic experience at least, may indeed be involuntary, still our aesthetic 
interest is 'forced' by the demands made on us by attending to a work's artistic ideas and its 
materialisation. As spectators and users of works (art and beyond) – least of all as makers – we 
are not then dependent on the 'rhetorical force' of aesthetic discourse for aesthetic experience 
but on the more clearly educable grounds of good work. Work Theory then supplies a different 
material of aesthetic appreciation of artworks than the Sibleyan model: that material is our 
interest in form and skilful workmanship delivering an artistic idea rather than a passive 
aesthetic sensibility awakened by the persuasive art lover.  
 The idea of aesthetic education reaching deeply into our interest in form and 
workmanship, beyond non-utilitarian delight in perceptual richness, and beyond artworks too, is 




 It is an elementary categorisation to distinguish the moral-political aims of individual 
artworks from any aims attributed to art as an activity in general. An artist may want his work to 
change our view on a range of social and political issues, from poverty to women's rights120. Or 
                                                
120 So, for example, a recent anthology of political art includes artists commenting on poverty 
and rights, but also using artworks to criticize transnational oil companies, to express their 
powerlessness in the face of totalitarian governments in Latin America, to comment on the 
radical changes taking place in China and artworks calling for an end to cronyism and 
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it may be that art generally, as an activity of making or appreciating or both, is regarded as 
necessary for the development of certain moral-political goals like the development of the 'whole 
man'. Unsurprisingly then, moral-political ideas of education through art (as yet still theoretically 
distinct from aesthetic education) range from the moral-politically expedient use of artworks to 
essentialist views that there is something of moral-political significance about all art as an 
activity. I examine these moral-political variants of 'education through art' in the light of their 
contributions to an idea of aesthetic education.  
* 
 Politically expedient 'education through art' is perhaps most easily characterised and 
explained given its 20th century apotheosis in the Zhdanov Doctrine of socialist realism. The 
Zhdanov Doctrine was the highpoint of Soviet socialist realism, explicitly demanding that art 
‘remoulded and educated people in the spirit of socialism’121. The doctrine committed artists to 
exclusively realist artworks and censored non-realist works. The non-realist experimentation 
with art forms of the Russian Avant-Garde in the 1920s in the Soviet Union (including Komfut, 
the communist futurists, and the Constructivists) gave way then to the artistic conservatism of 
socialist realism in the 1930s. Marxist humanists like Ernst Fischer commented on the 
“bureaucratic dictatorship of amateurishness over the creative imagination [in the Soviet Union 
and other socialist countries at the time] ... That is why a socialist can only speak with sorrow 
and anger of the boots and hooves which, again and again, trample upon the green wheat [of 
                                                                                                                                                       
environmental destruction. See Robert Klanten, Art and Agenda: Political Art and Activism 
(Die Gestalten Verlag, 2011) 
121  Andrei Zhdanov, 'Soviet Literature: the Richest in Ideas, The Most Advanced Literature' in 
Soviet Writers' Congress 1934: The Debate on Socialist Realism and Modernism (Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1977) 
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artistic creation]”122. Fischer argues a core Marxist aesthetics that art in some way fulfils a 
didactic political function, at least under capitalism, but he also views art as a universal 'creative' 
human activity123. The 'prevention of literature', as George Orwell called it, under Soviet arts 
policy meant putting the arts solely in the service of political ends: what was produced was 
propaganda in other words124. And like Fischer, Orwell's distinction between didactic works and 
propaganda rests on the absence of artistic spontaneity in choosing to make an artwork. In 
other words and in terms of Work Theory, artworks can fulfil didactic aims but those aims must 
be authentically chosen. So, for example, Orwell argues that Jonathan Swift's political satire 
Gulliver's Travels is a 'great work of art', rather than mere propaganda, because of the author's 
own 'intensity of vision'125.  
 The idea of non-realist didacticism is perhaps most famously associated with Bertold 
Brecht's Lehrstucke or learning-plays and related ideas of political art including 21st century 
                                                
122 Ernst Fischer quoted by Granville Williams, 'Review of Fischer's Art Against Ideology' (1970) 
available at http://www.marxists.org/history 
123 In Fischer, and Marxism generally, this 'creativity' is universal but suppressed under non-
communist conditions of production. I do not pursue that theory here, but in short: the dual 
aspect in Fischer's Marxist aesthetics (the social criticism of art and its universal character) 
can be broadly explained in terms of a simple distinction between art under capitalism and 
socialist art, and art conceived as paradigmatic at least of the aesthetic lives of makers that 
will be led under communist conditions of production. The latter appeals to Karl Marx's 
account of human labour under capitalist and communist conditions of production in 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Progress Publishers, 1977): work becomes 
a mere means to existence, but in a de-alienated state of affairs, so the argument goes, 
control and creative scope in production are returned to the worker, and 'in place of the 
wealth and poverty of political economy come the rich human being and rich human need'. 
124 George Orwell, 'The Prevention of Literature', in Essays (Penguin Books, 1994) 
125 George Orwell, 'Politics vs Literature: An Examination of Gulliver's Travels', in Essays, p.386 
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'Social Practice'. Non-realism was variously argued and practiced by Marxist aestheticians 
outside the Soviet orthodoxy, notably by Walter Benjamin and Brecht, and later by Theodor 
Adorno. Benjamin and Adorno, among many others, became associated with the Frankfurt 
School’s aesthetic modernism, which included a view of the revolutionary and emancipatory 
value of experimental art. The supposed 'emancipatory' value of the arts has since been 
thematic in politically didactic art. What form that moral-political 'education through art' takes 
changes; but what remains at its core is an, albeit diffuse and sometimes contested, idea of 
'participation'126. For Brecht, 'learning plays' contrast with 'Aristotelian plays': the latter show the 
world as it is, while the former show how it can be changed127. Theatrical techniques were 
developed with the intention of 'making the stage didactic', forcing individual audience members 
to participate in a work by critically responding to ideas expressed in plays rather than by 
responding emotionally as a 'mob' – the theatre becomes 'a place for philosophers'128. Brechtian 
participative didacticism extends into a variety of artistic forms beyond both the theatre and the 
idea of changing minds. Perhaps its apotheosis is 'Social Practice' art, where participation 
involves members of the public both 'making' and 'performing' artworks, so that audience 
participation goes beyond a Brechtian intellectual engagement to an active creation of works 
and new social situations, so the argument goes129. Before examining Brechtian and Social 
                                                
126 It is significant to note that this idea of 'participation' also figures in government funding for 
arts projects, where (in some form or another) it is a requirement. I do not comment on the 
various ends this 'participation' is supposed to achieve. 
127 Bertold Brecht, 'Introductory Note' to The Measures Taken and other Lehrstucke (Methuen, 
1977) 
128 Ibid, p.6 
129 Claire Bishop rightly notes this moral-political idea of 'participation' is distinct from what I 
have termed the 'art-appreciative' which might extend to an individual spectator using new 
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Practice didacticism in the light of Work Theory, some examples give a flavour of this artistic 
movement's moral-political idea of 'education through art'.  
 Shannon Jackson cites examples where the public 'play roles' in artists' works: "Ann 
Carson's scripted scenarios for 'Real People'.. Jeremy Deller who staged a re-enactment of a 
1984 miners' strike in working-class England, and many other artists…"130. And two of those 
others are described in a little more detail: “in a modest kiosk installed in New York's Times 
Square, Paul Ramirez Jonas distributes thousands of custom-based 'keys to the city' of New 
York. Re-defining a ritual that is usually reserved for visiting luminaries, Jonas democratises this 
civic honour, granting to everyday citizens special access to cultural landmarks throughout the 
city”. And: “in a commissioned art piece in Zurich, the artist collective WochenKlauser invite sex-
workers, politicians, journalists and activists to take a boat ride on Lake Zurich; gathered around 
the table of a main cabin, they are instructed to 'have a conversation' in an 'Intervention to Aid 
Drug-Addicted Women' that is both an art piece and a social process”131. The didacticism of 
Social Practice artworks like these is described as creating “forms of living that activate 
communities and advance public awareness of pressing social issues"132. Concluding this 
summary of Social Practice art, it is worth noting too that debate within its advocates and 
                                                                                                                                                       
interactive technologies to engage with existing artworks, for example, Claire Bishop, 
'Introduction' to Participation (Whitechapel Books Ltd, 2006), p.10  
130 Shannon Jackson, Social Works: Performing Art, Supporting Publics, (Routledge, 2011), p.1 
131 Both examples from Jackson, p.12  
132 Anne Pasternak, 'Preface' to Living as Form: Socially Engaged Art from 1991 to 2011 (MIT 
Press, 2012) 
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practitioners has resulted in a 'manual' of techniques and materials, an education in its 
educative aims133. 
* 
The distinction between political art and propaganda was made vivid by 20th century 
totalitarianism. The artist motivated by social conditions to write or paint scenes that evoke 
emotional and intellectual responses in audiences stands in marked contrast to the party hack 
producing to political instruction (and to the persecuted artist unwilling to follow the party line)134. 
Work Theory only confirms that distinction in terms of the necessary authenticity of truly artistic 
work. However, a significant point is thus reinforced: that political art does not necessarily fall on 
the propagandist side of an art-propaganda division because it (too) can be authentically 
created. This is significant because it supports an idea of aesthetic education with a moral-
political dimension in addition to the 'art-appreciative'; and so also an idea that is distinct from 
moral-political 'education through art'. 
But what then is an authentic choice in making when the choice is premised on the 
intended work functioning politically? Returning critically to the examples of Social Practice art, 
the participative roles of the public in these artworks are intended to deliver political goals. 
Receiving keys to the city or an invite to converse on a social issue from a political artist 
suggests, in terms of Work Theory, that our aesthetic interest as a participant still be one in the 
artist's creation of those situations. Are they recognisably his (so that I may participate in a 
                                                
133 Pablo Helquera, Education for Socially Engaged Art, (Jorge Pinto Books, 2011)  
134 Of many accurate descriptions of the difference, I merely offer Collingwood's: propaganda 
aims only to arouse a political emotion or prejudice that is “canalized into the activities of 
everyday life … modifying those activities in the interest of the social or political unit 
concerned” (p.73 Principles of Art). 
Work and the aesthetic  
99 
genuine political work rather than a 'party rally')? (And then, of course, our aesthetic interest 
extends to how the situation has been designed and delivered.) In other words, Work Theory 
concludes that  any moral-political function of an artwork – that supports then a moral-political 
dimension to the idea of aesthetic education – is explicable within Work Theory's account of 
good work's internal relations to aesthetic interest. There is no theoretic requirement for an 
external set of moral-political ideals that would justify this or that political work nor a singular 
idea of aesthetic education: rather, our aesthetic interest in good work establishes an interest in 
the authenticity per se of individual political works. And that is something like Orwell's 
conclusion to his examination of Gulliver's Travels as revealing the proper relations between 
politics and literature: of the political artist, “the most one can ask of him is that he shall 
genuinely believe in what he is saying, and that it shall not be something blazingly silly”135.  
* 
Individual political artworks can be authentically created; and support that 
characterisation at least of a moral-political idea of aesthetic education. Still, it remains to be 
seen whether the view is correct that there is something of moral-political significance about all 
art as an activity; and indeed whether the idea of a moral-political aesthetic education properly 
extends beyond considerations of political art and of art-making to the significance of making 





                                                
135 Orwell, 'Politics vs Literature', p.386 
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2. Function and flourishing 
  
 To summarise the arguments for an idea of aesthetic education so far, Work Theory 
concludes that aesthetic education is a broad church embracing aspects of both art appreciation 
and the wider goals of moral and political improvement and change through political artworks. 
But neither of these available goals of aesthetic education are determined by ideas extrinsic to 
the idea of good work and its relation to aesthetic interest. In other words, the idea of aesthetic 
education is not best explained in terms of education to establish and enhance a separate 
faculty of artistic taste; nor of any pre-established moral-political commitment that should 
determine an artwork's style and content.  
 These conclusions are developed by examining again the Arts and Crafts Movement's 
political and educational position on art and making more generally; and subsequent similar 
statements about art and design education epitomised by the Bauhaus School, up to present-
day aspirations for the 'power of making'. Using these illustratively, I will argue there are 
grounds for an idea of aesthetic education that enlarges upon the 'art-appreciative' and overtly 
'moral-political' elements discussed above to also include the moral and social benefits intrinsic 
to creating, designing and delivering functional objects, including artworks, well.   
 
 'Arts and Crafts' 
 
 William Morris's lectures on the arts in the late 19th century were exhortations for working 
methods based on individual workers having control over their working time, tools and 
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products136. The Arts and Crafts Movement that Morris (along with John Ruskin) inspired 
codified and publicised its practices through various societies and organizations like the Arts 
and Crafts Exhibition Society and Charles Ashbee’s Guild and School of Handicraft, each 
producing its own literature, which ranged from practical handbooks to political exhortations137. 
Later, William Lethaby’s lectures, often to organizations that were part of the movement, were 
published as Form in Civilisation, and all can be read as texts in aesthetic education138. Lethaby 
founded London’s School of Arts and Crafts in 1896, now Saint Martins School of Art and 
Design. Like Morris, he advised government of the need for education in the arts for reasons 
that extended beyond appreciation of the fine arts. In summary, 'Arts and Crafts' promotes 
aesthetics as a “philosophy of right labour” and aesthetic education as “education in fine forms 
of production”139. The moral-political dimension of the 'arts' extends then to the supposed 
benefits that accrue to individuals and society because work itself is, broadly speaking, skilled, 
pleasurable and for use. The following quotes illustrate the key features of this 'philosophy' and 
the related idea of 'aesthetic education'. These features are broadly a general view of 'art' as all 
kinds of handicraft making, including making objects of use; and a view of the negative effect of 
the division of labour on the possibility of art so construed.  
Thomas Cobden-Sanderson, artist and bookbinder: “art, as a manifestation of the artistic 
spirit, has its origin, or, to speak more correctly perhaps, its opportunity in Craft, and Craft in the 
                                                
136 See for example, William Morris, Hopes and Fears for Art: Five Lectures Delivered in 
Birmingham, London and Nottingham (Ellis and White, 1883) 
137 For a comprehensive list of key figures in the Arts and Crafts Movement see An Anthology of 
the Arts and Crafts Movement Edited by Mary Greensted (Lund Humphries, 2005) 
138 William Lethaby, Form in Civilisation (Oxford University Press, 1922) 
139 Ibid, p.167 
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needs of life”. Walter Crane, artist and designer, similarly stated: “make a man responsible, and 
give him the credit of his own skill in his work: his self-respect at once increases, and he is 
stimulated to do his best; he will take a pride and pleasure in his work; it becomes personal and 
therefore interesting.” Lethaby therefore held that “if we gathered the children who now dance at 
street corners into some better dancing-grounds, might we not hope for a new music, a new 
drama and a new architecture?”140. But this ‘Craft’ does not place proscriptions on artistic 
vehicles and styles: “as the needs of life vary from generation to generation, and from age to 
age, so must vary the objects [aims] of Craft, and with them the modes of manifestation of the 
artistic spirit”; so, “work, incessant work, with Beauty for our everlasting aim,” urges Thomas 
Cobden-Sanderson, and with it “the extension of the conception of art”141.  
Returning to Morris, he stresses the importance of an idea of 'undivided labour' for art 
and aesthetic education: “So far from his [the handicraftsman's] labour being “divided,” which is 
the technical phrase for his always doing one minute piece of work... he must know all about the 
ware he is making and its relation to similar wares... He must be allowed to think of what he is 
doing, and to vary his work as the circumstances of it vary, and his own moods... He must have 
a voice... Such a man I should call, not an operative, but a workman. You may call him an artist 
if you will, for I have been describing the qualities of artists as I know them”142. And “all works of 
craftsmanship were once beautiful, unwittingly or not” (in an age before the capitalistic division 
of labor), and so there was no category of “Art” as such. The very act of making in de-alienated 
                                                
140 Lethaby quoted in Greensted, p.42 
141 Thomas Cobden-Sanderson (19th century artist and bookbinder) quoted in Greensted, p.41 
142 William Morris, Hopes and Fears for Art, pp.164-165 
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conditions is to “share in art”143. Finally, it is worth noting the influence of Karl Marx (explicitly 
acknowledged by Morris at least). In The German Ideology Marx writes: “the exclusive 
concentration of artistic talent in particular individuals and its related suppression among the 
mass of people is a consequence of the division of labour”; and “in a communist society there 
are no painters, but at most people who among other things also paint”144.  
* 
Both of the two key features determining the 'Arts and Crafts' idea of aesthetic education 
– the general ideas of 'art' and 'undivided labour' – are flawed. First, the general idea of 'art' as a 
kind of making fails to properly distinguish good work's divided aesthetic interest between art, 
design and workmanship. Art is falsely characterised as 'craft proper', drawing the false 
conclusion that education and training in craft skills comprises a complete art and aesthetic 
education. Work Theory notes that training in a craft skill engages aesthetic interest when the 
skill is properly exercised: rightly then 'Arts and Crafts' makes no appeal to some aesthetic 
sensibility supposedly outside of the exercise of any skill (as Crane's quote illustrates). But our 
aesthetic interest extends back to designing objects of everyday function and to authentic 
choices to make artworks. The latter also reveals that the 'Arts and Crafts' identification of 
artistic imagination with human needs met by craft – the kind of identity Cobden-Sanderson 
posits – simply omits a separate aesthetic interest in making and appreciating original works of 
art. Similarly, Lethaby's hope for 'new art' from the new skills-based art schools neglects the 
                                                
143 William Morris, 'The Beauty of Life' in Collected Works, Volume 22, (Russell and Russell, 
1966), p.58 
144 Karl Marx, The German Ideology Edited and Introduced by C.J. Arthur (Lawrence and 
Wishart, 1977), p.109  
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uneducable act of artistic origination that is separate from the educable aspects of design and 
technique.  
Second, and relatedly, the 'Arts and Crafts' idea of 'undivided labour' fails to properly 
argue a reasonable level of division of tasks in making things, and in the different kinds of 
aesthetic interest that can be shown at different stages in the process of making something. 
Adam Smith observed that “the division of labour occasions, in every art, a proportionable 
increase of the productive powers of labour” and famously gave the example of pin production 
divided between workers so that “one draws out the wire, another straightens it, a third cuts it, a 
fourth points it,” and so on145. He additionally asserted that the division of labour is “carried 
furthest in those countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement”, thus 
suggesting its moral advantage, too. Ruskin denied any such moral advantage to the division of 
labour; indeed, “we give it a false name. It is not, truly speaking, the labour that is divided, but 
the men; —Divided into mere segments of men . . . so that all the little piece of intelligence that 
is left in a man is not enough to make a pin. . . . we manufacture everything there except 
men”146. It is reasonable to doubt a literal take on this scenario of a radically 'undivided labour' 
(one in which there are no specialist artists at all), but it expresses an important conception of 
the nature of all human beings as potential artists, and therefore a moral-political dimension to 
making generally. G. A. Cohen develops these themes: “why should a man or woman not find 
fulfilment in his or her work as a [specialized] painter . . . what is so bad about a person 
dedicating himself to one or a small number of lines of activity only?” But then Cohen answers 
his own doubt: “there is nothing wrong with a division of labour in which each type of work has 
                                                
145  Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York Modern Library, 2000) p.4 
146  John Ruskin, The Lamp of Beauty: Writings on Art Edited by Joan Evans (Phaidon, 1995), 
p.261 
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value”147. Work Theory suggests that such a virtuous division of labour could not extend to the 
extremes of Smith’s pin production: how can someone employed solely in 'straightening a piece 
of wire' have an  aesthetic interest in this work? But Work Theory's distinction between 
individual workmanship of risk (which engages the worker's aesthetic interest in getting the 
finish right) and good design does suggest that an aesthetic interest in 'perfectly straight pins' 
can be part of the production process. The aesthetic interest in the pin is at the design stage. 
And that sets up a requirement for precision in production that is best met by mechanised 
production. 'Arts and Crafts' traditionally fails to recognise this distinction and the possibility 
therefore of a workmanship of certainty (non-handicraft delivery of designs) that also delivers 
products of aesthetic interest to makers as designers and to users, thus extending the idea of 
aesthetic education beyond the application of traditional craft skills. It was essentially on this 
point that Herbert Read, for example, concluded that the Arts and Crafts argument of Ruskin's 
The Stones of Venice was lost: (some) machine art is 'abstractedly' beautiful – beautiful, that is, 
without any dependence on the work of a human hand. Read is arguing for the aesthetic 
interest proper to the workmanship of certainty, in other words, workmanship whose aesthetic 
value is determined by the work of an 'abstract artist' or designer. And in doing so, he indicates 
the limitation of the 'Arts and Crafts' idea of good work as strictly handicraft. In terms of Work 
Theory, the kind of control over production processes that 'Arts and Crafts' identifies with 
handicraft – recalling especially Morris's views as quoted above – properly extends to the 
control exercised by designers working with automated production processes, still with an 
aesthetic interest in the finish of products. 
                                                
147 G.A. Cohen, 'Reconsidering Historical Materialism' in Marxist Theory Edited by Alex 
Callinicos (Oxford University Press, 1989), p.159 
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Bauhaus and 'art-craft' today   
 
Read properly conceded his debt to Walter Gropius and the Bauhaus school of 
architecture and design in these regards148. The Bauhaus's first director, Walter Gropius, 
acknowledged and developed 'Arts and Crafts' principles without their qualms about the use of 
machine production. Still, for Work Theory the first Bauhaus Manifesto repeats some of the 'Arts 
and Crafts' flaws of loosely identifying art with craft. It is worth a brief detour to Bauhaus given 
its influence or at least similarity with later ideas of 'art-craft' – like those represented at the 
Victoria and Albert Museum's 2011 Power of Making exhibition – and the idea of appropriate 
aesthetic education that follows149. The Manifesto states that the school aimed “to unify the 
visual arts around architecture” based on idea that there is “no essential difference between art 
and craft but art is exalted or inspirational craft”150. A workshop-based education thus seemed 
most appropriate, focusing on different craft skills with the idea that, while 'art' could not be 
taught, artistry might be inspired in exercising these skills. In terms of aesthetic education 
(rather than education in a particular skill, which is not the concern here) Work Theory again 
argues that our aesthetic interest in different aspects of good work suggests its education is 
properly similarly divided. Education in craft skills engages an aesthetic interest in the delivery 
and finish of pre-designed products. It is not a sufficient condition of 'artistry', unless 'artistry' is 
misleadingly equated with that aesthetic interest. It also confuses the idea of our aesthetic 
                                                
148 Herbert Read, Art and Industry (Faber and Faber Limited, 1934), p.39 
149 See the exhibition catalogue: Daniel Charny (Editor), Power of Making (V&A Publishing, 
2011) 
150 Walter Gropius, 'Bauhaus Manifesto', from Bauhaus: Art as Life, p.15. (Directors after 
Gropius changed the school's focus, but I do not discuss here.) 
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interest in art as artists and appreciators of art: for Work Theory that interest is not sufficiently 
explained in terms of 'exalted craft' but is indicated by the authenticity of an artist's expressive 
ideas, ideas which relate to his personal, rather than exclusively workshop, experiences. 
Additionally, the Bauhaus conception of the artist as a 'master of form' directing the craftsman's 
workmanship confuses the aesthetic interest of design with that of authentic expression. As a 
matter of fact too, it led Bauhaus to quickly develop a distinctive formal style, famously around 
primary colours and basic geometry, which inevitably falsely excluded other potentially authentic 
stylistic expressions. These conflations of aesthetic interest around a hybrid notion of 'art-craft' 
also beset contemporary ideas of aesthetic education based on the so-called 'power of making', 
stated less rhetorically as the importance of craft skills151. But Work Theory finally notes in all 
these considerations of 'craft-based' education – from handicrafts to the new crafts of digital 
production – a legitimate moral-political idea of aesthetic education as concerned with improving 
the pleasures of work and the value of its products in the lives of others, a moral-political idea 
distinct then from that of political art152.  
* 
To conclude and summarise, Work Theory suggests a divided idea of aesthetic 
education corresponding to good work's internal relations to aesthetic interest. First, artistic 
creativity is unteachable in any reasonable sense that accords with everyday ideas of 
                                                
151 See the Power of Making V&A exhibition catalogue for examples. 
152 I also note recent 'craftism' – which purports to use craft activities to generate political 
activism – as either a form of political art, if the work involves some artistic creativity around a 
political aim, or as a version of the general moral-political aim of aesthetic education 
associated with good work. See, for example, the Craftivist Collective statement of aims at 
http://craftivist-collective.com/about/ 
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imaginative originality, but makers and viewers assess the authenticity of artistic choices 
(including overtly moral-political ones) and in so doing accrue and accumulate art-appreciative 
resources. Also, design elements and principles can be taught and related to the problems that 
particular functional objects necessarily present to designers. And particular crafts can be taught 
according to the skills they demand of qualified practitioners. Aesthetic education is internal to 
these art, design and workmanship aspects of good work, directing us only to their best 
practice. In other words, our capacity for aesthetic experience is not taught but is engaged by 
our good work as makers and users of all made objects that function well and allow us to 
flourish in our lives. Thus engaged as makers and users, Work Theory concludes a moral-
political dimension to the idea of aesthetic education additional to and independent of that 
connected to authentically political art.  
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PART 2 
SECTION 4 WORK THEORY AND EVERYDAY AESTHETICS 
 
1. Everyday (and Art-centred) Aesthetics 
  
 The idea that philosophical aesthetics has neglected aesthetic experiences and objects 
outside of Western fine arts and their appreciation has coalesced around the idea of ‘Everyday 
Aesthetics’. The key tenets of ‘Everyday Aesthetics’ have been set out by Yuriko Saito and Tom 
Leddy (hereafter ‘EA’ will refer to their account of everyday aesthetics), concluding a 
theoretically discrete aesthetics of the 'everyday'153. For Saito and Leddy EA challenges 
conventional ideas of philosophical aesthetics (and warrants a separate discrete aesthetics of 
the everyday) in two broad areas: first, it challenges what it perceives as the art-centred bias of 
aesthetics and argues for an aesthetics of non-art objects that sits alongside that of art; second, 
it disputes the idea of aesthetic experience as essentially a disinterested encounter with 
artworks, arguing too for accounts of aesthetic experience that at least acknowledge its active 
and practical nature.  Other writers have detailed the aesthetics of non-art objects like sport and 
the weather, eating and drinking, the home and civic environment, and so on, supporting the 
overall EA programme to extend the scope of philosophical aesthetics to recognise that “nothing 
                                                
153 Yuriko Saito, Everyday Aesthetics (Oxford University Press, 2007). Tom Leddy, 'The Nature 
of Everyday Aesthetics' in The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, Edited by Andrew Light and 
Jonathan M. Smith (Columbia University Press, 2005). 
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in the everyday world (or at least very little) can be supposed devoid of the power to excite and 
aesthetic response”154.  
 EA's programme to attend theoretically to the aesthetics of the everyday argues that 
there is an essential difference between the aesthetics of artworks and that of other made things 
and activities. I will argue that a significant consequence is a falsely divided philosophical 
aesthetics. Work Theory does argues for the idea of a divided aesthetic interest between 
different aspects of good work (it recognises then evidence for EA's premise of an aesthetics of 
the 'everyday'). But that divided aesthetic interest – between authentic artistic choices, good 
design and skilled workmanship – does not support the EA conclusion of theoretically discrete 
realms of everyday and art-centred aesthetics.   
* 
 The idea of the 'everyday' in aesthetics requires some preliminary clarification before 
examining EA's use of the term. Firstly, there is a use in art theory and practice. Here the 
'everyday' refers loosely to an 'understanding of art and visual culture... no longer grounded in 
traditional aesthetics' and expanding 'the boundaries of art to everyday themes'155. Stephen 
Johnstone makes a further four-fold characterisation within this understanding of the everyday 
in art156. So the 'everyday' is conceptualised in art theory and practice as 'unnoticed', as an 
'authentic non-art experience', as a kind of artistic 'immersion' in the world, and as a 'bringing 
together of art and life'. Each are vague and disputable in terms of relating the everyday and art, 
                                                
154 Jonathan Smith, 'Introduction' to The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, p.xv 
155 Stephen Johnstone, 'Introduction: Recent Art and the Everyday' in The Everyday: 
Documents of Contemporary Art Edited by Stephen Johnstone (Whitechapel Ventures Limited, 
2008)  
156 Ibid, p.13 
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and none is compelling for an 'everyday aesthetics' distinct from the 'traditional'. Johnstone cites 
'staging barely noticeable events' as an example of an art of the everyday, but the idea of 
'staging an event' contradicts an ordinary sense of 'everyday' as essentially unstaged. Similarly, 
experiencing 'everyday art' in 'non-art' ways seems contradictory unless some bifurcated 
aesthetic experience is assumed. But no argument is proposed for this being the case, and it is 
counter-intuitive in any case that something presented as an artwork – albeit utilising everyday 
materials and quotidian ideas and narratives – should not still engage us differently from our 
everyday experiences of life. Again, the idea of artistic immersion in the world hardly seems to 
establish a unique aesthetics centred on 'everyday art': we might reasonably think that every 
work of art properly involves some profound engagement with the business of living. Finally on 
Johnstone's summary characterisation of the everyday and art, the idea of bringing art and life 
closer together can be conceived in many ways, and again does not preclude – indeed it might 
be argued it supports – a singular account of the aesthetic.   
* 
 I make one further set of preliminary clarifications about the idea of the 'everyday' in 
aesthetics. This is not in response to an existing use of 'everyday' in art theory and aesthetics, 
noted above, but to pre-theoretic conceptions. Pre-theoretically, ‘everyday’ can mean both 
‘daily’ and ‘ordinary’, and while the two definitions often coincide in practice, there is no 
necessary connection: we can conceive the ‘daily’ as remarkable, and the ‘ordinary’ may not be 
a regular occurrence. If we focus on the aesthetics of the ‘daily’, we might wonder which 
particular daily occurrences we can be properly said to experience aesthetically, and if this 
means some reassessment of the category of ‘aesthetic objects’ is required, given that ‘daily’ is 
so often associated with the banal and mundane, the nonaesthetic. Alternatively, if we conceive 
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an aesthetics of the ‘ordinary’ (with agreement on this classification of certain events and 
objects), then the notion of the ‘aesthetic’ itself now seems vulnerable on either of two counts. 
First, it is vulnerable to claims of incoherence, given any agreement that exemplary aesthetic 
experience, at least, is fundamentally not of the ‘ordinary’ (and never of the ‘ugly’, of the stained, 
damp, cracked, and so on, in our domestic lives) but of an extraordinary class of events and 
objects called ‘art’, extending to good work associated with design and craft skills. Second, the 
idea of the 'aesthetic' is vulnerable to claims of cognitive and moral triviality (to amorality too, 
perhaps,  if it is possible, after Thomas de Quincey, to appreciate the way a murder is done), so 
that the aesthetic response is understood as merely a subjective, noncritical ‘look and feel’ 
response to (almost) everything157.  
* 
 It is evident, then, that EA cannot uncritically draw on either existing art theoretical 
considerations of art and the everyday, nor on intuitions about the everyday and the aesthetic, 
in arguing for an aesthetics of the everyday different in essentials from an aesthetics of 
artworks. 
 
Art and non-art aesthetics 
 
 With these preliminaries about art theoretic and pre-theoretic conceptions of the 
'everyday' done, I now return to EA and firstly the idea that there is an aesthetics of non-art 
objects that is radically separate from that of artworks (the second and other key idea, of a 
phenomenologically distinct non-art aesthetic experience, is examined later in this section). For 
                                                
157 Thomas de Quincey, On Murder (Oxford World's Classics, 2006)
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Leddy, this is a fruitful way to understand the concept of ‘everyday aesthetics’: he argues that 
there is a language of everyday aesthetic experience indicating a realm different from that 
marked by the language of art criticism and the appreciation of nature158. This aesthetic lexicon 
has its own aesthetic objects – everyday objects like the daily commute, the workplace, the 
shopping centre, and places of amusement. This is also a realm traditionally viewed, so Leddy 
argues, as outside the scope of philosophical aesthetics. The terms used in everyday aesthetic 
discourse are terms like ‘neat’, ‘clean’, ‘messy’, ‘right’, ‘nice’, and ‘big’; and experiences of this 
kind are daily and ordinary (dis)pleasures. Extraordinary experiences do, Leddy acknowledges, 
exist and as such simply leave the everyday domain and the aesthetics thereof159. 
 Two key problems are left unanswered by Leddy: what is correct everyday appreciation, 
and what marks high/extraordinary from low/ordinary aesthetic value and experience? No 
answer is forthcoming because no account is supplied of what makes an experience aesthetic; 
all that is supplied, in addition to the terms stipulated as indicating everyday aesthetic 
responses, are the author’s references to personal ‘aesthetic experiences’ (the sight of a pile of 
grass cuttings, for example) and, by extension, all our own equivalent experiences. This leaves 
the account open to the ‘trivialization’ claim (further evidenced, by the way, by claims that kitsch 
products exploit everyday aesthetic qualities like ‘cuteness’ and ‘cuddliness’)160. And when a 
class of extraordinary aesthetic experiences is admitted to the account by Leddy but left 
unexplained (except that they have their own terms and objects), the problem of incoherence 
noted above is raised. 
                                                
158  Tom Leddy, 'The Nature of Everyday Aesthetics' in The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, pp.3-22  
159 Ibid p.15 
160 Ibid, p.14 
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 Saito’s overarching thesis for EA shares analyses with Leddy’s. EA is argued to redress 
the 'neglect' of non-art aesthetic experiences that refer us to events and objects in our everyday 
life; these experiences too are not ‘aesthetically inferior’ versions of art experiences but 
aesthetic in their own right, as evidenced by their unique language of appreciation161. Saito’s 
analysis, however, is more closely tied to a particular theory of art and the aesthetic – a more or 
less standardised institutional account embedded in a fine art lexicon of artistic appreciation – 
that is then contrasted with EA. This ‘art-centred aesthetics’ is argued to falsely limit the scope 
of the aesthetic to the fine arts, and if non-art objects do evoke aesthetic interest, Saito 
continues, art-centred theory argues this as still an aspiration to full art status (in George 
Dickie’s institutional terms then, everything is a ‘candidate for arthood’)162. If, with Saito, it is 
agreed that there are aesthetic objects that are not art in the institutional sense, nor aspire to 
that status, still I would argue there are alternative strategies for the realignment of philosophical 
aesthetics. Broadly, Saito (and Leddy et al) chooses to accept institutional and related accounts 
of art and to establish a complementary ‘new field for aesthetics’ (EA). But institutionalism could 
be understood as a legitimate sociology of art, while art making is still understood aesthetically. 
Work Theory does not engage with institutional accounts of art directly, but its account of 
separate aspects of making in terms of art, design and workmanship around an integrated idea 
of aesthetic interest at least provides an alternative to the EA strategy. Saito ignores such 
options, satisfied that ‘art-centred aesthetics’ is essentially institutional in its account of art 
status conferral and limited to the fine arts in its range of aesthetic descriptions of objects.   
                                                
161 Saito, p.9 
162 Ibid p.13 
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Like Leddy then, Saito argues that a theoretically discrete non-art aesthetics is indicated 
by terms of aesthetic discourse excluded from the fine arts or 'paradigmatic art', terms like ‘neat’ 
and ‘tidy’. She lists associated non-art aesthetic and everyday experiences such as cleaning 
and tidying. The non-art aesthetic experience is correspondingly characterised as 'frameless' to 
evoke a contrast with fine art painting and by extension the ‘exhibition’ of artworks in galleries 
and so on163. Similarly, the non-art aesthetic experience is vaguely characterised as always a 
'free engagement' in contrast to the historically and institutionally conditioned engagements of 
artistic appreciation. But it is disputable that there are points of fundamental contrast here in 
terms of the aesthetic – the aesthetic experience of art and non-art objects may share 
something more fundamental than is supposedly revealed by these points of difference. So for 
Work Theory, acts of ‘framing and appreciating' artworks and ‘tidying up’ reveal a common 
notion of aesthetic interest in terms of ‘felt rightness’, while our aesthetic interest is still properly 
divided by our interest in an object's art, design and workmanship. But again Saito does not 
explore this alternative.  
 Similarly, for EA everyday aesthetics is said to fall outside of one of the characteristics of 
‘paradigmatic art’ because it is “characteristic of many everyday objects and practices that they 
lack any particular authorship”164. Our ‘townscapes’ for example, argues Saito, might offer some 
evidence of intentional human activity “but other aspects of the townscape occurred quite by 
happenstance, such as the weather-beaten appearance of some buildings, the color pattern 
created by individual houses’ painted walls” and so on165. But the lack of identifiable authorship 
in aesthetic experiences of non-art objects does not necessarily require the radically disjunctive 
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account of the aesthetic that Saito postulates. For Work Theory, our aesthetic interest in the 
appearance of buildings, in colours and patterns, is fundamentally one based on a sense of 
aesthetic ‘fit’, of things ‘looking right’, and therefore is an interest common across art and non-
art. Saito is right to point out that our experiences of our built environment are ‘everyday’ and 
‘aesthetic’ in at least some important sense, but it does not follow that our aesthetic interest in 
prosaic landscapes – the world of eyesores included – is not properly one of aesthetic 
(dis)valuation. Such aesthetic evaluation of our built environment is an interest in things looking 
right for the purpose they are made. So making an aesthetic judgement necessarily invokes 
thinking about the relations between needs and design, about how different materials weather, 
about the visual effects on a street of painting one’s house, and so on. Work Theory accounts 
for our aesthetic interest in the built environment in terms of our interest in work that 
successfully delivers – in terms of forms and finish – the functional requirements of whatever is 
made or built. Saito does sometimes characterise everyday aesthetics as activity-based, but 
never as an aesthetic interest in making and and everyday products of utility. One 
consequence, a connection of an everyday aesthetics to art-making, is not even contemplated. 
So while activities like mending, organising and arranging are mentioned by her – activities that 
are noted even in the story of art, for example, as evidence of an aesthetic interest that is 
shared by artists and non-artists alike – they are not understood as aspects of good work166. 
Continuing in this vein, EA uncritically understands pleasurable experiences as de facto 
aesthetic ones, when analysis here might reveal aesthetic interests that connect art and non-art 
                                                
166 See, for example, E.H. Gombrich's introduction to his The Story of Art (Phaidon, 1966) where 
he speculates on the similarities between an artist 'worrying about whether he has got it right' 
and our everyday concerns with 'getting it right' when we arrange flowers, match clothes, 
proportion food on a plate and so on (p.14). 
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around different and/or shared aspects of good work and exclude the merely pleasurable from 
the idea of the aesthetic. Many of Saito’s examples (and this is common to EA theorists) are 
inescapably personal too, seemingly requiring no explanation of why they are even pleasurable 
apart from their obvious ‘biological’ aspect (so experiences that are associated with and 
exhausted by the satisfaction of a basic need like taking lunch).  
 The character of EA’s argument about art’s predominance in aesthetic theory is also 
evident in Saito’s argument that the art-centred view unduly favours sight and sound 
experiences over tastes and smells – there is little by way of argument as to why this is not a 
warranted privilege, and the prima facie case at least seems strong for music over perfume for 
instance167. But I turn to these specific instances of everyday aesthetics now.  
 
The everyday aesthetics of... 
 
 The general idea of a distinctive non-art aesthetics is explored in a number of different 
situations by EA theorists, including the aesthetics of A) building, B) the weather, C) food, tastes 
and smells, and D) sport168. Examining each of these accounts in turn reveals in more detail the 
problems of false or misleading contrasts between art and non-art that besets EA, and the 
absence therefore of any requirement for a fundamentally disjunctive account of the aesthetic.  
* 
 A) Pauline von Bonsdorff argues for architecture that allows natural elements to affect 
the built environment in an unplanned fashion; our aesthetic lives are improved if we “allow 
                                                
167  Saito, p.21 
168  The examples that follow are all taken from the EA anthology The Aesthetics of Everyday 
Life  
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things to be”169. Practically, this means using materials such as wood and stone that react well 
in the everyday wear and tear of local climate, weather, and topography rather than processed 
materials like concrete that “clash and crack”170. As well as the aesthetic impact of using 
materials that properly integrate with their climate, there is an existential significance noted by 
von Bonsdorff: by allowing nature to appear in our built environments, we are facilitated as 
“temporal, aspiring and finite” beings171. Underlying these claims is the theoretic claim that 
aesthetic experience proper is a specific and sensuous experience. If we accept this account, 
then von Bonsdorff’s particular claims for the aesthetic appeal of buildings that are 
environmentally sensitive seem reasonable; however, as a general claim against, for example, 
'industrialized' buildings, the claim is weaker and not compelling against the many cases made 
since the early twentieth century for industrial art. Still, it is without doubt central to the 
development of an everyday aesthetics that the kind of environment in which we live is 
understood to either facilitate or impede aesthetic lives; but this does not hinge on a radical 
theoretic separation of the aesthetics of the everyday from that of art, as EA argues. Rather, 
Work Theory supports the idea that design problems set by human needs in particular 
circumstances determine appropriate technologies, materials and styles – von Bonsdorff’s 
‘unplanned’, everyday aesthetic is in fact a straightforward proposal for a type of architecture 
(where ‘unplanned’ wear and tear is built into building design) and therefore does not suggest a 
‘new field of aesthetics’ called EA.  
* 
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 B) In ‘The Aesthetics of Weather’, Saito argues that good and bad weather can be 
appreciated aesthetically and involves a special kind of appreciation unlike that involved in the 
appreciation of art172. Saito’s model of art appreciation, noted in her general account of EA 
above, is what she calls here the 'disinterest theory'. But if we set aside 'disinterest theory', then 
Saito’s description of the physical intimacy and interactivity of our engagement with weather is 
broadly compatible with a general theory of aesthetic engagement that could be applied across 
the piece to include appreciating art. There is also something more fundamental at stake: even 
if our experience of the weather shares some of the phenomenology of our aesthetic 
engagement with art, what of the value attached to such experiences that make them truly 
aesthetic and not merely pleasurable? Thematically in critically analysing EA, the aesthetic is 
trivialized without a proper account of aesthetic value (and not just ‘pleasure’), and the theory is 
potentially incoherent if art and the everyday are radically differentiated. 
* 
 C) In 'Sniffing and Savoring: The Aesthetics of Smells and Tastes', Emily Brady 
encourages the development of an aesthetics of taste and smell, arguing that tastes and smells 
are sufficiently structured and meaningful to warrant our critical attention173. She cites the 
evidence of critical discourses around wine and food tasting and perfumery in support of the 
case, and also notes Immanuel Kant and Frank Sibley’s philosophical attention to the matter. It 
is right, of course, that a developed sensitivity to tastes and smells marks a wider sensory 
engagement with our environment; but this in itself is not sufficient grounds for an aesthetic 
interest since it might only indicate a fully functioning biology. Brady is correct that evidence of 
                                                
172  Yuriko Saito, 'The Aesthetics of Weather' in The Aesthetics of Everyday Life   
173  Emily Brady, 'Sniffing and Savoring: the Aesthetics of Smells and Tastes' in The Aesthetics 
of Everyday Life  
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genuine aesthetic evaluation is provided by the presence of critical discourse. But it is here, 
contra Brady, that I question whether tastes and smells can ever support discussions of any 
general, lasting interest and value (apart, for example, from being simply personally evocative). 
Glenn Kuehn argues that food is art but that we need a Deweyan approach to art to get what’s 
meant by “food as art”174. Does this answer the doubt? Kuehn’s Deweyan defence is that 
making and eating food follow the broad outline pattern of 'an experience' as defined by John 
Dewey. Certainly, there is a superficial resemblance between making food (which might equate 
with Dewey’s idea of the 'movement' of an experience) and eating (the Deweyan 
'consummation')175. As with questions about the aesthetic status of experiencing weather, such 
an outline similarity – asserting that there is 'engagement' in making food (or a 'movement and 
consummation') – is insufficient to warrant food’s artistic or even aesthetic character, and by 
extension to support the EA argument for a theoretically discrete aesthetics of the everyday. 
However, Work Theory notes that in making food there are clearly aspects of good work, and 
therefore an aesthetic interest, in designing the look of a completed dish and in the skill of 
preparation – but, reiterating, this does not support EA's 'aesthetics of the everyday' .  
* 
 D) Wolfgang Welsch argues that sport is now art because of the way sport and art have 
evolved: sport is less moral and more aesthetic; art is low as well as high. But there is still an 
“Art-Art” distinct from “Sport-Art”, he concludes176. Welsch’s arguments in favour of sport’s 
                                                
174  Glenn Kuehn, 'How Can Food Be Art?' in The Aesthetics of Everyday Life  
175  John Dewey, Art as Experience (Perigee, 1980). See pp.172-173 for the ideas of 'movement 
and consummation'. 
176  Wolfgang Welsch, 'Sport Viewed Aesthetically, and Even as Art' in The Aesthetics of 
Everyday Life  
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increasingly aesthetic over moral appeal are not wholly convincing. The physical and mental 
health aspects, and by extension the moral and social benefits, of sports generally are still 
asserted; if this is not the case in professional sport, perhaps, then one still wonders whether 
the concern with bodily form and fashion that Welsch witnesses there is evidence of genuinely 
aesthetic concerns. To rest the argument for “Sport-Art” on the changing character of art and 
theorizing about it is problematic as well, creating a dependency on the very area of 
philosophical aesthetics that requires argument, namely the ‘everydayness’ or otherwise of art. 
The argument has credibility at least when Welsch shifts to considering sport as 'performance', 
but this is too narrowly construed around, as noted, physical/bodily achievement, rather than 
around an idea of the aesthetic interest inherent in fully applying a (sporting) skill. And the 
problem of sport’s essential competitive and partisan nature is not adequately dealt with; only 
minimal anecdotal evidence of professional sportsmen and women shifting their goal from 
'winning' to 'performing' is provided. Welsch’s final assertion that something called “Art-Art” 
should be “difficult, elitist and experimental” only adds to the confusion about art, sport, and their 
relation to the aesthetic, reinforcing perhaps the theoretical instability of the EA programme177. 
* 
 The problems of incoherence and trivialisation for an idea of the aesthetic are then 
brought to light in investigating cases supposedly supporting EA's account of 'everyday 
aesthetics' . So, from A) above, Work Theory argues that understanding that our aesthetic 
interest in the built environment and the fine arts  engages different and overlapping aspects of 
that interest – in terms of artistic intention, design and workmanship – does not imply a divided 
aesthetics generally. From B), Work Theory concedes that engaged encounters with our 
                                                
177  Ibid, p.149 
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physical environment have a global aesthetic characteristic rooted in adaptation to a situation 
but, with C), it is still problematic to characterise as 'aesthetic' features of our lives that are 
merely biological adaptations or strictly personal felt responses. From D), Work Theory 
concludes that the idea of extending the notion of the aesthetic by recognising the supposed 
artistry or art status of commonly understood non-art activities begs questions about ‘art’ itself 
that EA does not properly engage. 
 EA fails to properly recognise then that though we might all be alive to our environment, 
and find pleasures there in watching sport, the changing weather, and food and smells, our 
aesthetic experiences properly entail values that these activities, on the whole, cannot sustain 
(even if we get some insights into the nature of the aesthetic from them). And where EA does 
properly examine the aesthetics of our everyday built environment – its houses, shops, offices, 
factories, and all their furniture – EA fails to provide any persuasive counter-argument to their 
being properly accounted for in terms of an aesthetics of authentic choice, design and 
workmanship, where each engages our aesthetic interest in different ways. 
 
Everyday Aesthetics and aesthetic experience 
 
 The second major theme of EA – alongside the arguments against art-centred aesthetics 
and the supposed supporting case studies – is the claim that aesthetic experience is not limited 
to, or exemplified by, so-called ‘disinterested’ experiences of artworks. Additionally, so the 
argument goes, we are said to experience the everyday aesthetically and actively in ways that 
are entirely distinct from our aesthetic experience of art. Saito argues that ‘everyday aesthetics’ 
represents a range of 'moments that do not especially stand out' but are about how things look 
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and feel in our everyday life. She notes three features of a moment that is conventionally 
thought outside the scope of aesthetics, but is aesthetic: something is a) experienced as 
‘unpleasant’, perhaps ‘untidy’, and this b) is an ‘automatic’ aesthetic response that then prompts 
c) an action to ‘tidy up’. Such an example, argues Saito, counters the general claim of all 
‘aesthetic experience theory' that the experience is essentially ‘special’. Saito claims all 
aesthetic experience theories, which she categorises as either of the ‘disinterest’ or 
‘engagement’ variety, share a fundamental idea that the experience is ‘exceptional’ and that this 
falsely neglects everyday mundane aesthetic experience (of the kind that prompts tidying, for 
example)178. But this exceptional character is understood by Saito purely in terms of a 
phenomenology of ‘stand out’ art experiences that neglects other outstanding features of 
aesthetic experience. It fails then to acknowledge the general aesthetic sense of things ‘looking 
and feeling right’ that informs the Wittgenstein-Scruton view of aesthetic interest, and that Work 
Theory argues extends across different aspects of good work from artistic creation to skilled 
workmanship179. Saito argues that ‘special’ aesthetic experience is obviously rare (the kind 
associated with experiencing artworks) and yet everyday we engage in aesthetic lives. The 
argument neglects three key aspects of aesthetic experience. First, in suggesting the aesthetic 
is an everyday occurrence, it mistakes some experiences that are simply personally pleasurable 
for aesthetic ones. Second, it neglects that aesthetic experience is not a quotidian feature of 
many lives that are circumstantially, evidently and essentially non-aesthetic. Third, there is an 
                                                
178  Saito's argument is contained in the section, 'Special experience-based aesthetics' (pp.43-
53) of Everyday Aesthetics. She takes Edward Bullough's 'disinterest' and John Dewey’s 
'engagement' accounts of aesthetic experience as representative of different versions of 
aesthetic experience as necessarily 'special'. 
179 See Work Theory's account above at Part 2, Section 1. 
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alternative view of everyday aesthetic experience – provided by Work Theory – that explains 
both its ‘special’ characteristics in terms of our aesthetic interest in good work and the 
opportunities for richer aesthetic lives that are not dependent on engagement with fine art (and 
are in that sense then ‘everyday’). For Work Theory, these everyday aesthetic experiences 
depend on the character of our work – whether it involves opportunities for considered design 
and good workmanship – and on the everyday made things we use.  
In other words, Saito’s account of aesthetic experience, both her account supposedly 
including the non-special and her understanding of other accounts, fails to recognise an account 
of aesthetic experience as an experience marking a felt sense of things being right and of value, 
where there is then a distinctive phenomenology marking success. An account of aesthetic 
experience that characterises it as 'special' by virtue of its association with value (with a felt 
sense of rightness that is communicable) does not, contra Saito, mean that everyday aesthetic 
experiences of the kind she then lists are neglected by aesthetic theory: the designs of everyday 
objects, street furniture, town planning, architecture, graffiti, and so on, that Saito lists are 
properly things of aesthetic interest180. Our interest in these being ‘right’ is a special kind of 
interest properly called aesthetic, and that interest is affirmed as properly aesthetic by our ability 
to communicate why things look right (or wrong), about the words and gestures that make one 
conclude, after Wittgenstein, ‘now that’s right’181. Saito wonders why such examples are 
neglected in aesthetic theory, but evidently they are not: they have been noted here theoretically 
in Wittgenstein, and in philosophically-minded practitioners in the Arts and Crafts Movement and 
Modernism, and in contemporary designers. So there is a tradition of everyday aesthetics – 
                                                
180 Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, p.47 
181 Again, I refer back to the arguments for Work Theory's account of aesthetic interest in Part 2, 
Section 1. 
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concern with beauty in the home and town and country planning, with the industrial arts, and so 
on – from John Ruskin at least in British philosophically-minded aesthetics. Saito contends that 
non-art objects lack the 'lofty intellectual enlightenment' supposedly offered by Western art and 
are therefore neglected in aesthetic theory – again, that neglect may be the case in some 
accounts but it is not generalisable across philosophical aesthetics and is perhaps credible only 
as a critique of institutional theory (which it could be argued is in any case a theory that 
acknowledges itself to be a theory limited to Western fine art in the last few centuries)182.  
* 
Saito’s position also seems to reflect a reluctance to accept that much of everyday life is, 
at the time of writing at least, non-aesthetic, and this marks another important distinction with 
the kind of everyday aesthetics proposed by Work Theory. Work Theory's account of good work 
implies that everyday life is as mundane or aesthetic as social conditions allow – that is to 
argue, for one thing, that there can be no transformation of the everyday by an act of ‘EA 
aesthetic reappraisal’ alone, a kind of appraisal of the aesthetic value of things that I now 
examine. Accordingly, for Work Theory ‘mundane’ means just that and reflects the absence of 
real work or engagement in an object or situation. Work Theory then acknowledges the 
possibilities for beauty in the home, in the things we use everyday, and in our built environment, 
and for an aestheticised life then, but these possibilities are activated by good work, not by 
theoretical shifts prompting new outlooks on life. Saito cites Aarto Haapala’s ‘strange/familiar’ 
strategy, which is similar to Andrew Light’s approach of ‘making the thin thick’: it is worth 
examining these accounts in turn as they reveal further weaknesses in the EA programme 
                                                
182 Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, p.22. Work Theory is, in any case, agnostic on the history and 
sociology of art.  
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through their respective failures to properly account for the factors necessary for aesthetic 
engagement, and highlight important contrasts with Work Theory.   
In 'On the Aesthetics of the Everyday: Familiarity, Strangeness, and the Meaning of 
Place', Haapala, like Leddy, is interested in claiming a new subject matter for aesthetic enquiry 
to complement art-centred aesthetics, a central tenet of EA – in this case it is, he claims, the 
aesthetics of “what does not stand out”183. It is proposed on the grounds that there is an 
aesthetic response in our experiences of the 'familiar', 'safe', 'comfortable' and 'normal' – 
something indicated, for example, in the fact that “houses have a substantial function: these are 
places in which we live, homes”184. Haapala is reacting, he acknowledges, to a perceived 
overemphasis on the aesthetics of the 'strange' prevalent in twentieth-century art. But this 
contrast in Haapala’s account – between experiences of the strange and of the familiar – fails to 
support a conclusion that the difference is theoretically significant in signalling a new subject 
matter for aesthetics. A feeling for the familiar may be as powerful and significant an experience 
as that of the strange depending on the thing being experienced (a familiar functional object 
extraordinarily redesigned for example), but the essence of aesthetic interest remains 
unchallenged. Haapala effectively notes only that ideas of 'fit' and 'looking right' apply across a 
range of descriptions of made things, including 'strange' and 'familiar'. Both experiences of the 
'strange' and 'familiar' may engage our aesthetic interest, to repeat.  
                                                
183  Aarto Haapala, 'On the Aesthetics of the Everyday: Familiarity, Strangeness, and the 
Meaning of Place' in The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, p.40 
184  Ibid, p.49 
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In a similar vein, engagement with both the built and natural environments is explored by 
Andrew Light185. He deploys the notions of 'thick and thin' spaces (terms borrowed from the 
philosophy of technology) through an examination of Wim Wenders’s 1973 film Alice in the 
Cities. Light argues that the film illustrates and offers 'arguments' why individual actions and 
attitudes can 'thicken' 'thin' spaces, meaning make “thin” spaces richer sources of aesthetic 
experience. 'Thick' spaces are supposed to offer one 'things' rather than 'devices' with which to 
engage. The central character in Alice in the Cities encounters his environment as one full of 
banal 'devices', but a chance encounter with a child, Alice, transforms his view of the world. Her 
playful encounters with the world about her generally contrast with his, which had consisted of 
merely recording his world through photography – her engaged encounters give purpose to 
otherwise 'thin' spaces, in Light's terminology. Learning this, the main character is able to 
'subvert' or 'thicken the thin'. Whether an account of the psychological and aesthetic significance 
of playful and purposeful engagement with one’s environment requires either the jargon of 
'spaces' or Wenders’s insights is very doubtful (given all that has been philosophically argued 
on related subjects, from Friedrich Schiller’s Aesthetic Education, at least). That aside, the 
account fails to grasp that some environments might be essentially and inescapably 'thin'. Are 
hard cases of 'thin spaces' (for example, sweated labour in a factory or life in a violent, poor, 
broken-down neighbourhood) really open to 'subversion' (capable, in other words, of being 
experienced aesthetically)? And what kind of person must one be to be able to 'subvert'? Work 
Theory simply observes that not everything in the world (at least up to now) is potentially 
                                                
185  Andrew Light, 'Wim Wenders's Everyday Aesthetics' in The Aesthetics of Everyday Life, 
pp.109-133 
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aesthetic, and not everyone is in a position to exploit their potential to lead aesthetic lives if their 
lives do not involve any elements of good work186. 
* 
 Haapala's and Light's theorising of everyday aesthetics are perhaps best regarded as 
the EA programme in extremis in so far as the idea of an everyday aesthetics is argued on the 
basis of an aesthetics of everything, of every human experience, an argument that is strongly 
countered by appeals to the evidence of lives across the world. Saito's more reasoned EA 
approach argues an aesthetics beyond that of the fine arts, but does so at the cost of a divided 
philosophical aesthetics. Where both EA approaches fail is in not accounting for or 
acknowledging the singular character of aesthetic experience – as a felt and explicable sense of 
something being 'right' – across art and non-art objects187. So Saito notes our aesthetic interest 
in an eyesore as evidence of the 'ordinariness' of some (but not all) aesthetic experience – but 
this fails to recognise it is as a special kind of interest in something ‘looking right’ that is more 
than a simply personal record of momentary distaste of a non-art object. And nor does such an 
aesthetic interest in an eyesore imply or generate an 'artwork' out of it (in the manner of Light’s 
account of Wenders)188. Saito’s notion of ‘ordinary experiences’ confuses the everydayness or 
commonness of merely witnessing eyesores with the specialness of taking an aesthetic interest 
in them, an interest that thereby introduces notions of ‘fit’ and ‘rightness’ into one’s life and 
                                                
186 The idea of 'aesthetic lives' is one I have introduced in the course of exploring Work Theory 
in relation to aesthetic education and, here, to everyday aesthetics – I provide a more 
detailed examination of the idea in the Postscript that follows. 
187 Of course there are no doubt non-aesthetic experiences of art that do warrant separate 
theory and practice. But Work Theory is essentially an aesthetic theory. 
188  Saito, Everyday Aesthetics, p.52 
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engages one in matters of design and workmanship. Saito concludes the social significance of 
aesthetic interest and rightly so – that our aesthetic interest in our built environment indicates 
‘moral-aesthetic judgement of artefacts’ and contributes to the good life, as she puts it – but 
ignores the broader grounds of that interest in the requirement that we understand what makes 
something ‘look right’ in any given circumstance, be it our understanding of what makes for 
good street furniture or for effective theatre, appreciation, in short, of its good work. Saito’s 
strategic error is to conflate the idea of ‘special’ aesthetic experience with art-centred aesthetics, 
so that aesthetic interest in our built environment, for example, appears to require a new 
category of ‘ordinary’ aesthetic experience to explain it.  
*  
 In arguing against the EA programme I have implied that a conceptually integrated 
aesthetics encompassing both the arts and our everyday aesthetic experiences is available in 
terms of Work Theory's internal relations between different aspects of good work and our 
aesthetic interest in them. The idea of an undivided philosophical aesthetics still retaining a 
notion of 'everyday aesthetics' is worthy of some further explanation, and that follows. 
  
2. Aesthetics undivided 
 
 Thus far I have rejected EA's analysis of supposed discrete aesthetic realms of art and 
the everyday, arguing against both EA's conceptualisation of the everyday and its examples. 
However, Work Theory's account of aesthetic interest clearly extends that interest beyond 
artworks to some idea at least of the everyday. And that is straightforward enough: our aesthetic 
interest in design and workmanship of everyday objects of function indicates an 'aesthetics of 
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the everyday', if that is what we wish to call it. But design and workmanship are aspects of 
making artworks too. So if there is an 'aesthetics of the everyday' it is properly a shorthand for 
our aesthetic interest in the design and workmanship aspects of things of everyday function, 
where the functional requirement to make does not have an artistic origin.   
 Work Theory's antecedents in this area have already been noted, but it is worth 
repeating two positions and arguments that support an integrated idea of the aesthetic, and their 
differences from Work Theory's integrated but divided notion of aesthetic interest around 
different aspects of good work189.  
* 
 Roger Scruton recognises (like EA) the neglect of “the aesthetics of everyday life”: all 
those everyday actions motivated by a “desire for things to look right”, the kinds of example 
Wittgenstein uses too, which indicate an aesthetic interest in things190. But unlike EA the 
Wittgenstein-Scruton model connects this aesthetics of non-art to art by a singular account of 
aesthetic interest across both sets of activities and objects. The Wittgenstein-Scruton model, 
however, makes that connection by accounting for aesthetic interest as a cultivated ‘taste’ or 
aesthetic interest extrinsic to the design and workmanship problems set by having to make an 
everyday functional object (like a carpenter designing a doorframe) – whereas Work Theory 
argues that aesthetic interest is intrinsic to the proper resolution of design and workmanship 
problems. That argument effectively established a work-centred everyday aesthetics, in so far 
as it explained genuine aesthetic interest in non-art and its significance around a notion of ‘good 
work’ (and so acknowledging at least the ‘neglect’ point made by both EA and Scruton). That 
                                                
189 I am referring particularly to antecedents examined in Part 1 above. 
190 Scruton, 'In Search of the Aesthetic', p.240  
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argument also retained the integrity of aesthetic interest across art and non-art – in other words 
its coherence and significance as a notion. 
* 
 In dismissing art theorising as, on the whole, 'nonsense', William Morris, William Lethaby 
and Eric Gill felt vindicated by what they regarded as the neglected 'art' of the everyday, 
predating EA by a century or more in that regard191. Eric Gill's conclusion that art theory was 
'nonsense' was the culmination of similarly overblown statements by Arts and Crafts theorists – 
so Morris for example described art criticism as “sham technical twaddle” – but still it reflected a 
more reasoned judgement that 'art' is simply “the well-doing of what needs doing” and that once 
this is brought to light there are implications for any aesthetic theory focused exclusively on the 
fine arts192. Distinctions between different kinds of making were still acknowledged too: Lethaby 
argues, for example, that fine art is 'freer' than other arts, and represents their apex193. So the 
rhetoric does not diminish from the philosophic significance of the core Arts and Crafts idea (in 
terms of 'art' at least) that some conception of 'making well' applies across works of fine art and 
the making of domestic wares. For Gill then “the activity called art embraces all making and the 
ability and enthusiasm to make things is common to man”194. Of course for Arts and Crafts 
                                                
191 As previously noted the Arts and Crafts theorists were practitioners first and theorists second, 
and theory was put to the service of describing and advocating craft practices, rather than 
regarded as contributing to aesthetic theory as such. This accounts for the sometimes 
inflated language of 'nonsense' and such like (thus Eric Gill's collection of essays 'Art-
Nonsense').  
192 Lethaby, Form and Civilisation, p.209 for the idea of 'well-doing'. William Morris quote from 
'At a Picture Exhibition' in Art and Society Edited by Gary Zabel, (George's Hill, 1993), P.103 
193 Lethaby, p.156 
194 Gill, Art-Nonsense and Other Essays, p.316 
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theorists, 'making' meant handicraft. But it is not necessary to revisit the 'handicraft debate'; it is 
good enough in the context of 'art and everyday aesthetics' to understand the Arts and Crafts 
view of making as essentially one about makers controlling key elements of their work sufficient 
to influence the look and feel in use of their products. The point to make here is simply that a 
singular conception – 'making well' – is argued to support both an aesthetics of the fine arts and 
an everyday aesthetics of non-art objects. Work Theory supports this Arts and Crafts view as far 
as it goes. But additionally, Work Theory suggests how a divided notion of aesthetic interest can 
account for its art critical dimension (in relation to the authenticity of artistic choices to make an 
artwork at any rate) – that is summarily dismissed by Arts and Crafts – as well as its 
everydayness in terms of well-made goods and so on. If Gill's and Arts and Crafts' rhetoric of 
'art nonsense' has a value for philosophical aesthetics, it is that reminder of an everyday 
aesthetics sharing an idea of the aesthetic with making works of art. Concluding then, the Arts 
and Crafts theorists' idea of 'everyday aesthetics' tended to a singular view of aesthetic interest, 
typically around an idea of “thoughtful workmanship” (like Lethaby's)195. This is an inadequate 
account of human aesthetic interest, falsely restricting the theoretic and practical scope of 






                                                
195 Lethaby, p.213 





 Work Theory implies that aesthetic lives – lives guided by aesthetic interest – are led 
primarily by artists, designers and skilled workers, and by those with an understanding of their 
good work196. And aesthetic lives are important because they produce things societies value: 
works of art and objects of function that allow us to flourish. I want to test these related 
conclusions against similar claims made by Richard Sennett for 'the craftsman' (in its relation 
too to Hannah Arendt's idea of 'homo faber') and by Ellen Dissanayake for 'homo 
aestheticus'197. These claims address the different aspects of aesthetic interest argued by Work 
Theory, albeit without a precise correspondence – so, for example, Sennett's conception of the 
aesthetic (and socially valuable) life of 'the craftsman' maps directly to the idea of skilled 
workmanship, but also to aspects of artistic vision and good design.  
* 
 Arguing for a positive and socially significant idea of 'craftsmanship', Richard Sennett 
concludes “we can achieve a more humane material life, if only we better understand the 
                                                
196 We aesthetically experience nature too, but I refer back to Part 1, Section 1.1 for reasons to 
prioritise philosophical interest in the aesthetics of the made (and so by extension in the 
aesthetic lives of makers).  
197 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1998); Ellen 
Dissanayake, Homo Aestheticus: Where Art Comes From and Why (University of 
Washington Press, 1992); Richard Sennett, The Craftsman (Penguin Books, 2009) 
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making of things”198. Sennett aims to counter Hannah Arendt's concern about the 'human 
condition' under the control of technologically-driven work. Arendt refers to differences between 
the work of animal laborens and homo faber, so some preliminary definitions are required 
before examining her and Sennett's argument. 
 Arendt distinguishes animal laborens and homo faber as the labour of the body and work 
of the hands199. She also refers to homo faber as 'work' or 'making' more generally, further 
characterising it as having “definite and predictable beginnings and ends”; “this characteristic 
alone distinguishes it from all other human activities”200. There is an immediate point of dispute 
for Work Theory concerning good work having such 'beginnings and ends'. In terms of the self-
originating work of artists, it is characteristic at least of that work that it is not generally 
understood, either by artists or historians of art, as either definite or predictable in either its 
beginnings or ends. Rather, the reverse is considered true, that an artistic idea (an idea to 
produce a work of art) may come to mind unexpectedly, and that its delivery as a finished work 
introduces factors of design and workmanship that might alter the original artistic conception 
along the way. Perhaps it is reasonable to state design problems are effectively pre-set for 
designers, so that their work has an initial predictability, but again there is indefiniteness in how 
exactly a designer conceives the problem he has been broadly set. Only workmanship can be 
reasonably characterised along Arendt's lines, since the skilled worker does begin working with 
                                                
198 Sennett p.8 Sennett does talk explicitly of 'aesthetic lives' but there is a clear notion of 'the 
craftsman' producing with the best in mind that has affinities with Work Theory. 
199 Arendt, p.79 
200 Ibid, p.144. Arendt makes a tripartite distinction within all human life between 'labour' and 
'work', being discussed here, and also 'action', but this latter categorisation is not important at 
this juncture of the analysis. 
Work and the aesthetic  
 135 
a definite design to produce, but here too Arendt fails to acknowledge the uncertainty of 
workmanship which involves the human hand rather than automated machine production. That 
last point Work Theory recognises as the aesthetic interest of craftsmen in the finish of 
products. Similarly, Work Theory rejects Arendt's characterisation of 'work' or homo faber on 
that general ground that different aspects of good work necessarily engage aesthetic interest, 
which importantly introduces choice about what and how to make. This is a critical conclusion 
since amending the idea of homo faber in these terms has a direct bearing on Arendt's key 
conclusion about the moral consequences of 'work'.  
 It is Arendt's moral conclusion of the inherently 'destructive' character of homo faber that 
Work Theory's account of good work challenges. Given her characterisation of homo faber's 
'definiteness and predictability', Arendt goes on: “this great reliability of work is reflected in that 
the fabrication process, unlike action, is not irreversible: every thing produced by human hands 
can be destroyed by them, and no use object is so urgently needed in the life process that its 
maker cannot survive and afford its destruction”201. Work Theory's account of good work's 
internal relations to aesthetic interest challenges the idea of 'reliability', as noted above; 
additionally, the account challenges the notion that human making is not essentially motivated 
by needs but is 'destructive' (or at least offers no protection from the possibility of destructive 
acts). Arendt's argument is based on homo faber's supposed relationship to nature and to other 
people. So “homo faber is indeed lord and master .. because he has set himself up to master  
all of nature and because he is master of himself”202. The latter quality marks a difference with 
                                                
201 Ibid, p.144 
202 Ibid, p.144 
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the so-called 'man of action' who “remains in dependence upon his fellow men”203. Work Theory 
disputes the idea that good work necessarily embraces a 'mastery of nature'. In terms of making 
objects of everyday function, their design problems can be conceived in ways that take into 
account environmental effects, for example. The theoretic point then is that good work involves 
no a priori claim 'against nature' in terms of how we conceive artistic origination, design and 
workmanship. Indeed the good work of design and craft is premised on meeting live human 
needs to flourish in the world. This also suggests that the good worker too (not only Arendt's 
'man of action') remains aware of dependencies and relations between himself and others, 
especially as a designer giving full regard for all the human (as well as natural) factors that are 
proper to the conception of a design problem to make something of everyday functional value. 
This idea of the designer's good work challenges Arendt's idea of homo faber as simply the 
'master of himself'. For Work Theory, if this characterisation has some validity it is only as a part 
characterisation of the creative artist; for even here, Work Theory argues that authentic choices 
to make works of art connect artists to their times, to the world as it is and the people in it. In 
other words, artists and spectators have an aesthetic interest in the 'rightness' of artistic choices 
which, different and complex in each case, cannot be reduced to an interest in the mere 
'rightness' to choose to make anything.   
 Arendt's final telling characterisation of homo faber extends the idea of work's 
uncontrolled 'mastery' over nature and people to the point of its capacity to destroy: “alone with 
his image of the future product, homo faber is free to produce, and again facing alone the work 
of his hands, he is free to destroy”. It is at this point that Sennett argues that Arendt has failed to 
recognise the controlling aspects of animal laborens or the 'craftsman': animal laborans, 
                                                
203 Ibid, p.144 
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reconstructed as the 'craftsman', “might serve as homo faber's guide”, saving us from 
technological armageddons204. Sennett argues that there is something in the 'know-how' of 
making things of animal laborens – which he calls 'craftsmanship' – that guides technologies in 
positive life-affirming ways. For Work Theory Sennett's argument is both falsely constructed – 
the good work of the craftsman does not determine what is made nor conceive whole design 
problems in advance of applying a craft skill – and is unnecessary given that Arendt's homo 
faber falsely characterises 'work'. The second point related to Arendt's view of the 'freedom to 
destroy' has already been challenged here, particularly in terms of the good work of designers, 
which embraces the productive aim of creating products of use for people in their everyday 
lives205.  
 Turning to Sennet's reconstruction of the 'craftsman', Work Theory contends that the 
craftsman's good work comprises delivering designs where there is scope for the application of 
his skill to effect the finish of a product. On this understanding, the craftsman (that is, in terms of 
Work Theory), is the least likely 'good worker' to counter the destructive possibilities of homo 
faber, since it is a matter of indifference to him in delivering a design what is being made. 
Indeed then, Work Theory argues that it is only craftsmen that can deliver 'destructive products'. 
So Sennett appears to highlight precisely that aspect of good work – that he does after all call 
'know-how' rather than any knowledge challenging 'what' should be made – that supports rather 
                                                
204 Sennett, p.8 
205 Of course Arendt, writing at the height of the Cold War, was primarily concerned with the new 
destructive power of the atomic bomb. For Work Theory, this is a special case: a designer 
faced with brief to make a product that will kill clearly faces an overriding moral choice; it is 
not a moral element of a design problem then – like building in concerns about 
'environmental damage and sustainability' – that affects other designs.  
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than challenges Arendt's characterisation of homo faber's tendency to fabricated self-
destruction. For Work Theory, the kind of authentic choice of what to make belongs to the good 
work of artists and designers. To reiterate then: Sennett's reconstruction of the needs-based 
labour of animal laborans as 'craft' is not credible on two related grounds. First, the idea of craft 
as skilled workmanship is an aspect of good work, and does not resonate with any intuition 
about or idea of subsistence, needs-based labour like Arendt's animal laborans. Second, the 
good work of the craftsman does not supply any control over choices to make this or that, which 
are made by artists and designers; those 'workers' are most significant in contributing to 'a 
humane material life'206.   
 Work Theory concludes then that the idea of aesthetic lives can be explained in terms of 
the different internal relations that apply between good work and aesthetic interest: each relation 
directs us to varying types and degrees of choice in what humans make as good workers. 
Understanding the types of control over production these choices allow – to produce new works 
of art, to design functional objects that meet the needs of human flourishing, and delivering 
them in appealing ways – also counters an Arendtian conception of work. That counter-
argument and positive account of good work also makes an inflated general claim for the good 
work of 'craftsmanship', like Sennett's, redundant.  
 Given that Work Theory argues aesthetic lives are led across all aspects of good work, I 
now turn briefly to a possibly related universal notion linking work and the aesthetic, namely 
Ellen Dissanayake's 'homo aestheticus', before a final conclusion. 
                                                
206 It is worth noting too that Sennett's idea of 'craft' therefore follows a familiar problematic line 
– noted above in terms of 'craft theory' – of conflating aspects of design, art and 
workmanship under 'craftsmanship' so that important theoretic and practical distinctions in 
terms of aesthetic interest are lost.  
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* 
 Dissanayake argues that there is a basic behaviour, unique to humans, called 'making 
special', evidenced in all human playful and ritualistic behaviour that is “bracketed off from 
ordinary life”, including the “modern day arts acted out in demarcated areas such as galleries, 
theatres, concert halls” and so on207. The idea of an aesthetic interest across a range of human 
activities has a superficial resemblance with Work Theory. But equally, on quick examination, 
there are two key differences. Firstly, even if the idea of 'making special' indicates an aesthetic 
interest in work, it is not itself characterised by any divisions between different interests in the 
'rightness' of an artistic choice, or of a design solution, or of the finish of products. Secondly, 
relatedly, that singular aesthetic interest is also falsely limited to a certain kind of activity that is 
'bracketed off' from other making, excluding then making, for example, products of everyday 
use. If Work Theory is correct about the aesthetic interests that can be variously shown by 
makers and users in the design and delivery of everyday objects of function, then 
Dissanayake's 'bracketing' is not warranted. Of course, there may be a category of making 
indicated by 'making special'. But if this type of work engages aesthetic interest, it can still be 
explained in terms of design and workmanship. This seems evident in any case from 
Dissanayake's speculation that 'making special' began when “humans deliberately set out to 
make things special or extra-ordinary, perhaps for the purpose of influencing the outcome of 
important events that were perceived as uncertain and troubling, requiring action beyond simple 
                                                
207 Dissanayake, p.48 
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fight or flight, approach or avoidance”208. Work Theory simply explains this in terms of the 
aesthetic interest shown in designing and crafting ritualistic objects209.   
 Work Theory then recognises that 'making special' conveys an idea of making in certain 
circumstances, but still it can be explained in terms of good work and aesthetic interest. That is 
to say, 'making special' can be analysed in terms of the different aspects of good work. One 
significant consequence is that, unlike Dissanayake's account, Work Theory therefore makes no 
appeal to art's universality as a human activity. Humans may have a universal capacity for 
aesthetic experience, but it is an experience made live by good work, either as makers or users, 
not necessarily by art's 'bracketed' 'making special'210.  
* 
 In summary, Work Theory's idea of the aesthetic lives of good workers – artists, 
designers and skilled craftsmen – is not seriously challenged by some related but alternative 
ideas examined here. Arendt's conception of homo faber as essentially indifferent to what he 
makes omits the notion that aesthetic interests in the 'rightness' and 'fit' of products introduces 
non-destructive considerations as the norm in good work. But it was noted that craftsmanship, 
strictly speaking, only delivers products, and its sense of 'rightness' and 'fit' only challenges the 
'how' rather than the 'what' of making. Noting that, Sennett's reconstruction of craft work as 
offering an explanation of good work is not well-founded.  
                                                
208 Ibid, p.51 
209 Incidentally, it also supports a Collingwoodian argument that such activity is not proto-art but 
a form of 'magic'. In other words, for Work Theory this kind of 'making special' is not self-
originating art but a pre-conceived design problem of dealing with a 'troubling situation'. 
210 Of course there are other views of art, including Work Theory's in terms of self-originating 
choices to make works of art – my general point is aesthetic experiences can be engaged by 
design and workmanship problems.   
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 Work Theory concludes then that aesthetic lives require good work. Since aesthetic 
interest is engaged in good work by artists, designers and skilled craftsmen, aesthetic lives are 
not simply artistic ones. This seemingly simple and innocent conclusion does present one 
further significant set of consequences of Work Theory, suggesting firstly that the social 
organisation of making determines a society's scope for aesthetic experience among its 
population, so that, secondly, exactly what is produced and how is also affected. But this is 
where a theory of aesthetics encounters political and ethical considerations – a point to end on 
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